At What Precise Moment Did Andrew Sullivan …

… transform himself from a principled defender of liberal values to someone who is willing to deceive to make his points? 

The video shows Iraqi troops beating three men who’d been caught with a bag full of mortars in their car. I don’t defend the beatings, which at least one American tries fecklessly to stop, but calling people captured with mortars “civilians” is a bit of a distortion, no?   

I noticed  it at the precise moment Bush declared his support for the anti-gay marriage amendment (which I also oppose).  I guess the Dorian Gray analogy is too easy, but it saddens you to see it.  Plenty of people love to enjoy the benefits of life in a liberal society, and they’re even willing to defend that society  … as long as  doing so remains easy and politically popular.

In the future, all wars will be won by the side  with the best propaganda, not the best weapons.  For how long can a free society whose information is dominated by  self-hating intellectuals survive?  Just watch the Caliphate slowly digest the Soft Reich.

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24 Responses

  1. I really don’t get your point. Are you saying the Sullivan is purposefully over looking the fact that these people are terrorists because of GWB’s stance on gay issues?

  2. I saw the video over at Hot Air and I was happy to see the police doing their jobs and capturing insurgents. Those guys were not beaten near death, just roughed up. Who knows how many family members those policeman have lost from cowards firing mortars into buildings or setting off bombs in marketplaces. Just another example of people sitting at home watching the tube expecting police in Iraq to act like policemen they see on COPS.

    Just another example of why I dislike the current embed program. Who knows how much video these reporters have of soldiers and police helping and interacting with Iraqis but they wait and lurk to film anything that happens that they can sensationalize to send back home and that is what is broadcasted. Why does the US military allow reporters with US troops when the vast majority of them are there to play gotcha games against the military?

  3. The way I see it was that Sullivan was trying to point out the impossible situation the US troops are in. They are in between two warring parties and no matter what they do they will only make things worse. This video is an example of this: US troops roughing up people who look like civillians to the rest of Iraq and the world. The fact that they had mortors and weapons does nothing to getting the US to its goal which is a stable government and country.

  4. If you can’t see how seizing mortars and the men who are firing them in a city is at least a modest step toward stability, I guess an explanation is pointless … especially against if you’re making an argument as intellectually lazy as “no matter what they do.”

    Additional point of fact — I think the roughers-up are Iraqis.

    I don’t know how many ways I can say this: there is absolutely no way that leaving Iraq will bring peace, or do anything but dramatically intensify the wars that the United States and Iraq are fighting. Surrender means an even bloodier war for them, and for us.

  5. “I don’t know how many ways I can say this: there is absolutely no way that leaving Iraq will bring peace”

    I don’t know how many ways I can say this: Wait until someone actually says that they think leaving Iraq will bring peace.

    Talk about intellectually lazy. You’re answering questions that were not asked.

    If you cannot see how being “seen” as taking sides of a sectarian (and civil) war will bring stability to this country, I guess an explanation is pointless too.

    I am fairly certain things will get worse, quickly, if the US troops pull out of Baghdad and the south. I am also certain that the deaths of US troop will mount and we will pull out anyway (except the death on the US side will be greater) within 1-2 years. After which, things will get worse in Iraq.

    These are the two likely scenarios given the backdrop of sectarian hatred. The words I used, “not matter what they do” maybe succinct but it is not intellectually lazy given the reality in Iraq and the fact that I used it to point out what Sullivan, IMO, was trying to say. I just thought it pointless to spell out the obviousness in my last post.

    BTW: I like your blog and read it everyday.

  6. Also, I have not said it but I thought the BBC piece showing the incident was crap. It seemed very biased. I too, focused on the mortars found and felt that it was put as a happenstance.

    The main reason I commented on your post was to point out what I thought Sullivan was thinking on his blog about this clip.

  7. “Just another example of why I dislike the current embed program. Who knows how much video these reporters have of soldiers and police helping and interacting with Iraqis but they wait and lurk to film anything that happens that they can sensationalize to send back home and that is what is broadcasted.”

    That is the best comment I think I’ve read in many, many months…

  8. marteens view of the video is that the war is hopeless. That is a fundamental starting point for that interpretation. Another is that picking a side in sectarian violence must be avoided.

    The sitaution can be stabalized, and it will be mostly up to the Iraqis. The US and others can help influence, but the decision will have to be made as a collective whole by enough Iraqis to make it work.

    And the US should definately pick a side in the sectarian violence.

    We should pick the group(s) that have a certain amout of broad support and that we have a certain amount of reasonable belief they can be influenced to establish a democracy in the Iraq that emerges out of the violence.

    We should pick people and groups to help win in the sectarian struggle who we believe will after victory take Iraq toward what we want — a stable democratic nation.

