Senate Confirms Kathleen Stephens as Ambassador to Korea

[Updates below and in the text.]

A couple of days ago, while traveling on business, I was informed that Sen. Brownback would lift his hold on the nomination of Kathleen Stephens to become Ambassador to the Republic of Korea. She was confirmed in a voice vote later that day. This is the first time I’ve had a chance to post about it.

The Senate confirmed a new American ambassador to South Korea on Friday, after a senator dropped his objections upon getting promises the Bush administration would urge North Korea to improve human rights.

The Senate’s voice vote confirming Kathleen Stephens came just ahead of President Bush’s trip next week to South Korea, a pivotal U.S. ally in Asia.

Stephens is currently a political advisor to the State Department’s Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, where she previously served as deputy assistant secretary of state responsible for managing U.S. ties with Japan and Korea.

Kansas Sen. Sam Brownback, a Republican, had held up her nomination over concerns that the Bush administration was overlooking human rights abuses as it pushed ahead with a multilateral effort to get North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons program.  [Reuters]

Brownback’s people informed me that he only lifted the hold in exchange for concessions on State’s policies on human rights toward the North. My understanding of those concessions  is as follows:

1. There will be a separate human rights track as a sideshow of the normalization working group.   Not just a sideshow, but a sideshow of a sideshow.  The other obvious question this raises is whether the North Koreans will go along, and what State will do in the overwhelmingly likely event that the North Koreans  decide not to.  My guess is that tongues will be clucked, shoulders will be shrugged, and the rest of the track will proceed apace.

2. Jay Lefkowitz will be “involved” in the normalization working group in some capacity, which is not clear. Will Lefkowitz himself, a  man whom State has  sidelined and shock-collared from the beginning,  have a seat at the table? Will it be one of his staffers (a mix of true believers and company-minded “establishment” minders)? Will this only allow Lefkowitz’s people to pen some suggestions for those who do the real talking?

3. There will be a separate Helskini-type framework for dealing with dissidents and prisoners of conscience. See 1 above. [Update: Sen. Brownback’s statement refers to abductees, not prisoners of conscience, but I didn’t hallucinate the word “Helsinki.” The same aspiration would be subsumed into 1 or 2 above, so I think the post is still accurate.]

4. State agrees not to oppose the North Korean Human Rights Reauthorization Act.    I’ll believe it when I see  what gets onto the House and Senate calendars for a vote by August 8th, when Congress goes into recess.  Nor is this necessarily a commitment not to try to water down the  bill the House recently passed.  Because the NKHRRA itself is merely an effort to get State to follow some portions of a law that was passed four years ago, I can’t say this impresses me deeply. [Update: Brownback’s statement doesn’t mention this, but I heard this from someone who would know, so I’m leaving it up.]

All of this came up shortly before Chris Hill was scheduled to testify before the Senate Armed Services Committee. Warner, the Committee Chairman, offered Brownback the opportunity to question Hill in a last-ditch effort to talk Brownback into lifting the hold. If Senator Brownback’s goal was to get State’s promises onto the record, I can’t say the effort was completely successful. Here’s the video of Hill’s appearance before the Committee:

Hill’s carefully prepared text on human rights appears at around 16:30.  Here’s a transcript of that portion of Hill’s statement, with links helpfully inserted by yours truly, because not every misleading thing Hill says is proceeded by his use of the  “frankly.”  You may want to use your “back” and “forward” buttons for this:

Even as we make progress toward finalizing Second Phase actions and begin moving into the Third, and final, denuclearization Phase, significant work remains, including  abandonment of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs, dismantlement of all North Korea’s nuclear facilities, removal of all fissile material, and verification of North Korea’s denuclearization.

In exchange, the United States is prepared to transform our relations with the DPRK into a more normal relationship. The United States and DPRK have committed to improving bilateral relations and working toward full diplomatic relations. One way we will seek to do this is by increasing bilateral exchanges between the United States and DPRK aimed at enhancing mutual trust.

