Some Questions for David Albright (Which He Won’t Answer)
[Some Background for new readers: When the U.S. and North Korea signed a denuclearization agreement on February 13th, one of the major unresolved issues was the question of North Korea’s suspected uranium enrichment program. When U.S. diplomats confronted the North Koreans in 2002 with evidence suggesting the existence of that program, North Korea admitted, in effect, that it had a program and “so what of it?” The United States then declared North Korea in violation of the Agreed Framework of 1994, which, like another previous agreement, required the complete denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. North Korea has since reverted to denying both the program and its previous admission.
Enter David Albright, physicist, ex-U.N. inspector, and President of a left-of-center Washington think-tank, with much media fanfare, to claim that the evidence leading to the North Korean admission, and the admission itself, were bogus. Richardson and I raised questions about Albright’s claims that in our view, the media did not ask and should have. Albright has since commented on our blogs, but I’m not sure I’d call it a response.]
[Update: Albright comments again, but refuses to answer my questions, to specify which arguments are unfair or inaccurate, or who is misquoting him. It’s not exactly a winning argument strategy, but it does make it harder for people to pin you down. Albright also thinks it was “unfair” of me to ask him hard questions based on the very published views he repeatedly cites. Well, that may be a new experience for someone who has grown accustomed to uncritical media attention, but the ability to answer hard questions is what separates true experts from those who are merely in drag as such. In the end, I ended up feeling like this guy must have felt.]
David Albright, or someone who claims to be him, has commented on this post, criticizing Richardson’s arguments, and indirectly, mine:
Richardson appears hopelessly confused on what a centrifuge program is and how it must develop. He also seems intent on misquoting me about what I said and wrote. He really needs to pay more attention to facts and has a responsibility to mislead the reader less. For those truly interested in learning about North Korea’s nuclear program and what I have written about that program, I would refer them to the ISIS web site at www.isis-online.org.
That’s a rather vague set of accusations, which Mr. Albright (yes, I think it’s really him) follows up with an offer regarding [a reference to] a book that seems to have been written a decade ago. Furthermore, I did read Mr. Albright’s recent point paper on the subject, and commented on it. So since we know Mr. Albright is reading, I’d like to ask him to be a bit more specific and answer some questions that I’ve raised before:
Q.1 How are Richardson and I confused on what an enrichment program is? Enlighten us.
Q.2 You focus your criticism of the Administration on the allegations about aluminum tubes from several years ago. Yet on page 3 of your ISIS paper, you concede that the aluminum tubes would have been for centrifuge casings. In light of subsequent admissions by the Pakistanis that they sold complete centrifuges to North Korea, doesn’t the debate about aluminum tubes become academic?
Q.3 Who misquoted you and where? How did Don Kirk misquote you? Did Carol Giacomo misquote you, too? Can you please substantiate your accusations?
Q.4 Giacomo’s Reuters article, which is based on your views says that “[t]he United States should reexamine a questionable charge that North Korea has a covert uranium enrichment program … that could complicate the new nuclear weapons deal….” Your ISIS paper, however, is very careful to attack evidence of a “large-scale” uranium enrichment program. So which is it? Is the entire claim of a uranium program questionable, or just the claim that it’s large in scale?
Q.5 As you know, North Korea denies having any uranium enrichment program whatsoever. Later in your ISIS paper, you suggest several possible explanations for the evidence the Administration cites:
The reclusive, totalitarian state sought to buy everything it could for a centrifuge program, despite its inability to actually build a functioning facility. The items may have been placed in storage.
North Korea bought the tubes for someone else. A European intelligence agency that knew of the procurement of the tubes believed at the time that this was indeed the case. After later learning about Khan’s sales of about 20 centrifuges to North Korea, this official could not exclude that the tubes were for a North Korean centrifuge effort, but said in late 2004 that he thought there was little chance that a large-scale centrifuge program would surprise us someday.
Another possibility is that the scale-up never happened, despite initial preparations that could have even included the start of the physical construction of a plant.
So are you conceding that there are uncertainties, or are you conceding that North Korea really has a small uranium program after all, along the lines of its nascent plutonium program in the early 1990’s? If so, don’t you think that we should insist, in accordance with UNSCR 1718, that this program be declared and dismantled?
