I have resigned myself to a Lee Myung Bak presidency in Korea, something I can do without much difficulty because (a) there will be much amusement, hilarity, scandal, and great blog material,  and  (b) because I’m not South Korean [Update:   or North Korean]. 

Superficially, Lee is the furthest “right” of the major candidates, and while  South Korea’s idea of “right” may  not be my thing, it’s  the linear opposite of South Korea’s idea of  “left,” which I unreservedly  despise.  Concepts of “left” and “right” don’t translate well from Korean.  I’ve noticed that American liberals don’t often like Roh; they find him generally  inept and  too cozy with Kim Jong Il’s atrocities.  American conservatives wince at Lee’s love of massive quasi-Stalinist public works projects,  his lack of personal gravitas, and the sense that  as he drifts off to sleep each night,  he dreams of waving at columns of tanks from a reviewing stand.  That, or columns of scantily clad maidens in tall white boots (maybe we have more in common than I’d thought).

Still, we can  take comfort from knowing that  a Lee Myung Bak presidency will not be a Roh Moo Hyun presidency.  Roh’s historical legacies have been irreparable damage to its highly beneficial relationship to the United States, a creeping Finlandization by China, and  the lion’s share of a  seven-billion dollar contribution to a putting nukes in the hands of the world’s most ruthless oligarchy. 

President Roh Moo-hyun on Saturday told South Korean expatriates in New Zealand that preventing North Korea’s possible collapse is a “very important strategy” for our government because the North “will never wage war unless attacked or collapsing.” Seoul is therefore “concerned” about the suspension of humanitarian aid to the North under UN Security Council Resolution 1718, he added.  [Chosun Ilbo]

If  the former human rights lawyer has  actually read 1718 (full text here),  he  must have meant to say “unconditional cash payments,” because there is a specific exception for humanitarian aid in 1718.  Not that Roh really cares much either way in practice, because his government has ignored 1718 since Day One.  I’m unwilling to believe Roh doesn’t know this, but it’s often hard  to tell whether Roh is being dishonest or simply ingorant.  We know that Lee is dishonest and no intellectual, but hardly anyone doubts his guile.  I sense that Koreans have grown weary of fresh faces.  They want guile again. 

The hopes of those who voted for Roh were once so much higher.  Five years ago, Roh was … a candidate so unpopular within his own party that he’d caused it to split, but four and a half years ago, he was the fresh-faced  boy who would lead Korea to reunification by throwing off the Yankee yoke.  Today, Korea is more dangerous and divided than ever, and South Korea is more vulnerable to the whims of foreign powers, not less.  Roh has often been compared to Jimmy Carter, a fresh-faced American boy who who promised a post-Watergate return to clean government and a quasi-pacifist foreign policy focused on human rights.   Clean government did not ensue  (Bert Lance, Hamilton Jordan), and overseas, the Carter years were boom times for dictatorship and  terrorism.   It was Iran, a problem nation  that has been kidnapping and  killing Americans  ever since, that finally broke Carter of his illusory ideas about American power, its uses, and the importance of sustaining it.

 desert-one.jpg

So it tends to go with elevating fresh faces to high office.   What has me thinking about this is Barack Obama, who managed to say something I approved of last week, which is what politicians try to do in election years.  Since then, he’s taken a lot of criticism for his enthusiastic  youbetcha after being asked whether he would “be willing to meet separately, without precondition, during the first year of your administration, in Washington or anywhere else, with the leaders of Iran, Syria,  Venezuela, Cuba, and North Korea.”  A voter unfamiliar with diplomacy may not see the naivete of this, and an especially savvy voter could even see opportunity in such a meeting, since it could be a bold way to challenge an unpopular dictator on his home turf,  including in the eyes of his own people, and bring attention to that dictator’s worst abuses in the very  way that Bill Richardson never would.  It might have been possible to deny that Obama had  shown himself as Not Ready, until this:

Democratic presidential hopeful Barack Obama said Thursday the United States cannot use its military to solve humanitarian problems and that preventing a potential genocide in Iraq isn’t a good enough reason to keep U.S. forces there.

“Well, look, if that’s the criteria by which we are making decisions on the deployment of U.S. forces, then by that argument you would have 300,000 troops in the Congo right now — where millions have been slaughtered as a consequence of ethnic strife — which we haven’t done,” Obama said in an interview with The Associated Press.

“We would be deploying unilaterally and occupying the Sudan, which we haven’t done. Those of us who care about Darfur don’t think it would be a good idea,” he said.