The issue of human rights will be a key element of the normalization process. We will continue to  press the DPRK for the kind of meaningful progress that will be necessary for the DPRK to join the international community. The DPRK’s human rights record is abysmal, and every day that the people of North Korea continue to suffer represents an unacceptable continuation of oppression. I have seen satellite images of the DPRK’s extensive prison camp system ““ a scar on the Korean Peninsula ““ in which it is reported that North Koreans suffer torture, forced abortions, and in some cases execution. The dangers faced by North Korean refugees, who flee their country in search of a better life, often only to face suffering or repatriation, are similarly unacceptable. The United States’ dedication to improving the lives of the North Korean people will never wane, and we continue to seek all available opportunities to improve this heartbreaking situation. We have repeatedly made clear to the DPRK that human rights is a U.S. priority. We have emphasized how much we value the advancement of human rights in all societies, and our need to have this and other outstanding issues of concern discussed in the normalization process.

We note that the ROK’s National Assembly is considering legislation addressing North Korean human rights. Our Special Envoy on Human Rights in North Korea, Jay Lefkowitz, plans to travel to Seoul soon [see fourth item]. We will look for every opportunity to work with our partners in the region on our shared goal of a better future for the people of North Korea. Our goal through this process has been and will remain improving the lives of the people of North Korea.

On a separate track, to respond to severe food shortages in the DPRK, the United States began providing food assistance to the DPRK in June after establishing a strong framework to ensure that the food will reach those most in need. The United States also assisted U.S. NGOs in providing aid to fight the outbreak of infectious diseases following floods in North Korea last summer, and is working with U.S. NGOs to carry out a plan to improve the supply of electricity at provincial hospitals in North Korea.

You will not see Points 1-4 anywhere in the text or the video.  If you followed the links, you  realize that just about every statement Hill just made was either inaccurate or  misleading.  Perhaps  Hill’s newest promises  were in the Q&A, but that portion — for some reason — isn’t in the video or the transcript.  How odd….

Significantly, Hill does not say that any of the North’s worst human rights abuses — its discriminatory food distribution, its concentration camps, the inhuman experiments alleged to go on there, or its racially motivated infanticide  — must end as a prerequisite to the establishment of normal trade or diplomatic relations.  Unfortunately, the senators’ Q&A portion was cut off, and I was much more interested in their questions and Hill’s responses to them than in Hill’s carefully deliberated machinations.  That’s where Hill’s commitments would have gone “on the record,” assuming anyone was paying attention by then.

As you probably figure, I put about as much stock in a commitment from the State Department as one from North Korea.  The latter is under the totalitarian rule of a habitual liar, whereas the former is under the temporary sway of one.  In an election year in particular, you can expect this entire issue — starting with State’s promises — to disappear down the memory hole by mid-November.

I don’t mean to suggest here that Sam Brownback got any less than best deal he thought he could get, nor do I question in the slightest the sincerity of his efforts.  Politics, a topic he knows far better than me, is the art of compromise, and furthermore, he’s probably one of just four or five people in the entire Congress who gives a whit about any of this.  The problem of securing State’s compliance with the law after the hold is lifted is much like the problem of securing North Korea’s compliance with its agreements after sanctions are lifted.  Now that there’s nothing held over State, they will quickly lose interest in keeping their word. 

The big difference, of course, is that Senator Brownback’s clock was ticking, too.  As he must have realized, Congress goes into an election-year recess on August 8th with or without confirming an ambassador.  Rumor has it that Vershbow can’t stay on after September, so someone is going to get the job, even if  by a recess appointment.  After that, Brownback effectively has no leverage unless he’d opt to hold every single nomination for the post  until he gets what he wants.  If he did that — and he’d have been all alone in doing it — I can imagine that the pressure from his fellow senators would have been withering, and there might well have been consequences for his constituents. 

That said, we will all see soon enough that — just as with North Korea — nothing State says means anything unless they’re bound by hard conditions, deadlines, or benchmarks, of which there are none here. 

