North Korea Signs Preliminary Statement; Agrees to Give Up Nuclear Programs

Well, I must say that I didn’t expect this:

BEIJING, China (CNN) — Nearly three years after ordering U.N. nuclear inspectors out of the country, North Korea Monday agreed to give up its entire nuclear program, including weapons, a joint statement from six-party nuclear arms talks in Beijing said.”

This is the most important result since the six-party talks started more than two years ago,” said Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei, Beijing’s envoy, in a report from The Associated Press. In exchange, the United States, China, Japan, Russia and South Korea have “stated their willingness” to provide energy assistance to North Korea, as well as promote economic cooperation.”

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) committed to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs and returning at an early date to the treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons (NPT) and to IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) safeguards,” the statement said.

Full Text of Agreed Statement, With Comments

Let’s have a look at the statement the six diplomats signed:

1) The six parties unanimously reaffirmed that the goal of the six-party talks is the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner.

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) committed to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs and returning at an early date to the treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons (NPT) and to IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) safeguards.

This means we’ll be depending on the thoroughness and aggressiveness of the IAEA inspectors, particularly when it comes to uncovering North Korea’s long-denied but hardly deniable uranium program. By the way, what about that uranium program?

The United States affirmed that it has no nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula and has no intention to attack or invade the DPRK with nuclear or conventional weapons. The ROK (South Korea) reaffirmed its commitment not to receive or deploy nuclear weapons in accordance with the 1992 joint declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, while affirming that there exist no nuclear weapons within its territory. The 1992 joint declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula should be observed and implemented.

This was a red herring issue raised by the North when talks first resumed in July. Whatev.

The DPRK stated that it has the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The other parties expressed their respect and agreed to discuss at an appropriate time the subject of the provision of light-water reactor to the DPRK.

Sure. How about never? Is never good for you? I don’t see “an appropriate time” coming before the IAEA certifies North Korea as being in full compliance with the safeguards regime.

2) The six parties undertook, in their relations, to abide by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and recognized norms of international relations. The DPRK and the United States undertook to respect each other’s sovereignty, exist peacefully together and take steps to normalize their relations subject to their respective bilateral policies. The DPRK and Japan undertook to take steps to normalize their relations in accordance with the (2002) Pyongyang Declaration, on the basis of the settlement of unfortunate past and the outstanding issues of concern.

We’ve given up on our threats of blockades, and possibly more, depending on whether you have a Kim Il Sung badge on your lapel. For example, is enforcement of the Proliferation Security Initiative consistent with “respect for each other’s sovereignty?” Will “recognized norms of international relations” allow–

. . . such actions as may be necessary to increase the availability of information inside North Korea by increasing the availability of sources of information not controlled by the Government of North Korea, including sources such as radios capable of receiving broadcasting from outside North Korea . . .

as required by the still-unfunded Section 104 of the North Korean Human Rights Act? Don’t bet on it.

“Subject to their respective bilateral policies” may have been intended by the United States to save some room to maneuver on human rights. Or not. Nobody knows, because it’s hopelessly vague. This will simply be a matter of different presidential administrations and whether they want to normalize relations enough to ignore human rights.

3) The six parties undertook to promote economic cooperation in the fields of energy, trade and investment, bilaterally and/or multilaterally. China, Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK), Russia and the U.S. stated their willingness to provide energy assistance to the DPRK. The ROK reaffirmed its proposal of July 12, 2005, concerning the provision of 2 million kilowatts of electric power to the DPRK.

4) Committed to joint efforts for lasting peace and stability in northeast Asia. The directly related parties will negotiate a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula at an appropriate separate forum. The six parties agreed to explore ways and means for promoting security cooperation in northeast Asia.

Will this mean conventional disarmament along the DMZ? Or just more photo ops for Chung Dong-Young?

5) The six parties agreed to take coordinated steps to implement the aforementioned consensus in a phased manner in line with the principle of “commitment for commitment, action for action.”

Aha! The elusive thing known as “reciprocity.” North Korean cheating or recalcitrance to cooperate will mean that the United States and Japan are released from their obligations.

6) The six parties agreed to hold the fifth round of the six party talks in Beijing in early November 2005 at a date to be determined through consultations.”

Specifics. Details. Lurking devils. Don’t forget that this is just the preliminary statement that we tried to agree on for the first round of talks, as a starting point for subsequent rounds. You could drive a mechanized battalion through the loopholes in this thing, and vagueness in dealing with North Korea has gotten us into trouble before. Take some comfort from the fact that there will be subsequent rounds at which we’ll eventually need to see whether North Korea will “come to Jesus” on uranium and inspections. And this is already a superior product to the Agreed Framework, although that’s setting a low bar.

Whether you’re exuberant or despondent about this, your reaction is probably premature, although everyone is entitled to be despondent about the fact that we may not know much else until November. As for the question that concerns me the most–whether this is really a deal with the devil on human rights–I don’t know the answer to that yet. We’ll just have to watch the signals coming from Washington: whether Congress appropriates the funds it authorized for the radios; whether the United States goes along with the North’s demands for “development aid” instead of food; and whether Jay Lefkowitz will continue to challenge the regime’s methods of internal control.