Obama, a first-term senator from Illinois, said it’s likely there would be increased bloodshed if U.S. forces left Iraq.  [AP]

A moment later, Obama denied that U.S. forces would leave “precipitiously” because there would be other U.S. forces in the region,  forces Obama  presumes would  neither invite nor inspire yet  more terrorism or casualties.  Does anyone think that President Obama, having declared Iraq a hopeless disaster (and having thus helped make it so) would re-invade for the same reason he just told us wouldn’t prevent him from withdrawing?  Does anyone think the people of this nation or any other will look favorably  this leap from the frying pan to the holocaust?   James Taranto adds:

Mr. Obama is engaging in sophistry. By his logic, if America lacks the capacity to intervene everywhere there is ethnic killing, it has no obligation to intervene anywhere–and perhaps an obligation to intervene nowhere. His reasoning elevates consistency into the cardinal virtue, making the perfect the enemy of the good.

Further, he elides the distinction between an act of omission (refraining from intervention in Congo and Darfur) and an act of commission (withdrawing from Iraq). The implication is that although the U.S. has had a military presence in Iraq since 1991, the fate of Iraqis is not America’s problem.

Seldom  are the unfitness and its consequence captured in a single frame so far before their realization.   Obama’s campaign seems to have hit its high water mark, although Hillary Clinton is so widely disliked by so many voters that we can eliminate the possibility that her campaign will “catch fire.”  This certainly is a depressing pair of prospects, unless your name is Al Gore (yes, he will run).  Much depends on what happens next month, when every thug in Iraq will launch an all-out offensive in anticipation of General Petraeus’s report.  Although  al-Qaeda is hated  by almost all Iraqis, and despite the fact that its  military capability is  evaporating on the battlefield,  it  could still succeed at  making  Iraq the next Cambodia, making Afghanistan the next Iraq, and making America the next Israel.  But they can’t do it without the help of invertebrate American politicians.

[Update:   Obama,  sensing that he has hurt himself,  spins tough.]

Which brings us back to North Korea, where Roh Moo Hyun offers  his all-inclusive list of circumstances — “unless attacked or collapsing” —  in which Kim Jong Il might go for broke.  It seems unlikely that a collapsing regime would  try to save itself  by drawing in yet more enemies,  but Roh  omits a far likelier  circumstance: a clear signal that American power was paralyzed and unwilling to deter the North, even from the air or sea.  The worst possible circumstance would be to realize that only  after a North Korean first strike  aimed at U.S. forces, done with the calculated intent of knocking us out of the war politically.   Whether this would turn out to be a miscalculation is debatable, but irrelevant.   Our objective  is to increase our power to deter at  the lowest possible cost  by quietly projecting strength  and reducing  vulnerabilities that  undermine that power.  Barack Obama’s naive view of our predatory world  could be the greatest of them.  The potential costs are incalculable.

See also:

*   North Korean soldiers are turning to traditional  highway robbery.  Theft and marauding by soldiers is not a new trend in North Korea, and it’s difficult to know whether it’s a rising one.

*   Their government prefers more organized methods.  It has summarily  demanded a 15% raise in the “wages” paid to the workers at Kaesong, although it’s not clear how much of it actually trickles down to the workers after Kim Jong Il takes his cut, which would naturally follow an expensive reconversion  to North Korean won at the official exchange rate.

*   If it’s censorship to arrest someone for burning a flag or immersing a cross in urine, why isn’t it censorship  to  arrest a man who immersed a Koran in a toilet — at a university, no less?  There are times when I think there’s less freedom of thought at our universities than in  most  medium security prisons.

*   The Daily NK that North Korea is stepping up the brazenness of its songun (“military first”) propaganda in the South.  How adherents of that sort of aggressive, militaristic, repressive thinking ever got the name “peace activists” baffles me.

*   Congratulations to the Iraqi soccer team on winning the Asia cup.  Its last two big wins were against South Korea and Saudi Arabia.

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7 Responses

  1. I think Roh is right. I think there is a good chance NK would strike out if it began a serious move toward collapse. The conditions of how this would transpire are as varied as anyone could possibly imagine – ranging from on the border of the Doom’s Day variety to a quick internal, limited bloodletting as North Korean units refuse to fight and turn on Pyongyang instead….

    However, since the North is never going to return to strength to contemplate pleasing Bruce Cumings by unifying the peninsula through brotherly Civil War —– Roh noted the two primary and sole likely causes of such a conflict….

    What he didn’t way is that —- such a situation is predicated on the United States remaining South Korea’s bitch“blood ally” – and just as importantly….

    …..remaining unconcerned about the plight of the average North Korean millions……..and unconcerned about US security interests.

    I dislike the South Korean position — for South Korea’s sake — because it ignores the fact North Korea is likely to collapse sometime in the coming decades, regardless of SK’s appeasement approach — so that despite throwing resources at it and working against US interests, the war through collapse they are trying to avoid still has a good chance of taking place.