    We failed in this in Vietnam for a variety of reasons.

    We succeeded in South Korea – but only after a few decades.

    Given the current state of American society, I am suprised we were ever sucessful at anything in the past.

    Or, the real problem is not with which wars we choose to fight —– but what political party the chooser happens to come from….

    I can’t figure out which one is more the case.

    Maybe we are a society that simply can’t stomach a dozen soldiers or so killed in Somolia. Maybe the only way we can stomach fighting for something we say we believe in is to drop bombs from 25,000 feet like in Bosnia and Kosovo.

    Maybe we really believe nothing save the threat of consistent , direct attacks on the US proper is worth the expenditure in resources and lives of GIs.

    Or, maybe we really believe that the US should have “done something” about Rwanda.

    Maybe it is the “saying” that something “should have been done” is what we believe is correct – but the actual doing something is what we can’t stomach.

    Or, do we simply wait to see what positoin France takes before we (by “we” I’m talking about a certain segment in America’s intelligencia) can decide what we feel and think?

  9. “We should pick people and groups to help win in the sectarian struggle who we believe will after victory take Iraq toward what we want — a stable democratic nation.”

    usinkorea, if this were an economics classroom, it would be clear that you are arguing from a normative (what should be) perspective. I’m coming from a positive (what it is) perspective.

    You use the words, “we should” a lot in your last post. We should do a lot of things but it does not mean that it will have a likelihood of working. You said: We should “pick the group(s) that have a certain amount of broad support and that we have a certain amount of reasonable belief they can be influenced to establish a democracy in the Iraq that emerges out of the violence.” I agree, we should do this but this presumes that we can find such a group. It is my feeling that we cannot find a group that will do what you (and I) want and NOT either link up or be a part of a Shia cleansing of Sunnis.

    And I do not think the war is completely hopeless. I do think that based on the last three years that our chance for something that will resemble victory is very very slim. So, I think it is close to being hopeless. Given this perspective, I do not think linking up with a Shia or Sunni faction is worth it. There are some less-bad options that I would like to see tried than the current strategy.

  10. I don’t know how many ways I can say this: Wait until someone actually says that they think leaving Iraq will bring peace.

    I’ve been listening to Senators talk about pulling out to “end this war” all day. I contend that it will do the exact opposite. People are so desperate for a quick and easy “end” to the war that they’ve fooled themselves into believing that it’s possible. It isn’t. And the hard truth that can’t be evaded is that we’re fighting al-Qaeda there and can’t afford to surrender one square mile of soil to them.

    Which senators? I specifically refer to Dodd, Biden, Hagel, Vitter, and Schumer, who come from both parties, and who voted to invade to begin with. I note that these senators are quite adept at identifying everyone’s miscalculations but their own, and that they never put thought-out alternatives on the table. The mother of all miscalculations is their continuing misunderstanding of counterinsurgency, something neither they nor this Administration should have carried into a major Middle Eastern country with a long history of anti-American indoctrination.

    The popular myth is that insurgencies are unwinnable. This is false. The truth is that Insurgencies are not easily winnable. They’re long, grinding affairs — witness Chechnya or Northern Ireland — but that’s our only non-nuclear alternative to giving al-Qaeda and a new Iraqi Hezbollah their own safe havens, along with a absolute proof that America has no stomach to fight them.

    I wonder what we will all say when next year’s Afghanistan looks twice as bad as this year’s Iraq, when it’s filled with the same people we’re fighting now, each leading a squad of new recruits. What “miscalculation” will require the next surrender?

  11. “And I do not think the war is completely hopeless. I do think that based on the last three years that our chance for something that will resemble victory is very very slim.”

    What would your realistic victory look like? Or, perhaps, how much of a “defeat” do you see going on in Iraq right now?

    The reason such a question will probably seem odd to most Westerns watching the news the last few years is —- the media has worn the masses down until the 3,500+ deaths in Iraq and Afghanistan the past 4 years is an “incredible” death toll.

    I’m going to be very busy starting Monday, but I think when I force myself to take a break from teaching and class, I’m going to check something out I’ve had in mind for some time…

    I’m going to look at the headlines from about 1954 to about 1975 —– related to any violence that was going on in South Korea during that period.

    Anyway, I don’t know enough about what is going on in Iraq to say whether we should back the current government or replace it or which groups are worth backing….

    but I feel safe in saying that there will be groups the US can support —- or more correctly – groups the US should wipe out —- to build toward a situation where we can use influence and pressure to gain democratic reforms. I am willing to bet there are groups out there right now we are working with who are willing to move more toward democracy if they knew we weren’t going to cut and run in a year or two.