Q.6 Have you ever visited any of North Korea’s nuclear facilities? Do you have access to classified information regarding North Korea’s nuclear programs? What specialized knowledge should cause us to credit your views when they conflict with those of others?
Q.7 In your ISIS paper, you said,
In addition, the supposed admission by North Korean officials in late 2002 about a centrifuge program may have been oversold by U.S. officials. This same official told Wit that ‘the notion that they admitted to the HEU isn’t as clear-cut in the transcript as in the oral tradition that the meeting seemed to foster.’ Regardless, North Korean officials have never been reported to have said in this meeting that they were building a large-scale plant.
I interpret this as meaning that people kept rough handwritten notes, but they also say they remember what they heard. Jack Pritchard, by no means a hawk on North Korea policy was there, and described it to the Washington Post this way:
One of the specialists who visited North Korea last week, former State Department official Charles L. Pritchard, was part of the U.S. delegation that reported hearing the North Korean admission. U.S. officials said they had three translators at the 2002 session and have no doubt the North Koreans confirmed the program.
One official present at the 2002 meeting said Pritchard and Assistant Secretary of State James A. Kelly began passing notes as Kang Suk Ju, North Korea’s first vice foreign minister, “looking flushed and defiant,” began a 50-minute monologue reacting to the U.S. declaration that it knew North Korea had an enrichment program. As the translation progressed, Pritchard and Kelly each passed notes, asking, “Is he saying what we think he’s saying?” A half minute later, they passed notes again, in effect saying, “Never mind — it’s clear.
I’ve also spoken with another knowledgeable source about the North Koreans’ admission, and there seems to have been no misunderstanding at all. So we have Pritchard, James Kelley, and three different U.S.-employed translators all saying that North Korea, when confronted with the evidence, admitted it (but now denies it). What do you know that these people don’t know?
Q.8 Doesn’t the discovery of unenriched uranium in Libya, reportedly from North Korean stocks, suggest a vital U.S. interest in accounting for North Korea’s entire uranium production cycle? Don’t the economics of scale suggest that North Korea would have also mined uranium for domestic enrichment? Didn’t sticking to our guns and asking tough questions pay enormous dividends in the Libyan case?
Q.9 What do you think motivates Kim Jong Il to even negotiate about nuclear disarmament that will also motivate him to actually abide by the terms of any deal he makes?
Q.10 No one denies that we got a lot wrong in our intelligence about Iraq, but what specific and common errors of logic or procedure actually make your drawing of the Iraq comparison relevant to your argument? Are you saying that the North Korea intelligence was deliberately distorted? Are you really saying that when secretive tyrants create uncertainties about their intentions and capabilities, that we must never draw adverse inferences? If we’re not entitled to be vigilant about uncertainties, why even have intelligence services?
Q.11 Isn’t North Korea ultimately in the best position to answer all of these questions with a degree of transparency about those places we have questions about? What’s so unreasonable about asking North Korea itself to resolve the uncertainties it created?
Q.12 The floor is yours. Make any other points you want to make. Comments will remain open, as readers will likely have more. I will moderate. Questions may be tough, but I’ll delete anything abusive or gratuitous.
If he wouldn’t come out in front of the press at a news conference and make clear, unabiguous claims, what makes you think he is going to answer any number of these questions clearly.
(Note the non-questionmark in my masked statement)
I think the failure to answer them would be as telling as the responses. So I asked.
Yes, I would love to see his answers. So far there have only been hollow accusations and failures to responds to direct questions. If he can’t or won’t respond with substantial answers, he should not have stirred the pot.
Albright’s response to me (via email) posted here. Perhaps we are beneath an actual, direct response to specific questions and points. He does appear to think he’s the almighty expert of all this.
I as well seriously doubt he will respond with substantial answer to these perfectly legitimate questions. He has to much staked on his current positions of North Korea which appear based more on politics then anything else.
This is a part of what I mean when I frequently rant about academic/think-tank/State Dept think…
At least the State Dept people can (lamely) fall back on “it’s my job” as a defense.
