Some Questions for David Albright (Which He Won’t Answer)

[Some Background for new readers:   When the U.S. and North Korea  signed a denuclearization agreement on February 13th, one of the major unresolved issues was the question of North Korea’s suspected uranium enrichment program.   When U.S. diplomats confronted the North Koreans in 2002 with  evidence  suggesting the existence of  that program, North Korea admitted, in effect, that it had a program and “so what of it?”  The United States then declared North Korea in violation of the Agreed Framework of 1994, which, like another previous agreement,  required the complete denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.  North Korea has since reverted to denying both the program and its previous admission. 

Enter David Albright, physicist, ex-U.N. inspector,  and President of a left-of-center Washington think-tank,  with much media fanfare, to claim that the evidence leading to the North Korean admission, and the admission itself, were bogus.  Richardson and I  raised questions about  Albright’s claims that in our view, the media  did not  ask and should have.  Albright  has since commented on our blogs, but I’m not sure I’d call it a response.]

[Update:   Albright comments again, but refuses to answer  my questions, to specify which arguments are unfair or inaccurate, or who is misquoting him.  It’s not  exactly a  winning argument strategy, but it does make it harder for people to pin you down.  Albright also thinks it was “unfair” of me to ask him hard questions based on  the  very  published views he repeatedly cites.  Well, that may be a new experience for someone who has grown  accustomed to uncritical media attention, but the ability to answer hard questions is what separates true experts from those who are merely in drag as such.  In the end, I ended up feeling like this guy must have felt.]

David Albright, or someone who claims to be him,  has  commented on this post, criticizing Richardson’s arguments, and indirectly, mine:

Richardson appears hopelessly confused on what a centrifuge program is and how it must develop. He also seems intent on misquoting me about what I said and wrote. He really needs to pay more attention to facts and has a responsibility to mislead the reader less. For those truly interested in learning about North Korea’s nuclear program and what I have written about that program, I would refer them to the ISIS web site at www.isis-online.org.

That’s a rather vague set of accusations, which Mr. Albright (yes, I think it’s really him) follows up with an offer regarding [a reference to] a book that  seems to  have been written a decade ago.  Furthermore, I did read Mr. Albright’s recent point paper on the subject, and commented on it.  So  since we know  Mr. Albright is reading, I’d like to ask him to be a bit more specific and  answer some questions that I’ve raised before: 

Q.1   How are Richardson and I confused on what an enrichment program is?  Enlighten us.

Q.2    You focus your criticism of the Administration on the allegations about aluminum tubes from several years ago.  Yet on page 3 of your ISIS paper, you concede that the aluminum tubes would have been for centrifuge casings.  In light of subsequent admissions by the Pakistanis that they sold complete centrifuges to North Korea, doesn’t the debate about aluminum tubes become academic?

Q.3   Who misquoted you and where?   How did Don Kirk misquote you?  Did Carol Giacomo misquote you, too?  Can you please substantiate  your accusations?

Q.4   Giacomo’s  Reuters article, which is  based on your views says that “[t]he United States should reexamine a questionable charge that North Korea has a covert uranium enrichment program … that could complicate the new nuclear weapons deal….”  Your ISIS paper, however, is very careful  to  attack evidence  of a “large-scale” uranium enrichment program.  So which is it?  Is the entire claim of a uranium program questionable, or just the claim that it’s large in scale?

Q.5   As you know, North Korea denies having any uranium enrichment program whatsoever.  Later in your ISIS paper, you suggest several possible explanations for the evidence the Administration cites:

The reclusive, totalitarian state sought to buy everything it could for a centrifuge program, despite its inability to actually build a functioning facility. The items may have been placed in storage.

North Korea bought the tubes for someone else. A European intelligence agency that knew of the procurement of the tubes believed at the time that this was indeed the case. After later learning about Khan’s sales of about 20 centrifuges to North Korea, this official could not exclude that the tubes were for a North Korean centrifuge effort, but said in late 2004 that he thought there was little chance that a large-scale centrifuge program would surprise us someday.

Another possibility is that the scale-up never happened, despite initial preparations that could have even included the start of the physical construction of a plant.

So are you conceding  that there are  uncertainties, or are you conceding  that North Korea really has a small uranium program after all, along the lines of its nascent plutonium program in the early 1990’s?  If so, don’t you think that we should insist, in accordance with UNSCR 1718, that this program be declared and dismantled? 

Q.6   Have you ever visited any of North Korea’s nuclear facilities?  Do you have access to classified information regarding North Korea’s nuclear programs?  What specialized knowledge should cause us to credit your views when they conflict with those of others? 

Q.7   In your ISIS paper, you said,

In addition, the supposed admission by North Korean officials in late 2002 about a centrifuge program may have been oversold by U.S. officials. This same official told Wit that ‘the notion that they admitted to the HEU isn’t as clear-cut in the transcript as in the oral tradition that the meeting seemed to foster.’    Regardless, North Korean officials have never been reported to have said in this meeting that they were building a large-scale plant.

I interpret this as meaning that people kept rough handwritten notes, but they also say they  remember what they heard.  Jack Pritchard, by no means a hawk on North Korea policy was there, and described it to the Washington Post this way:

One of the specialists who visited North Korea last week, former State Department official Charles L. Pritchard, was part of the U.S. delegation that reported hearing the North Korean admission. U.S. officials said they had three translators at the 2002 session and have no doubt the North Koreans confirmed the program.

One official present at the 2002 meeting said Pritchard and Assistant Secretary of State James A. Kelly began passing notes as Kang Suk Ju, North Korea’s first vice foreign minister, “looking flushed and defiant,” began a 50-minute monologue reacting to the U.S. declaration that it knew North Korea had an enrichment program. As the translation progressed, Pritchard and Kelly each passed notes, asking, “Is he saying what we think he’s saying?” A half minute later, they passed notes again, in effect saying, “Never mind — it’s clear.

I’ve also spoken with  another  knowledgeable source about the North Koreans’ admission, and there seems to have been no misunderstanding at all.  So we have Pritchard, James Kelley, and three different U.S.-employed translators all saying that North Korea, when confronted with the evidence, admitted it (but now denies it).  What do you know that these people don’t know?

Q.8   Doesn’t the discovery of unenriched uranium in Libya, reportedly from North Korean stocks, suggest a vital U.S. interest in accounting for North Korea’s entire  uranium production cycle?  Don’t the economics of scale suggest that North Korea would have also mined uranium for domestic enrichment?  Didn’t sticking to our guns and asking tough questions pay enormous dividends in the Libyan case?

Q.9   What do you think motivates Kim Jong Il to even negotiate about nuclear disarmament that will also motivate him to actually abide by the terms of any deal he makes?

Q.10   No one denies that we got a lot wrong in our intelligence about Iraq, but what specific and common errors of logic or procedure actually make your drawing of the Iraq comparison relevant  to your argument?  Are you saying that the North Korea intelligence was deliberately distorted?  Are you really saying that when secretive tyrants create uncertainties about their intentions and capabilities, that we must never draw  adverse inferences?  If we’re not entitled to be vigilant  about uncertainties,  why even have intelligence services? 

Q.11   Isn’t North Korea ultimately in the best position to answer all of these questions with a degree of transparency about those places we have questions about?  What’s so unreasonable about asking North Korea itself to resolve the uncertainties it created?

Q.12   The floor is yours.  Make any other points you want to make.  Comments will remain open, as readers will likely have more.  I will moderate.  Questions may be tough, but I’ll delete anything abusive or gratuitous.