    I would start by taking Sadr (sp?) out and his crew – regardless of what the current Iraqi government leadership might say.

  12. ” REDS KILL SOUTH KOREAN; Capture Another in Patrol That Crossed Armistice Line [PDF]
    View free preview
    April 5, 1954 – Article”

    Can you imagine a headline like that today? —- Reds….

    No. Today, the press mentions mortar shells falling on a middle and high school as if it were an act of God. If they started talking about bad deeds on one side too much (unless it is about US prisoner abuses) — it might make readers pick a side. — well, pick the wrong side – the side the press doesn’t want picked….

    So, it is better to just say “sectarian violence” —

  13. Sullivan and his type are NOT AMERICANS. The moderates in American are the problem. In order to win in Iraq, we first need to take out the US moderates that are stopping Bush from winning.

  14. If “take out” means what I suppose it to mean, I couldn’t agree less. Either we have the situational awareness and mental toughness to see what we’re facing or the consequences will be upon us all. Or, if we’re hit enough times, we’ll eventually conclude that there’s no “easy” button here. The only solace I take from this is that 1930’s Britain was even worse off than we are now. It’s just depressing to see the once clear-minded Sullivan become our time’s Lytton Strachey.

  15. I like debating what Sullivan’s position is on the war and I like debating if it is possible for the US to make the Iraq situation better than it is right now. But the completely moronic statement by AntiSullivan is not worthy of any discussion (assuming it was not meant to be a joke).

    “Take out US moderates?”

    What?

    “Stopping Bush from winning?”

    Yes, it is entirely “moderates” fault. No need to learn form mistakes. No need to make sure that what you are doing has public support. Let’s just wipe ’em out and let God sort out things.

    I want the US to succeed in Iraq. I just do not have any confidence in the Commander in Chief of our armed services. Does this make me a “moderate” or “NOT AMERICAN?” I think it is impossible to find the clear headed Iraqis that was mentioned in usinkorea’s post. W/o those people on our side, I do think it is nearly hopeless. I am warming to giving it one more try with the whole “surge” thing but there has got to be a plan B.

  16. Marteen, I ask in all sincerity: what is Plan B? Listen, I can see now that you’re offering an intelligent discussion here, and I apologize for my snarkiness before. I just can’t see another option that would not make matters much worse.

    I think we tend to underestimate the value of having the majority of the people more-or-less on our side now — the tips we get from the locals and the support we get from the IF. They clearly have a long way to go. The IP has even further to go. But if we face a completely hostile population, complete anarchic dissolution of the government, and all-out fragmentation of a security force that stands at about 400,000 trigger-pullers now, we will rue the day we gave that up.

    Our big roundup in Najaf over the weekend would not have happened without local tips and good IP support. By all reliable accounts, the IP are improving fast, and they stand and fight. Refusals to fight are rare within the regular IF today. Police still have plenty of infiltration and sometimes, they run. It’s a process. There are no magic wands. Even in the last stages of our own long Revolution, the Continental militias ran as often as they stood their ground.

    Last weekend, I heard Dodd suggest we pull out of the cities and just focus on hunting terrorists in Anbar, but I see that ultimately reversing a trend in which the Sunni tribes are turning on the AQ trying to avoid complete marginalization by Shiites. What I fear Dodd’s plan will mean is that we end up babysitting millions of refugees who flee bombed-out cities. We’ll be truly “stuck in Iraq” then, when the US Army is the only thing to protect them. Some of the refugees will be inflitrators, and some will want to infiltrate our own soil in the guise of refugees.

    Partition? I think of the millions who died in the Indo-Pak partition in the 40’s, or the half million who died in Bosnia. We’re probably underestimating just how bad that would be, and the extent to which AQ would have sway in Sunnistan, and Iran would lord over Shiastan.

    Not to deny that those proposals — unlike a summary pullout — at least merit serious discussion. I just think we underestimate how unattractive those options are, and I also think it’s somewhat shocking how little our policymakers, media, and people still know about insurgency and how one suppresses it. It’s the fault of our government for not communicating that effectively, of course. But ignorance of military matters makes plenty of the “sage advice” we hear tactically meaningless — a lot of politically motivated radio chatter.

    Perfect example: Andrew Sullivan.

  17. Let me say clearly, Joshua: I agree with you. I too feel that chaos will come with even a partition-type pull out (that would be my plan B). It is seems to be a matter of disaster now or disaster later. Even now it seems that there are serious flaws in the current Plus Up strategy.

    http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2007/01/29/split_command/index.html

    I just don’t think we can pull this off with Bush as president. You suggest staying and fighting while adapting. This is not only a sound course of action it is also a moral one. We need to help those who now depend on us. The question is can we do this?