And  what kind of ambassador will Kathleen Stephens make?  For one thing, I think that she’ll get along well with everyone personally, her fluency in Korean will help in those relationships, and she won’t be gaffe-prone.  That’s where the good news ends.  Here are some predictions on which I’d love to be proven wrong:

– She’ll accommodate South Korean demands at the expense of U.S. interests, on trade, on USFK cost-sharing, on “restructuring” our forces out of artillery range, on any remaining force reductions, and (my greatest fear) on criminal jurisdiction and the SOFA.  I fear, to put it simply, that Stephens will fail to protect the people who are protecting her, and that she’ll  pitch more young American military personnel — guilty and innocent alike — into that fundamentally unfair and deeply prejudiced machinery the Koreans call a judicial system (start on page  78). 

– She’ll continue to say and do as little as possible about human rights in the North.  She’ll push as hard as she can to give the North benefits it has not earned, such as allowing Kaesong exports and other exports into the United States. 

– Her Korean language skills will prove less helpful to our public diplomacy than you might think.  Speaking and understanding the host nation’s language is a skill I wish more of our diplomats could master, but being understood is of no benefit when you don’t communicate your ideas the right way or understand what messages appeal to different cultures.  Stephens will be a master of moderation in her tone and in her careful choice of words.  And since when has anyone in Korea won an argument with moderation?

– If she lasts that long, she’ll eventually part ways with the Lee Administration over North Korea policy.  I increasingly suspect that Lee is uncomfortable that the Americans are moving too far, too fast in giving up our leverage  over the North Koreans.  It’s fair to see Stephens as an architect and executor of that policy.  So far, Lee has been too weakened politically to raise the issue.  If he can recover, he may start to express his concerns more openly.

– She  may not  last long anyway.  One gaffe and she’ll tempt the next president to replace her.  The polls are about even, so  she doesn’t even know who to be more careful not to piss off.  She’ll know that she’s on the thinnest of thin ice, and so will the Koreans.   Traditionally, ambassadors to Korea have been political  appointees, not career  foreign service officers.  Expect the next president to revert to past practice.   Don’t expect any  Bush appointee to last long under Obama.  McCain, whom Brownback endorsed early on when McCain seemed to have little chance of being nominated, would also view her with suspicion and want to put in someone he trusts.  All in all, Stephens is probably only there in a “caretaker” role.

Update 1: The L.A. Times adds a little more information on the Q&A by some of the senators on the committee, and by Sen. Brownback, who is not on the committee:

“We will definitely raise these issues as an element of our normalization process,” Hill said under questioning by Sen. Sam Brownback (R-Kan.), who had held up the nomination of a U.S. ambassador to South Korea as a sign of his unhappiness with the administration’s approach on North Korea.

But Hill added: “I’m not in a position, at my level, to state to you today what the specific conditions of normalization will be.” [L.A. Times, Paul Richter]

Not prepared? A howler. Is he actually suggesting that he has actually begun this “normalization working group” without having yet coordinated his must-haves all the way up to the White House?

Under questioning by Sen. Jack Reed (D-R.I.), Hill said the agreement commits North Korea to give up all its plutonium, including the fissile material in the small number of bombs it currently possesses.

But Hill said he could not estimate how long it would take to reach that goal.

“That is very difficult to assess,” Hill said. He said the wary North Koreans “prefer small steps,” and pointed out that they had shut down their rickety Yongbyon nuclear facility only “because we moved them along.”

Hill’s answer underscored the uncertainty still surrounding the multinational deal. U.S. and North Korean diplomats are trying to work out a process for verifying disclosures in June by North Korea about its nuclear activities and assets. But many experts on North Korea remain skeptical that Pyongyang will ever be willing to entirely close down a program it believes has guaranteed the security of the regime.

The hearing signaled the widely varying reactions to the deal. Although many conservatives are deeply unhappy with the agreement, Sen. Jeff Sessions (R-Ala.), a staunch conservative, told Hill that “it looks like you’re beginning to make some progress.”

At the same time, Sen. Joe Lieberman (I-Conn.) said he was worried an administration decision to drop North Korea from the U.S. list of governments that sponsor terrorism might have been “premature.”