U.S., ROK Ministers Agree on OPCON Date

[Update:   But we’re demanding benchmarks!   Gates apparently  shares my fears and has demanded ROK assurances that the date won’t slide yet again.  He’s also demanding “tangible moves,” such as “establishing a military command that would take charge of troop control, and an earlier start to drawing up new military strategies once Combined Forces Command is dismantled.”  Those sure do  sound a lot like “benchmarks,” although that term was understandably avoided.   I think the value of a promise made to Robert Gates  will diminish pretty steadily between now and January 2009.]

[Update 2:  The Korean Retired Generals’ and Admirals’ Assocation hates it.   They think it’s too soon.]

The date is April 17, 2012, which is further out than what we’d been discussing recently. 

After noting that the two sides agreed to the future command relationship structure at the October 2006 Security Consultative Meeting (SCM), Secretary Gates and Minister Kim agreed that the two sides will disestablish the current ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command on April 17, 2012 and complete the transition to the new supporting-supported command relationship between U.S. and ROK forces at the same time. In this regard, Secretary Gates and Minister Kim further agreed that implementation of the OPCON transition “Road Map” will commence in July 2007 immediately following agreement on the “Road map” and culminate in a Certification Exercise in March 2012.  [link to joint statement]

This will allow the Koreans plenty of time to come back to the new Defense Secretary in March 2009  and announce  an urgent need to renegotiate the schedule again, pushing the date back to 2015, and beyond.  As much as  this looks like another unwelcome cave-in, I’m personally less concerned about OPCON than I am about moving our forces out, and to the South, in that order.  The news there isn’t all bad:

Secretary Gates and Minister Kim reiterated commitments to work closely to accelerate the relocation of USFK units and facilities and the full implementation of both the Yongsan Relocation Plan and the Land Partnership Plan.

I expect the Koreans to drag their feet on this, too.  Both Koreas want to keep a lot of warm American targets within North Korean artillery range.   The Korean  government  always pushes  hardest where it sees a soft spot.

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12 Responses

  1. This is probably the first big post-Rumsfeld sign that the US-SK military alliance is going to shift back to the norm.

    Too bad.

    With a GNP victory at the end of this year, a return to the status quo will probably be set in stone.

    I haven’t heard anything about the South Korea or global military structure from any of the leading US presidential hopefuls. I don’t any of them have put much thought into SK one way or another.

    …..I guess the hope for fundamental changes was nice — while it lasted….

  2. Perry is a worthless arse, and clueless when it comes to Korea. I lost all respect for him after he criticized Bush for doing things called for in the ‘1999 Perry Report.’ He’s now a political hack, who will be listened to by the left and the media, but likely will have any actual constructive comments in the process.

    In July, Perry (like Gingrich) actually called for a U.S. strike on North Korea’s missile launch pad before they could send them off. This is somewhat incredible since, as a former SecDef, he should know the potential for such an action to trigger a regional war.

    Considering the estimates that North Korea had 1-2 nukes before 1999, it could have been that much worse. But Perry did this, I assume, as a political attack to make the Dems look more aggressive than Bush in a defense issue. Pathetic. Either that or he was stupid enough to really want such action.

  3. I thought I remembered him calling for military acts more recently.

    When I read that he was in Kaesong with a big businessman, I figured it was just to get his bank account fattened, much like many “former” Xs…

  4. Secretary Gates and Minister Kim reiterated commitments to work closely to accelerate the relocation of USFK units and facilities and the full implementation of both the Yongsan Relocation Plan and the Land Partnership Plan.

    Uh-huh, yeah. As I recall, we’ve heard that empty promise a time or two since 1990. And yet, the lights are still on in Yongsan.

    This is just another cave-in.

    Washington has no spine and Seoul damn well knows it. And once again the US taxpayer is looking the other direction while his pockets are picked.

  5. We also just said we will not downsize any more after 2008.

    That means absolutely nothing as an actual policy agreement and could be changed in a heart-beat —- but it is also likely a glimpse into what the contemporary mind-set is in whatever circles influence US policy with Korea – and it is —- back to “thank you, may I have another….” mentality – the mentality Korean society banked on for years and years as a buttress to anti-US/USFK activity – the type endulged by the society as a whole – because the US was never going to leave…

    It is a “we are going to be in Korea for a long, long time, so we should at least try to get along with them. Don’t rock the boat.” mentality….

    I said recently that we can’t judge whether significant progress has been made on the anti-US culture in Korea since 2003 — until Korean soicety becomes comfortable with the idea nothing is going to change and the US isn’t leaving – something they have feared since late 2002.

    I think we might get a chance in 2008 to see the comfort zone feeling return.

    I am certainly reading all this stuff coming out the last month and confidently predicting things are back to normal with the usual status quo many of us came to know and loathe.

  6. On the benchmarks, South Korea didn’t speedily get things done when it had an administration that wanted the US out.

    Why should I believe a GNP Blue House is going to follow through with something it is going out of its way frequently to denounce and call on the current Roh-crew to stop negociating on?

    SK will break these benchmarks just as Noth Korea will break its…