    Look, I jumped in this discussion because I thought Sullivan’s point of view was inaccurately described. I read the guys blog and he does have a consistency to his thinking on this issue. But as far as you and me on Iraq, I don’t see much daylight between us either. I just don’t think the horse we rode in on (Bush) will take us to where we need to go. That’s all.

  18. “I don’t see much daylight between us either. I just don’t think the horse we rode in on (Bush) will take us to where we need to go. That’s all.”

    And that is the problem I see with your position(s). It is all about one man – Bush —– and a whole lot of talk that it is nothing but disaster and can’t be fixed though you say it can be fixed and that an effort to fix it should be tried. That all gets a little confusing. The only clear part for me right now on where you stand is that Bush is bad and should go.

    But what you seem to be saying comes after is….what?…..more plans for an impossible situation – which means those plans won’t work either???

    Or, is there some simple faith in there that who ever comes after Bush might find a way that does work – though it looks for now that nothing will work???

    I too don’t know what will work, but I am also not one of the people saying what has been going on is absolutely worthless and has been a waste of time.

    Unlike what seems to be the 95% shared tendancy on Iraq War II —- I never expected things to be hunky-dory by this time. I expected the main fighting days of the war would take a good bit longer and involve MUCH heavier casualties on the US side.

    I believed there was a fair to good chance the nation would split into 3 parts with the Kurds duking it out with the Shiia primarily.

    I didn’t expect that a sound, well-founded, democratic government would be up and running the nation by now.

    I am not suprised bombings still go on.

    But, as Joshua said, if I believed the situation were at or close to being one where the vast majority of Iraqis were against the US or the vast majority were too unwilling to work with the other groups in the nation —- I’d say we should pull out and keep an eye on the situation in case we had to go back in (probably with just air power) to take out bases if Iraq turned into another Afghanistan — a large training ground for terrorist orgs.

    But, even with all the focus by the press on the violence in Iraq, I do not believe we have seen that the society is steadfastly against what the US is trying to help the Iraqis establish for their nation.

  19. He’s the horse we saddled. I voted for McCain, and you may well have voted for Joe Lieberman, but what we have is what we have: the best president an imperfect nation decided to elect, who is striving his utmost after the political abandonment of just about everyone, including those who joined in the decision but shrank from the consequences once things got tough. To this day, they’ve offered no constructive alternatives.

    And really, the situation is not objectively much worse than we should have expected it to be at this point. If Bush “misunderestimated” it somewhat, so did each of us. But I contend that Iraq would be a shithole with a triple ration of whooping loonies and UXO whether our president was McCain, Lieberman, Dennis Kucinich, or some highbrow thinker like Joe Biden who voted to to invade and can now list everyone’s fuckups and alleged lies except his own.

    Where I credit Bush — and would not credit everyone else on that list — is with having the spine to stand and fight. A bad plan decisively executed beats a great plan executed with halting ambivalence six days a week, and twice on Sunday. Counterinsurgency is a captains’ war, not a general’s, or a president’s. The strategy is on a micro level. As the great British counterinsurgency expert, Sir Robert Thompson, put it: the only job of a division commander in counterinsurgency is to make sure the men have their beer.

  20. From the beginning, the key players in the reconstruction were going to be two — 1. the most important being the Iraqis themselves who would have to set a foundation and build on it with enough cooperation from the masses to get it done and 2. the US and allies providing the material and financial support as well as military support until the Iraqis had made that collective decision to advance and got it firmly under way.

    From 1945 to 1948, South Korea looked like a hopeless basket case with a large amount of “sectarian violence” with the sects being communists vs non-communists (but also as always different groups wanting power after a vaccum was created when the Japanese colonial government fell).

    Things were so “hopeless” in South Korea, we pulled out washing our hands of it — only to have Truman throw us back in when the war started.

    Then, from 1953 to 1960, South Korea was again on a very rocky road. I don’t know enough to quantify the amount of instability — like — was it under constant pressure, or just periodic flareups, or just 1 or 2 huge blow ups??? —- but the end result was clear —– a massive uprising that toppled the government.

    The result being a few more years of uncertainity and instability – until Park Chung Hee gained a strong enough hold to increase his authoritarian powers which he codified in the early 1970s. And things got worse on the uprising front until his own CIA chief blew his head off and the power vaccum it caused ended up producing the 1980 Kwangju Massacre and then further years of authoritarian rule by another former general.

    Then came the massive demonstrations of the late 1980s – which set in motion some democratic reforms and eventually led to the flowering of real democracy in Korea.

    Notice – we began this history tale back in 1945 with the US in Korea — and we didn’t get to real stability in 1992 or 93…

    But most of that was before the invention of the microwave and the dawning of American society’s gnat-like patience….