I said this at DPRK Studies:
The heart of this thing – both here and out in the real world – is:
What specific claims did the US make (or strongly imply) was the level of NK’s HEU program —-
—-And——how do we know that claim was misguided?
If Albright would like to get specific about that (preferably with quoates (and links)) ——- he could win this debate fast.
NOT getting specific about what claims the CIA/US made about the HEU program —- on the other hand —- makes this whole thing like trying to grab a bar of soap in the tub with one hand.
And that makes things oh so much better for Pyongyang’s negociatng position —- which is what bothers me a whole lot about this whole thing.
Joshua attacks me unfairly and inaccurately in his posts, slanders me, and expects me to straighten him out by me answering his questions. I do not think so. But I will offer to invite him and anyone else to our next briefing on North Korea. Please send contact information to intern@isis-online.org.
You’re too much. You make accusations of being misquoted, but refuse to point to exactly which quotes you refer to. You then claim others are ignorant of centrifuge programs, but fail – when asked on numerous occasions – to point to any specific text to give you that impression.
So let’s get this straight; you can make wild accusations, but when called on them, claim you’re being treated “unfairly.â€
Well cry me a river.
Mr. Albright, You’ve just accused at least one highly respected journalist (and two no-name bloggers) of misquoting you. You repeatedly tell us to read your site, which I did. It raised factual questions about your assertions, which I duly ask. Your response is to refuse to answer and accuse me of “unfair attacks.” I don’t think you’re winning the argument.
By the way, I checked Mr. Kirk’s quotes from the Asia Times piece, and it does appear that they’re all verified by either your interview with Ms. Giacomo or your ISIS publications. If you’re going to join the debate, why not come prepared to offer answers, facts, and specifics rather than naked argument? My questions shouldn’t be too difficult to address, and unlike you, I don’t even do this for a living. Is being challenged on your facts and arguments such a novel experience for you?
By the way, Mr. Albright, you don’t have to answer today. Take all the time you need. I’ll print everything you write, unedited, as long as I have the bandwidth for it. Hey, it’s just possible you might persuade us of something.
I’ll say here too —– and if somebody sees where I am off – please let me know —-
What seems to be the bone of contention (aside from the misquoting stuff) —- is what exactly the US government claimed in 2002
or stated a different way — what about a HEU program broke the deal.
Albright and some in the press (using Albright as a source) have put the message ou that simply having a HEU program was no big deal or at least was not a deal buster.
But what actually broke the deal was juiced-up accusations that the HEU program was well on its way to producing enough material for a bomb.
If this is true, Albright and those quoting him in the press need to grab Christopher Hill by the collar and straighten him out before he makes a fool of himself again in front of Congress.
,because when Hill starts testifying that we know for a fact NK bought equipment that had “no other use” than in a HEU program
—it sure as heck seems he is relying on the idea that simply having a HEU program (regardless of how close it was to pumping out enough material for an uranium-based bomb) was what broke the Agreed Frame work….
[By the way, when I went back to check on the “no other use” item so I could provide a citation, look what I ran across as the first one:
https://freekorea.us/?p=6594%5D
Isn’t a bit scary to think that he is considered one of the best and brightest in regards to nuclear proliferation and he can’t even answer simple questions? He has a very interested audience on the two main North Korea blogs out there waiting for these simple answers and he can’t provide them. Very telling. Maybe he has gotten to used to the softball media interviews he is usually given to present his views.
And it is the media angle that is increasingly driving me nuts.
Yes, his claims did receive great media fanfare
which ends up CLEARLY increasing Pyongyang’s ability to manoeuvre
BUT THE PRESS DOESN’T GET IT!!
These questions about the nautre of Albrights claims do not require a MA in physics or detailed intel……
…..it is straight forward thinking the kind of which are supposed to be at the core of journalistic ethics. It is simple questioning of what is being said and memory of the not-so-distant past.
Was juiced up claims about how far advanced the HEU program was the reason the 1994 Accord was broken?
Or, was it simply the fact a HEU program was in existence?
“What did the US claim in 2002?”
That should have been one of the first thoughts to pop into a journalist’s head when listening to the words at the press conference they chose to quote……
I won’t read all that’s here and over my head this very moment, but promise to later.
