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The Death of an Alliance, Part VII

What kind of diplomatic response could the United States possibly offer to Roh Moo-Hyun’s astonishing announcement that South Korea will now seek to “balance” its long-time protector against the lean, hungry barbarians that surround it? It’s doubtful that any U.S. official could offer a response he’d want printed–particularly in the context of another deadlocked round of cost-sharing negotiations. That might explain why Washington let the Commanding General of the Eighth U.S. Army, Lieutenant General Charles Campbell, do the talking today:

At an urgently called press conference, General Campbell said the U.S. military must reduce spending because the amount Seoul has agreed to pay is not enough to support Korean workers at U.S. bases. There are about 10,000 Korean civilians employed by the U.S. Forces Korea that are affected by cost-sharing contributions, the forces said. Support contracts range from construction to cleaning duties. . . . ”

“Throughout the course of the negotiations, U.S. government officials discussed with [Republic of Korea] officials the potential impact of funding shortfalls,” General Campbell said. “The measures that we expect to implement could include cutting up to 1,000 civilian jobs and reducing our support contracts by as much as 20 percent over the next two years. We notified the Korean Employees Union yesterday of the plan to cut jobs.”

The union got a phone call first. The Blue House didn’t. As an indicator of the state of relations between two “allies,” it’s hard to send a clearer signal than that. Incidentally, expect those support contracts to have a far greater effect on the Korean economy than the layoffs.

The papers alternatively describe LTG Campbell as the USFK commander–which he isn’t–and as the USFK Chief of Staff–which is like describing Paul McCartney as the guy who started “Wings.” Campbell is in fact the commander of the Eighth U.S. Army, which is the main Army component of USFK. Having prepared dozens of memos for EUSA and USFK commanders to sign (and on very rare occasions, read), the difference (mostly) sticks with me.

In any event, the announcement is likely to snap that nasty deadlock in the cost-sharing talks:

South Korean contributions to the USFK have risen over the past four years. Seoul paid $444 million in 2001, and the amount grew to $472 million in 2002, $557 million in 2003 and $622 million in 2004. But the amount is now expected to fall by about 9 percent this year.

Why, can you picture the temerity of it? Those Yankees, demanding that we help pay for our own defense? One concern I do have is that the cuts include reductions of pre-positioned equipment stocks, which to me is one of the best things to leave behind to preserve our flexibility to intervene, should we choose to do so. Perhaps those particular stocks exceed our needs, or are more urgently needed elsewhere. Or perhaps we’ve decided that floating stocks are even more flexible. The Chosun Ilbo lets its concerns be known:

Talking about stores of ammunition, tanks and armored vehicles pre-positioned on the Korean Peninsula for an emergency, Campbell said it would become necessary “to alter the amount and composition of combat equipment currently planned for our pre-positioned program. We are analyzing additional measures we may be forced to take to meet our operations and readiness requirement.” This could directly affect the country’s defence capability in an emergency.

Meanwhile, as the Korean government fumbles around for words of reaction, the Korean General Schedule (KGS) employees’ union is wasting no time in stating how it will react:

The union said it would take legal steps to protect jobs. Nam Hyo-shin, senior official of the union, said, “We will immediately bring the case to the National Labor Relations Commission.”

Yes, I can see it now. The NLRC rules against the USFK and orders it not to lay off the workers. The USFK actually complies, and adds it to the ROK’s “cost-sharing” bill. The USFK makes up for the shortfall by cutting infantry, armor, and missile defense. One thing leads to another, and eventually, 25,000 Korean civilian employees are all fighting over the kickbacks from twelve embassy guards’ apartment leases.

