The Death of an Alliance, Part 45: An October Surprise?
Jodi at The Asia Pages appears to be the recipient of some inside information that a dramatic reduction of the U.S.-Korean military welfare state alliance will be announced this fall, which coincides high-level security consultations scheduled for October. According to Jodi’s source, the USFK will not only announce the withdrawal of its ground forces, but most of their equipment. Deep cuts in its air and naval contingents are also likely. A much-reduced USFK would remain under a different name. Jodi’s source — putting two and two together, you get the impression that he’s U.S. military or intel — speculates this will set off a panic in some financial and military circles of South Korean society.
I don’t know enough to vouch for any of the details, but the overall theory seems plausible enough. Read, then wait and see.
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Update: The wait was not as long as long as I had expected. Here is USFK Commanding General Burwell B. Bell, speaking to the Stars and Stripes:
The top U.S. military commander on the peninsula said U.S. and South Korean officials hope to have a “road map” toward independent military commands here completed by October.
U.S. Army Gen. B.B. Bell, who heads the Combined Forces, U.S. Forces Korea and United Nations commands, said he hopes to have a macro-level road map approved at an October security consultative meeting in Washington, D.C.
“So we’re conducting a range of meetings “¦ in hopes of laying out these road maps,” he said in an interview with Stars and Stripes last week. “I don’t know if we’ll make it “¦ but we’re working on it.
The difficulty is neither drafting a plan nor saying that the nations have agreed to a deadline for setting up independent commands, Bell said. Rather, what’s more difficult, he said, is enacting the plan and meeting the deadline.
I see three ways to translate that: Either both sides have agreed on everything (which would be unprecedented), we’ve agreed with the Roh Administration but not the adults who actually run the government and defend Korea, or we already know what we’re going to do, and the only questions are (a) whether we can pack fast enough, and (b) whether the Koreans can stop us.
He told the Korean National Assembly’s Security Forum on July 13 that officials are considering creating two independent commands that would take advantage of U.S. air and naval powers but place U.S. Forces Korea in a supporting role.
Translation: We’re pulling out our ground forces.
Asked whether the goal of restructuring implied fewer ground soldiers — or additional Air Force or Navy assets on the peninsula — Bell said, “Not at all. We’re not anywhere near that kind of level of fidelity.
Translation: “So we’re pulling out our ground forces?” “I didn’t exactly say that.”
He said his emphasis in the speech on air and naval strengths reflected the reality of U.S. forces on the peninsula, that “quite frankly, today, our most competent, immediate capability is air and naval.
He said South Korea’s army has more than 500,000 active troops; North Korea’s, 600,000 to 700,000.
“The American Army in Korea, what is it? Ten thousand. “¦ The total number of U.S. ground forces in this theater is a little speck compared to the big armies that are facing each other,” Bell said.
I think he’s underestimated the number just a bit. It’s probably closer to 15,000 or 20,000 at the moment. But key to this analysis is that the Pentagon won’t put U.S. soldiers under foreign command.
He said that realistically, U.S. forces “have today an air- and naval-centric capability. It’s very powerful, it is very good, it’s very reliable and it is capable of “¦ bringing enormous military power to bear very quickly.
Translation: You have six months to teach your officers how to call in air strikes.
A key question, he said, is determining how U.S. forces can support an independent South Korean command that would “bear the principal war-fighting burden.
“We’re not even close to defining all that,” he said.
Translation: All I know is that we’re drawing ourselves a road map to Fort Hood. The rest is your problem.
In the Security Forum speech, Bell also stressed the need for a modern air-to-ground training range. He said that lacking such a range in South Korea, he’d “be forced to pursue other approaches” to train U.S. crews.
Asked whether “other approaches” meant moving Air Force crews out of South Korea either temporarily or permanently, Bell declined to provide specifics.
A range requires electronic devices to rate aircrews, Bell said. “You’re not just looking for a splash of water or a big field of dirt somewhere. You’re looking “¦ to score the capabilities of these aircrews.
Bell said officials believed they’d have that type of range soon after South Korea closed the Kooni Range Complex in August 2005. He said he thought it appropriate to remind the National Assembly of this and to emphasize how important he considers it.
“One thing is for sure,” Bell said. “We are not going to allow American aircrews to go into a war, or to propose that they can deter a war, unless they’re trained and ready.
“If I can’t get access to an air-to-ground range, I’m going to have to do something.
Translate that on your own. And here is one prediction I will make with great confidence: the U.S. military will not leave troops deployed in a high-risk foreign position without close-air support.
“Obviously I’m not too worried about Taepodongs landing around here,” he said. “I’m worried about short-range missiles “¦ Scud and Nodong missiles that are built for theater deployment.
Bell said a salvo of such missiles were fired and “all appeared to work pretty well. “¦ We’ve now seen an expression of their readiness to be able to shoot those missiles relatively accurately, at night, in quick succession, effectively.
“That signals that we ought to be able to do something about that, at least in a defensive construct. If there was an argument for a more capable missile defense, they made it very effectively for us. “¦ Until there’s a peace treaty on this peninsula, I think we should be able to defend ourselves against them.
Translation: Some people here really need to pull their heads out of their asses.
What I just have to ask myself is this: how exactly does it work, having U.S. forces stationed in Korea but under a completely separate command from the host-nation forces? What, exactly, is the point of that? Exactly.