Libya Uranium Update

And to think that just over an hour ago, Andy Jackson, a/k/a the Flying Yangban, and I were discussing (over fried bean curd and beef noodle soup) what a slow news week it’s been regarding North Korea (thanks to Andy for his intelligent, engaging presence over lunch; I hope the Lady Yangban didn’t get too hungry).

In the wake of reports that Libya was found in possession of what U.S. officials believe to be North Korean uranium, the New York Times now reports that the Bush Administration has seriously ramped up its pressure on China to force Kim Jong Il to deal in good faith, and strongly implies (as I suggested here several months ago) that the administration will give the talks one last chance before pursuing something a little less pointless than the next lie. Bush’s message was carried directly to Hu Jin Tao himself by two officials of the National Security Council.

According to the Times article, the new revelations about North Korean uranium found in Libyan possession has “energized” hard-liners, ie., those who think that North Korean uranium flowing into the international market is a big deal requiring urgent action not involving a large transfer of cash. It also responds to a potential inconsistency raised by last week’s Washington Post coverage–the possibility that Pakistan may have been the more immediate source. The administration responds this way:

American and Asian intelligence officials say it is unclear whether North Korea knew that Libya was the ultimate destination for the chemical, called uranium hexafluoride. One senior official with access to the intelligence data said it was possible that the North Koreans only knew that it was transferring the fuel to members of Dr. Khan’s network. “We don’t know how much they produced, or if it was shipped elsewhere,” the official said. “It’s one of the questions we have to get answered.”

Which is another way of saying “same difference,” as I did last week, given the extensive collaboration between the North Korean and Pakistani nuclear programs. North Korea may have thought it was simply selling to the A.Q. Khan network, neither knowing nor caring what the ultimate destination was, but knowing full well that it was likely to include terrorists. So what, then? A willfully reckless transfer of nuclear material to a terrorist is no less dangerous than an intentional one. Intent isn’t the issue. Prevention is.

As we learned recently, China’s influence over North Korea is not insignificant, but thus far, yanking the drawstring around Kim Jong Il’s bag of loose pixie dust has not been among China’s top priorities. China did manage to extract a promise from the Bush Administration not to make provocative public statements, which may explain why Bush’s SOTU statements about North Korea were “wimpy,” as I characterized them here. Somewhere in the alternate universe of diplomatic metaphor, another shoe is dropping.