On a related note, a reliable source inside the USFK recently sent me this lovely example of one KGS employee joining the hand-biting fun over at onecorea.org:

ì â‚¬ 는미êµ° ë¶â‚¬Ã«Å’ۓ– ì¢â€¦Ã¬â€š¬Ã­â€¢ËœÃ«Å ” 한국 군무원 ì¢â€¦Ã¬â€š¬Ã¬Å¾Ã¬Å¾â€¦Ã«â€¹Ë†Ã«â€¹¤ 물ë¡  ì Å“직장이ê³  ì›”ê¸â€°Ã¬â€ž ë°â€ºÃ¬â€¢â€ž ê°â‚¬Ã¬¡±Ã¬Æ’Ãª³â€žÃ«¥¼ 이어ê°â‚¬Ã¬§â‚¬Ã«§Å’ 왜미군놈들이철수해야하냐ë©´ 우리국민들ìâ€ž 식민ì§â‚¬Ã«¡Å“ 생각합니다 이른ë°” ê°â‚¬Ã¬§â‚¬Ãª³  놓다는소리죠 샹 산입얐 거미ì¤â€žÃ¬¹ËœÃª² Ã¬Å µÃ«â€¹Ë†Ãª¹Å’ 짤리는 한이있어ëâ€ž 미êµ° ê°Å“쇄이들ìâ‚¬ 철수ì–‘키고홈해야í•œ다ê³  ì Ë†Ã¬â€¹¤Ã­â€¢ËœÃª²Å’ 생각이듭니다 상사ê°â‚¬ 미군인데 이ê±´ 노예ë¶â‚¬Ã«¦¬Ã«Å ” ê²Æ’ê³¼ 똑ê°â„¢Ã¬â€¢â€žÃ¬Å¡” 이른ë°” ê°â„¢Ã¬´Ã­â€¢´Ã¬â€¢¼Ã­â€¢ËœÃ«Å ” 일ëâ€ž 3디얅ì¢â€¦Ãª°â„¢Ã¬â‚¬Ãª±° 위햘하고 더럽ê³  힘든거는 한국 사람시키ê³  안그런거는 미국놈시키ê³  얐이 씨ë°Å“ 미국ìâ‚¬ 무너져야합니다
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2005ë…„ìâ‚¬ 주í•œ미군ìâ€ž í•œë§Ë†Ã«¦¬Ã«â€ž 남ê¹â‚¬Ã¬–†ì´ 철수시키는 í•´…
먼ì â‚¬ ë…„ì´Ë†Ã¬– 주í•œ미군들얐ê²Å’ 스스ë¡Å“ 나ê°â‚¬Ã«¼Ãª³  경고하ê³ , 스스ë¡Å“ 안나ê°â‚¬Ã«©´ 모두 시체를 ë§Å’들어ì„œ라ëâ€ž ê¼­ 내몰아야 한다.
우리는 ë°ËœÃ«“œì‹œ 승리í•œ다. 미군철수 이후 자주/통일조êµ­ 건설ìâ€ž 위í•´ 2005ë…„ 자주성ì â€žÃ¬– 모ë“  ê²Æ’ìâ€ž ë°”ì¹ËœÃ¬Å¾!
투쟁!!!
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매향리사ê±´, í•œê°â€¢ ëâ€¦Ãª·¹Ã«¬¼ 방ë¥ËœÃ¬â€š¬Ãª±´, 얬ì¤â€˜Ã¬Æ’ 장ê°â€˜Ã¬°¨ 사ê±´…..미국인들이 ì â‚¬Ã¬§â‚¬Ã«¥¸ ë§Å’행들ìâ‚¬ 끝이 얆습니다. 과ì–° 그들ìËœ ë§Å’í–‰ìâ‚¬ 언ì Å“ê¹Å’ì§â‚¬ ê³â€žÃ¬â€ Ã«ËœÃ«Å ” 걸ê¹Å’ìš”?
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ì•„…. 아직ëâ€ž 냉ì â€žÃ¬£¼Ã¬ËœÃ¬Ëœ ì°Å’꺼기인 주í•œ미êµ°.. 어ì„œ 꺼ì â‚¬Ã«¼…
주í•œ미군철수ë§Å’이 통일ìâ€ž 위한 ë°â€˜Ãª±°Ã«¦â€žÃ¬´Ã«©°.. 우리나라ìËœ 경ì Å“ê°â‚¬ 활성í™”ëËœÃ«Å ”
ì§â‚¬Ã«¦â€žÃª¸¸Ã¬´Ã«â€¹¤..
주í•œ미군ìâ‚¬ ì¤â€˜Ãªµ­Ã«´â€°Ã¬â€¡â€žÃ¬â„¢â‚¬ 통일ìâ€ž ë§â€°Ãª¸°Ã¬Å“„í•œ 하나ìËœ 장애물일뿐이다.
주í•œ미군ìËœ 군사력ë•Œ문얐 언ì Å“나 긴장하ê³  북í•œ과ìËœ ë¶Ë†Ã¬â€¢Ë†Ãª°Ã¬â€ž
ì¢â€¦Ã¬â€¹Ã¬â€¹Å“키ì§â‚¬ 못í•œ다… 어ì„œ 꺼ì â‚¬Ã«¼ 주í•œ미êµ°..