Update 1: “No intention to attack or invade.” Anything else that was not in the text? The Chosun Ilbo reports this:

The U.S. in turn offered reassurances that it had “no intention to attack or invade the DPRK with nuclear or conventional weapons.

The Bush Administration has been saying exactly that for years now, so this isn’t news. What is mildly interesting is that the South Koreans are having trouble containing their glee: “North Korea also made a big decision, but they got everything they wanted from the United States. The Chosun Ilbo also reports that the South Korean government is already taking credit for this, although the rest of this is mostly junk analysis.

Update 2: A Chuseok Hangover, Perhaps? Three and a half hours after I read the story I first linked above, here’s what the Joongang Ilbo shows:

This is known as “news at a leisurely pace.” In fairness, the Korean version carries the story.

Update 3: Curb Your Enthusiasm. The New York Times’s Joseph Kahn does a pretty good job with the story:

The agreement is a preliminary one that would require future rounds of negotiations to flesh out, as it does not address a number of issues, like timing and implementation, that are likely to prove highly contentious. China announced that the six nations participating in the talks would reconvene in November to continue ironing out the details. . . . “The problem is not yet solved but we hope it can be solved eventually through this agreement,” said Christopher Hill, the chief American negotiator. “We have to take the momentum of this agreement and see that it is implemented.”

It also mentions the only added fact of significance to have occurred within two or three days of this very preliminary breakthrough:

The Bush administration had said it was prepared to take tougher measures, including freezing North Korean assets abroad and pushing for international sanctions, if the latest round of talks collapsed.

Speaking of which, this is pretty bad news for Iran. But let’s think positive for a moment:

“This is first time they have committed to completely dismantle their weapons in an international agreement,” Mr. Hill said. “They cannot just stall and pretend it does not exist. I think they have gotten the message.”

Wanna bet? I mean, these people can pretend that Kim Jong Il was born under the Star of Bethlehem and a double rainbow on Paektu-san. The fact is, there is a lot more ferocious haggling ahead, and things are likely to break down over important details like, “Take me to your centrifuges.” The fact that the latter question hasn’t been addressed yet suggests that this administration made a deliberate decision to delay confronting it. Which means that there could be plenty of pretending for everyone here.

Update 4: Nobel Endeavor. More claims of credit, including the fairly depressing fact that both Koreas expect deliveries of heavy oil, presumably promptly and from the United States. Perhaps the Nobel Committee will simply agree to let Kim Jong Il have his own stockpile of prizes, contingent on him only selling one per year. Technically speaking, that would “advance the cause of peace” by the Committee’s definition.

Update 5: Heh. Oranckay has a quibble with CNN’s translation. In related news, OFK links Oranckay without using the word “Trotskyite” (just joshing). There’s an astonishing degree of ideological diversity behind the view that this agreed statement, by itself, means very little.

Update 6: The IAEA Reacts; More Diversity Among Skeptics. The IAEA, which will be in charge of inspections and certification of compliance with the safeguards regime, wants to put inspectors back in as soon as possible. “The earlier we go back, the better.”

Chris Hill wants the North Koreans to demonstrate their good faith by shutting down the plutonium reactor at Yongbyon: “The time to turn it off would be about now. . . .”

The BBC also agrees that inspections could present “the most formidable obstacle” when the issue is raised, and adds these interesting facts:

Correspondents say the US was on the verge of walking out of the talks and heading home – a fact that may have been the clincher which forced North Korea to back down. In Monday’s statement, the North “promised to drop all nuclear weapons and current nuclear programmes, and to get back to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as soon as possible”. This latter detail is crucial, as it will allow United Nations inspectors to return to the North’s nuclear sites.

Oddly enough, the BBC actually got the story about right. This analysis by correspondent Charles Scanlon is well worth reading in its entirety:

Mr Hill came to the negotiations this summer with new tactics – to show more flexibility and engage the North Koreans directly. But he only managed to reach the current agreement by postponing discussions on the most contentious disputes. . . .

Monday’s agreed statement merely said [the light-water reactor] issue would be discussed again “at an appropriate time”, which looks like a recipe for further deadlock in the future. . . .

North Korea continues to deny American allegations that it is running a second, secret uranium enrichment programme in addition to its well known plutonium plant at Yongbyon. There is also no agreement on sequencing–who is to make the first move–and this could be another key stumbling block. And the fraught question of verification–North Korea is one of the world’s most closed and secretive nations–has also not been addressed.

What this suggests is that the United States still really doesn’t expect an agreement at all, and doesn’t want to be the first country to walk out and take the blame. But the BBC reporting, unlike that I’ve seen in the Korean papers so far, picks up on just how little progress we’ve made toward the really contentious issues here.

Update 7: President Bush Reacts.

They have said — in principle — that they will abandon their weapons programs,” Bush said. “And what we have said is, ‘Great. That’s a wonderful step forward.’ But now we’ve got to verify whether that happens.” “The question is, over time will all parties adhere to the agreement,” Bush said. . . . “Part of the way forward is for the North Koreans to understand that we’re serious about this and that we expect there to be a verifiable process,” the president said after a meeting of his Homeland Security Council.