The Death of an Alliance, Part 50: Alternative Realities and Real Alternatives

I suppose everyone is entitled a theory on why Kim Jong Il decided to launch a round of missiles on July 4th, thereby drawing the wrong kind of attention from the U.N. Security Council, Japan, China, and the U.S. Treasury Department. This blog has been lukewarm on the conventional “extortion” theory, and has recently hosted discussions of the Strategic Disengagement Theory, the “Barrel of a Gun” Theory, The Loyalty Test Theory, and most recently, the Robert Kaplan Theory. All of these theories — which aren’t all mutually exclusive — share the single premise that the missile tests have a primarily domestic political explanation. After all, the alternative doesn’t make a lot of sense. That’s why I won’t be too harsh on Roh Moo Hyun, who appears to be saying the same thing:

I think the missile test was aimed at achieving political purposes …

The universal reaction of disbelief is more attributable to this part:

… rather than posing military threats,” Roh said.

[….]

The July tests were most likely politically motivated, with the largest projectile “too meager” to reach the United States but “too big” to be directed at South Korea, local media Friday quoted him as saying in Helsinki.

[….]

“However, there are many news media that regard the missile test as a real military threat instead of a political move, and this makes the issue more difficult to resolve.”

[….]

Asked about the possibility of further actions by the North, Roh said talking about hypothetical situations “will only make many people worried.”

“It could also harm inter-Korean relations, so it’s very difficult for me to answer that question,” he said.

Prime Minister Han Myeong-Sook actually offered a justification for the tests:

“With regard to the missile test, they were not threatening to start a war or to use force, they just want to get something out of the US through six-party talks. It was a way of addressing the negotiations and creating a more favourable environment for them,” Han told the paper.

And it’s no stretch to guess that Ms. Han expects us to give them that something. Incidentally, she’s propounding what sounds like the extortion theory, meaning that (apparently) unlike her President, she thinks that the tests were for external consumption. The incoherence only gets worse. Here’s the Chosun Ilbo version of Roh’s comments:

“One of the reasons why the North Korean missile issue is becoming more difficult to deal with is that the majority of the media” in South Korea, the U.S. and Japan “regard them as real military threats, not as a tool for political purposes,” the president told a Finnish reporter. “I don’t think of them as military threats.

And this:

The president also said Seoul sees “no signs or evidence that North Korea will carry out a nuclear test or if so, when. Asked if it is possible that North Korea will carry out a nuclear test, Roh said, “There is no evidence to support that possibility and people have offered only assumptions that the North could do it. Senior government officials in charge of security, however, have said otherwise. Asked about news that cables were spotted in Gilju, North Hamgyeong Province, National Intelligence Service Director Kim Seung-kyu told the National Assembly’s Intelligence Committee, “It is unclear if the objects are directly related to preparations for a nuclear test” but “North Korea could conduct a nuclear test at any time if leader Kim Jong-il makes the decision. Unification Minister Lee Jong-seok told the National Assembly on Aug. 24, “The possibility that North Korea will conduct a nuclear test cannot be ruled out” and, “North Korea declared last year that it has nuclear arms, and it appears that there is a logical possibility that the test may occur.

I officially have absolutely no idea what this administration’s position on North Korea’s nuclear capability even is. I challenge anyone to make something coherent of that: “Sure, they’re a declared nuclear power and could probably do a nuclear test at any time, but you’re all just making unfounded assumptions that they might do one, and by the way, stop talking about the entire subject because you’re scaring people. They’re not really trying to ‘threaten’ anyone, they’re just doing scary things to ‘get something out of’ you. So pay up..”

It’s just too irrational and inconsistent to fathom. Such amateurishness would get most city councils recalled, except that here, we’re talking about deterring an impulsive, nuclear-armed tyrant from threatening the world’s largest, third-largest, and 12th-largest economies. Statements like these have eviscerated the alliance’s power of peaceful diplomatic and military deterrence. They make war more likely. As things stand now, if war does come, our soldiers will be among the first to die.

Obviously, I don’t see much good coming from a military alliance with a government like this. If one of my Army friends picked up a habit and moved in next door to a crackhouse in the South Bronx, he’d still be my friend, but I sure as hell wouldn’t send my kids over to spend the summer there. My friend could say that his crack-dealing friends next door didn’t intend to hit the neighbors with their gunplay, and it might be even true, but their true motives — enforcing gang discipline, protecting turf, marksmanship improvement, whatever — would be little consolation to the bereaved loved ones of dead bystanders. And to extend the analogy a bit further, if someone points a gun at me and pulls the trigger, I sure as hell wouldn’t deny the existence of a threat just because his gun jammed.

Is South Korea the sort of place where we want to tie tens of thousands of our soldiers in an inextricable commitment … particularly one that precludes us from packing up and leaving if their detachment from reality approaches the point of inviting or provoking a conflict that could involve us? If such a government can win one election, it could obviously win another. I suppose we should wait and see how the next Korean election turns out, but you can’t form much of an alliance with someone who lives in an alternative reality, no matter how much sense it makes in ours. You can always try to awaken another democracy from dreamland, but you can’t force it to act rationally. That’s why I believe that we need to move to a leaner, more flexible kind of alliance, one that’s more conformable to shifting risks and opportunities.