    If I were a S Korean, I’d have a hard time deciding to risk one of the worse case war scenerios by working to collapse the regime, but it is an option I’d have to come close to making since I see such a possible war as inevitable….

    As an American, I see no persuasive reason to continue to guarantee the North will never consider war with the South due to our strength and its weakness………

    ….while agreeing to watch South Korea do all it can to keep the North alive and a threat to the US.

    I understand why many South Koreans are looking at a potential collapse of the North and saying it is in their best interest to avoid collapse and hope for the best in the future…

    I have no idea why Americans should agree that those South Koreans are thinking things that are great for America too.

    Roh might be have some point for South Korea’s sake.

    But his points are directly against the interests of the US for the most part —- unless we agree it is ultimately best for us to ensure the North will not attack South Korea or Japan by helping it remain a broken down atrocious dictatorship a stone’s throw from collapse….

  2. Could you go more in depth as to Korea’s “Finlandization” by the PRC?

    Not that I disagree with you–on the contrary I am in total agreement but would love some more evidence to explain this to the starry-eyed Koreans who think pushing America away and leaving a vacuum for the PRC to fill is leading to “independence”

  3. I’ll give you a few links.

    Here’s a very good 2004 piece that tells us about the growth of Sino-South Korean economic and military ties up to the time of Roh’s infamous “balancer” policy. You could see that policy as, in essence, a declaration that South Korea is a neutral power (that still demands American protection). South Korea’s defense minister, Yoon Kwang-Ung, continued to expand Sino-Korean military ties afterward.

    Here are two two other well-written analyses since then, by Corey Richardson and Bruce Klingner. Overall, China has made some very significant diplomatic, political, and economic gains in its desire to influence South Korea in the last five years. It has probably made significant gains in the North, too, though it’s harder to quantify those.

    Even after Roh is gone, South Korea’s neutrality as to China is probably an established fact. Witness the controversy over the USFK and “strategic flexibility,” meaning that the US could potentially use Korea-based US forces to deter or oppose a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Korea wants no part of that, which is understandable, but Korea needs to understand that having US forces on its soil doesn’t mean those forces cease to serve US interests first.

    Now, much of that influence is necessarily hidden beneath the surface, but what’s most telling is how differently this South Korean government deals with the United States and China. It positively seeks out controversy with the United States (and Japan, of course) — because that’s what its base wants. It carefully avoids conflicts over things like North Korean refugees or Koguryo, and the Chinese and South Korean positions at the six-party talks are nearly indistinguishable. At those talks, South Korea was effectively in China’s lap, while the United States’s only really ally was Japan, until we turned on them.

    Somewhat related prediction: when the Roh government leaves office, there will be a massive scandal related to Chinese and/or North Korean influence in South Korea. Note also that the North Korean handlers of the Il Shim Hue ring worked out of a safe house in the Beijing suburbs, and that cell members had secured key positions in South Korea’s radical anti-American movement. How likely is it that China had no idea who all those foreigners were, coming and going from that apartment at all hours? Not very.

    China’s influence in the North is more of a question mark. Plenty of people have taken note of China’s investments and trade there, such as in the North’s mines, or its lease of the Rajin port. Still, well-informed friends tell me that the NK regime is increasingly wary of Chinese influence, especially within its military. It’s obviously hard to know the full extent of this, and the excellent Jasper Becker also questions how much influence China has on NK, at least politically. My guess is that in certain regions, and at the lower and mid-levels, the influence is considerable, but is less strong in the NK regime’s “core” areas and at the higher levels, except with NK officials whose families live in China, or who frequently move back and forth. And at some point, Kim Jong Il may grow suspicious of those people, which will be dangerous for them.

  4. Park Geun-hye is further to the right than Lee Myung-bak, as reflected in several South Korean polls where voters identified where the candidates were on the spectrum. Kim Geun-tae (since dropped out) was seen as most leftward followed by Chung Dong-young. Sohn Hak-kyu is seen as centrist, appearing both to the left and right of Lee depending on the poll

  5. I’m surprised that you say that about Lee and Park, but you’ve met at least one of them, which is one more than I have. Much of this may be the uselessness of the left-right taxonomy, especially in Korea. Lee certainly has a populist side, and with his love of public works projects, you could almost call him “left” economically. He is also much more aggressive in his confucio-evangelist social conservatism, ie., offering up the city of Seoul to Jesus. On North Korea, Lee seems marginally less accommodating of Kim Jong Il than Park, but the difference is barely noticeable, and thus won’t be very satisfying to Americans. I’m sure Park would be more steady, cautious, and measured in her dealings with the North … which is also how she’d be in her dealings with us.