Just a partial translation for you non-Korean speakers:

I am a korean employee at a U.S. Army base. This is my work place, I got a salary from them and my family live on that money. But the reason that the US army should withdraw is that they think of our people as a colony [poor grammar in original].
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And 2005 is finally the year when we will drive the Yankee animals from our shores. If they will not go willingly, we will send them all home as corpses! Our victory is certain! After the U.S. Army withdrawal, we will build an independent and united country–let us devote ourselves in 2005 to the crusade for independence. Resist!!!
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MaeHyangRi, poison discharge in Han River, Korean middle school girls hit by armored vehicle, the Americans’ acts of brutality are [yada yada yada].
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Ah…. The leftover of the Cold War, U.S. Army in Korea, get out soon.
The withdrawal of the U.S. Army is the foundation of Korean unification and the shortcut to the Korean economy’s recovery.
The purpose of the U.S. Army is for blocking China and blocking Korean unification.
Because of the U.S. forces, Korea is always tense and can’t ease North Korea’s anxiety.
Get out of Korea soon, U.S. Army!

Participation in this particular chat room requires registration with a Korean ID number and payment of a subscription fee. So anyone happening across KGS-10 Ms. Kim Hui-Yon, be sure to politely thank her for her patriotism and her patience as we withdraw. Gently remind her that there will be ample time to test all of those theories about unification, economic recovery, blocking China, and learning the meaning of the word “brutality.”

Of course, one person’s view (or two) isn’t evidence that most Koreans or KGS employees share it (you want empirical evidence, you say?). Yet we will soon be subjected to a bombardment of stories about the loss of livelihoods these cuts will cause, and sad as that may be for some, American taxpayer funds must ultimately be devoted to protecting American interests. We don’t advance our interests, win friends, or help Korea learn responsible self-government by being its iron rice bowl. It’s possible that in at least some ways, the onecorea.net crowd is right, albeit for all the wrong reasons.

UPDATE: Seoul appears to have no idea how to react to this. The Chosun Ilbo is doing its best to sow panic, probably with the bi-election in mind. I happen to think the Chosun Ilbo has it right that the alliance is dissolving, but I don’t think that necessarily means that their assessment is sincere. Denial is a powerful force when it comes to Korea’s view of its relationship with America, and the Chosun has an interest in raising the stakes for Roh’s diplomatic bumbling.

Here are links to–

  • Part I, describing the universal unpopularity of the South Korean government in Congress;
  • Part II, Thomas Barnett and the Asian Wall Street Journal reconsider the alliance;
  • Part III, the reconsideration spreads to the left-of-center Brookings Institution;
  • Part III 1/2, Donald Rumsfeld says that Korea must learn to defend itself;
  • Part IV, the GNP leader’s alarm at the unpopularity of Korean government in Washington;
  • Part V, the failure of a symbolic congressional resolution commemorating the alliance; and
  • Part VI, the Korean government’s quixotic declaration of neutrality toward the nation on which it depends for its defense.

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