Let me state that I have no opinion about whether NK has HEU, but it would seem to me that just as a matter of common sense, there’s no way to be absolutely, positively sure until someone invades it and has a good look around.
I’m not arguing for an invasion, of course, but if an invasion really was believed to be necessary, the US would have a much easier time making a case for one had it not sexed up the intel on Iraq. It would have an easier time persuading both the American people and the international community. WHATEVER THE TRUTH MAY BE about either country, you have to sympathize with someone or some state that’s hesitant to jump on the bandwaggon about HEU in NK. Whatever one thinks of what Albright is saying (and frankly I don’t know what that is) would one not have to admit that if the Bush Administration’s claims about HEU were center stage in American debate like Nigerian yellowcake was, the administration would be laughed at and Republican Congressmen would voice hesitation, knowing the American people would be thinking, “oh no, here we go again”?
I don’t know either way. Really. But the best argument (which isn’t saying much) that I’ve heard against the claim P’yang has HEU and that the accusation is being used to corner NK is what happened with the money in Banco Delta Asia. If it was frozen for really being a laundering operation and drug money and all that, the question becomes why are they getting it back and won’t something similar happen with the talk about HEU, with accusations withdrawn when convenient, thus bringing their initial legitimacy into question.
BTW… isn’t the money in BDA somewhere around US$25 mil? (I hope I’m wrong.) What’s with that? Get all happy again and willing to talk about denuclearization for less the price of a big piece of military hardware? Can’t the int’l community just buy the Pyongyang elite all the luxury items the money is going for and bribe them into cooperation in the future, too?
“I’m not arguing for an invasion, of course, but if an invasion really was believed to be necessary, the US would have a much easier time making a case for one had it not sexed up the intel on Iraq.”
Before we add another war to our growing list, we ought to be able to answer yes to two questions: 1) Is war justified? and 2) Is our desired outcome achievable? From the beginning, Iraq has looked shaky on both counts. North Korea doesn’t have a sectarian problem, but it does have three neighbors who would strongly oppose any military solution. One of those neighbors hosts 37,000 of our troops and the other sits on the Security Council.
I think the opposition to invasion is unanimous. The choice between war and appeasement, however, is a false one. We never applied a concerted strategy of political and economic pressure, and to the extent we applied it at all, we only persisted from Sept. 2005 to February 2007.
Oranckay, I’m sympathetic to anyone who assembles a connected series of statements to support a logical conclusion, but doctrinaire atheism about all WMD programs is the biggest bandwagon in this town.
It’s not really about if they have HEU or not, it’s about the HEU program. We know they received some two dozen centrifuges for enriching uranium (not enough to produce the amounts of HEU needed for a weapon unless in the *very* long-term), and that they have attempted to produce materials for what would amount to thousands of centrifuges (would be enough for nuclear weapons).
We “know†this as well as possible without actually going there to see it; A.Q. Khan admitted to it, which corroborated intelligence. Reports of intercepted shipments of aluminum tubing suitable for use in centrifuges is plentiful and unclassified.
But the number of centrifuges is moot; the existence of any HEU program, pilot or not, even active or not, is forbidden by numerous agreements North Korea has signed on to.
So there is no question about North Korea having violated the 1994 Agreed Framework et al, just of how to answer that. Since the only persons of some note calling for air strikes on various parts of North Korea in times of tension (i.e., the July missile launches) are Perry and Gingrich, we don’t have to worry about that happening, and no one in the administration is calling for a war with North Korea at this point (if they are proved to have proliferated nuclear material that could change quickly).
I’ll also note that most likely U.S. troops would not do too much invading of North Korea in the most likely scenarios, ROKA troops would.
Joshua wrote:
“The choice between war and appeasement, however, is a false one.”
Who is framing the debate in those terms?
Not you. One I will specifically mention is Roh Moo Hyun.
