Jane’s: N. Korean Regime Near Collapse

[Update:   Digg it here]

[Update 2:   A reader points out that Reuben F. Johnson is the source of both the Weekly Standard and Jane’s stories.  I admit that I’m not familiar with Johnson’s work, but  when  a story comes with specifics, it’s more persuasive than when it comes without.]  

Kim Jong-Il’s regime could collapse within six months, bringing chaos to North Korea, observers and intelligence sources in Asia have told Jane’s. [. . . .]

I know, I know: saying that North Korea’s regime could collapse in six months is a lot like saying someone else could step forward to accuse Bill Clinton of sexual harassment sometime between now and November. There’s a certain unpredictable inevitability to either contingency. This would have been an Anju Link, except that it’s Jane’s Country Risk News saying it, and they are offering some specifics to back this up.  I report, you decide:

Any apocalyptic scenario has to be taken with a grain of salt; in 1997 the Central Intelligence Agency predicted the collapse of North Korea within five years. However, there are reasons for the heightened levels of concern; in particular, the recent actions of Kim Jong-Il and other North Korean officials are being interpreted as signs that the regime is nearing its end.

Tellingly, the ‘Dear Leader’ is in the process of moving financial resources to ensure that his assets are portable should he have to go into exile, according to some sources.

The centrally controlled economy has also now ceased to function and the food distribution system is near breaking point. With loyalty to the regime at an all-time low, another sign of trouble is the regime’s diminishing ability to prevent people from leaving the country.  [Jane’s Country Risk News]

And there it ends, at the subscriber’s wall.  (For you subscribers or SIPR-Net users,  if you send me the rest of this, you can have one of my kidneys  or my chisel mortiser.  Take your pick, and bring plenty of plastic sheeting.)    

You will recall that I wasn’t very persuaded by a similar prediction at the Weekly Standard last November, but Jane’s does cite some known facts that support its position.  Our limited knowledge of events inside  North Korea supports the existence of a sharp downward trend:

• Food Situation Worsens.   North Korea’s food situation has gotten much worse, probably as bad as any time since the Great Famine, and this time, that situation may actually be  affecting  people Kim Jong Il  depends on  to stay in power. 
• Disease Spreads.   For several years now, we’ve been reading of major outbreaks of typhoid, paratyphoid,  typhus, scarlet fever, measles, and most recently, drug-resistant tuberculosis.  This may reflect the worsening food situation and dysfunctional health system, but it probably also reflects the fact that North Korea’s borders have sprung leaks.  Today, we’re more likely to hear about things we wouldn’t have heard about five years ago.
• Chaos Spreads,  Control Slips.   The border is leaky:  , and even the guards are dropping their guns and crossing it.  Most amazing, if true, would be reports that even the concentration camps aren’t secure anymore. 
• Palace Economy Damaged.   The sanctions of 2005-2006 did lasting damage to the palace economy.  The transfer of Kim Jong Il’s assets is interesting: it might mean what Jane’s thinks it means, or it might mean that Kim Jong Il reads this blog  and wants to protect himself against another round of sanctions.  It could also be a sign that slowly, banks are losing their fear of dealing with him.  If we continue to relax sanctions, the palace economy will gradually recover and we’ll lose our leverage over the regime.

Increases or reductions in  aid from the United States, South Korea,  or China could dramatically change  the regime’s survival prognosis.  Then again, if I were of a conspiratorial frame of mind, stories like this might be a good way to use intel leaks to mollify disgruntled collapsists. 

My take on this:  the conditions for collapse have probably  existed for a decade, and those conditions probably  are intensifying.  In past years, the probability of collapse might have been 10% per year.  This year, it might be 25 or 30%.  The fact that it hasn’t happened yet owes nothing to the contentment of the North Korean population;  the people have voted.  The problem is fear.   There have been many isolated acts of rebellion, dissent, and even mutiny, but so far,  no one in a position to make  collapse happen has dared to try, and no one can do it alone.  The decisive factor won’t be food or even information.  It will be fear.