The Mongolian Channel
“I really believe that Mongolia’s experience is very much transferable to North Korea, and we can become a kind of transition consultant to them,” Tsakhiagiyn Elbegdorj, Mongolia’s prime minister, said in a recent interview. The North Koreans “listen to us because we’re not Western people trying to teach them [the Western] way of life. We are like them, and through workshops and meetings we are simply sharing our knowledge, our experience with them.”
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Over the past two years, Mongolia and North Korea have exchanged several high-level delegations, and in August North Korea reopened its embassy in Ulaan Baatar five years after it closed because of what Pyongyang termed financial reasons.
But most of the cooperation is being channeled through “back-door diplomacy,” said Baabar, an adviser to Elbegdorj and a founder of the Northeast Asia Association, an organization committed to improving Mongolia’s ties with North Korea. Baabar, who like many Mongolians uses only one name, says he has visited North Korea more than 30 times in the past few years.
“Officially, the North Koreans say they have no interest, but unofficially there is great curiosity at how our step-by-step movement to the market system worked,” he said. “They ask us a lot of questions and want to find ways to make money. Now, there is a new black market in Pyongyang [and] that means at least they’re learning how a market works.”
I have some gentle advice for the Globe’s readers about this new exotic new attraction: her features may be familiar, but she’s a dude.
That sudden reestablishment of relations? It resulted from the increasing numbers of North Koreans who were fleeing into Mongolia, and Pyongyang’s determination to avoid the establishment of refugee camps there. Either the Globe didn’t know that, or else it simply left out a key fact that could have gotten in the way of its theory.
What’s not missing in our negotiations with North Korea is yet another way to talk to them or another vain argument that their incomparably awful system can survive in the presence of comparison (which openness inevitably invites). What’s missing is the sense that Pyongyang will suffer real consequences if it doesn’t negotiate in good faith. If the end result were openness, transparency, disarmament, and freedom, I’d give strong consideration to a “soft landing” for North Korea. This isn’t it. This is another line of credit for the few. And the men on the reviewing stand in Pyongyang don’t want a soft landing for the very reason that they have no undue concern about a hard landing.
Mongolia, of course, could provide this missing ingredient if it were to start accepting significant numbers of North Korean refugees and U.S. funding to assist, feed, and educate them. Inevitably, large groups of refugees would talk to reporters, worship openly, and even form political parties and factions. This, in turn, would attract more disaffected North Koreans, both physically and ideologically. Yes, these refugees would have to cross a large swath of China, but given that they’re already going all the way to Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand, it’s not impossible. Such a plan would take guts from the U.S. and Mongolian governments, and Russian support would be very helpful (Russia has a shrinking population in Siberia and boundary disputes of its own with China). Without firing a shot, Mongolia could give both China and North Korea the missing incentives for honest diplomacy and reform.
HT: Publius, who has a lot of great stuff today.