I don’t know what Mr. Albright’s answer is going to be for this, but FWIW mention of Iraq is relevant because whether or not there were errors (and I think there were) and whether or not Iraq intel was deliberately manipulated (and I think it might have been) and even though secretive tyrants create uncertainties about their intentions and capabilities which “we” SHOULD draw adverse inferences from, the fact remains that whatever argument is made by the Bush Administration about HEU (HEU itself or HEU programs or HEU capabilities, if one wants to get technical) in North Korea is tragically less convincing because of Iraq. Even if one thinks everything was done right and honestly with Iraq I don’t see how one couldn’t think the failue to find WMD in Iraq hurts any case against NK based on intel coming via the current US administration, no matter what the intention – invasion, sanctions, pure rhetoric, whatever.
The fact that Mr. Cheney keeps saying there was a connection between Iraq and al qaeda can’t help either.
I seriously doubt Albright will answer anything (I’ve posted this complaint form for him, though).
There are two ways (ok, more, but for this…) to mention the Iraq intelligence failure in the context of North Korea; a) to point out (legitimately) as you did that regardless of intent the Iraq failure will cast a shadow of doubt on the accuracy of U.S. intelligence on North Korea’s HEU program, or b) to imply that Iraq was hyped for political reasons with flimsily evidence ergo the DPRK HEU case was as well (a position which ignores a lot of publicly available information completely). “B†is what can be taken from the whole of Albright’s writing and comments. He doesn’t state it directly, but strongly suggests it. I’m all for qualified statements, but at a certain point he’s got to stop speaking form the side of his face.
Basically Albright is a political hack with an MS in physics (whoop-dee-freakin-doo).
” in North Korea is tragically less convincing because of Iraq. ”
That I can support without a doubt. Having the intelligence wrong on Iraq was bound to hurt US credibility.
Saying that the evidence was fabricated or fudged —- saying that the Bush administration lied —– in order to go to war is a different matter and where the discussion starts to become worthless.
The best thing that can come from getting the intel wrong in Iraq is for the intel community —– including the ones in all those other European nations who believed it just as much as we did —- to take a look at how they gather and analyize intel and figure out where the weaknesses were and try to fix it.
But, what is the point in Albright, or anybody else, bringing up the Iraq intel failure?
How many people see the US going out to build a case for war against North Korea based on the HEU claims – raise your hand…?..
OK. So, stopping the next war isn’t the reason Iraq is used. What else could it be?
Is Albright being a champion of the 1994 Accord? He is bringing in Iraq and connecting it to HEU because it was Bush’s telling lies about the HEU program, just as he did in Iraq, that led to the current impasse by forcing NK to walk away from the Accord?
Alright does in fact make that case through direct statements andimplications.
So, what is to be done? Since the Bush administration lied about HEU to break the 1994 Accord, it is incumbent on the US to now make things right. Since we broke the 1994 framework down, the US has the obligation to make major concessions to North Korea to get it to trust us again and re-make the 1994 Accord?…
Some of us have pointed out, and some in the press too, that just having a HEU program was a breach of the 1994 deal as well as others….
But, if we entertain the idea that Albright is correct in his bringing up Iraq to bolster the case he won’t make just using NK alone, it would seem to me that the above is what he must be arguing for.
But, I don’t believe that is really what he wants to do —- that he wants to help NK by defending it and making it out to be the victim in the 2nd nuke crisis.
No. I believe the foundation for his use of Iraq and connecting it to the HEU program is much more simple – it is just a way to publically strike at the Bush administation. In short, NK and the 2nd nuke crisis is being used to bring up the spectre of “failed intelligence” to strike at the Bush administration as a whole.
Bruce Cummings has had a somewhat sucessful career out of making the Korean War the first Vietnam…
Albright is doing the same with the HEU program intel spiel.
And he is the one claiming Richardson, (the blogger — not the new skipper of the Pueblo…) is too blinded by politics in his analysis of the HEU program and its implications.
On a 2nd note, “The fact that Mr. Cheney keeps saying there was a connection between Iraq and al qaeda can’t help either.”
If Oranckay wants to change that to “connection between Iraq and 9/11” – I can again get on board – if Cheney is actually saying that.
However, it turns around completely if we just stick to the actual words written. — It seems to me you have to have a heck of a lot of faith to say with strong conviction that it is preposterous to believe Hussien had any connection with Al Qaeda….and I thought others had already laid out a fair case showing connections between the loosely connected terrorist groups that fell under the broad name “Al Qaeda” and the Hussein regime?