Verify Distrust: Kim Jong Il’s Next Move

No one exceeds Kim Jong Il at the production of belligerent and grandiose theater.  So exactly what sort of kind of theater is he putting on for international monitors at Yongbyon?  That may depend on what you’d rather believe.  Do you remember a time, back when Roh Moo Hyun and George W. Bush were still the presidents of their respective nations, when South Korean leaks always cast the Americans as too suspicious and inflexible?  My, how times have changed.

North Korea has moved disassembled parts of its main nuclear reactor back to the plutonium-producing facility in a step toward its restoration, South Korea’s top diplomat said  Thursday. Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan expressed concern over the North’s move and urged it to honor a disarmament  pact.

“It’s not just words,” Yu told reporters. “They’re putting words into action. I urge North Korea to stop any unilateral move and resume” disarmament. Yu said the North has placed “severed or removed equipment back to around the five-megawatt atomic reactor,” the country’s sole operational reactor at the heart of its nuclear  ambitions.  [IHT]

Separately, the IHT’s Choe Sang Hun describes that equipment as “cables, pipes and other disassembled parts it had stored at sheds since its engineers began disabling the complex late last year.”  Choe also notes that the North Koreans have started clearing away the debris of the old cooling tower they dynamited in June.
The State Department would like very much prefer that you view this as a mere “negotiating tactic.”   Still, there are dissenters:

North Korea has begun reassembling nuclear facilities at Yongbyon which it had already disabled, Fox News reported Wednesday. An intelligence source told the Chosun Ilbo the story is true, adding Seoul “should watch carefully what North Korea does next.”

Quoting U.S. government officials, Fox said, “The North, after halting the disassembly of a key nuclear center, is now putting the center back together…  The motive isn’t clear but sources say North Koreans likely are reassembling nuclear facilities at Yongbyon partly to protest the United States’ delay in taking the country off its list of terrorist-sponsoring nations.”  A U.S. government official was quoted as saying, “They’ve been threatening this move for some time.”  [Chosun Ilbo]

You can read the full transcript below, and if you do, I hope you’ll agree that the State Department spokesman is quite clearly — to paraphrase a vulgar expression — talking out of the exit ramp of his alimentary canal.  He admits to knowing very few of the facts and takes this as license to put his preferred spin on them.  All he really claims to know for sure is that the North Koreans are “moving some equipment around that they had previously put into storage.”  Meaning what?  Pressed for details, the spokesman would not elaborate, although we have monitors on the ground watching all of this happen.

But this time, we have monitors on site watching everthing, so you have to wonder why State pretends to need “clarification” of what the North Koreans are really up to.  More to the point, the North Koreans have already clarified it:

Before workers began moving mothballed equipment back into place, North Korea informed U.S. personnel at its Yongbyon nuclear plant it would start reassembling its nuclear facilities, a South Korean official said today.  [….]

North Korea had publicly warned of such a move last week after stopping work to disable facilities at Yongbyon, including its main nuclear reactor, claiming Washington had failed to remove it from the U.S. blacklist of states sponsoring terrorism under a deal reached last year.  [AP, Jae Soon Chang]

True or not, doesn’t this declaration of intent mean something by itself?  Then, this little gem of a money quote:

The U.S. played down Pyongyang’s latest step.

He’s not the only one to use that word.

If you parse all of these reports carefully, the sources in the know don’t exactly say that the North is rebuilding the same reactor it had partially disabled.  Why should it?  The North has already produced a small arsenal from it, and its capacity is modest.  Some of that disablement was mostly symbolic; other disablement operations might in fact make it more difficult to restart the reactor (here, I lack the technical knowledge to opine, but proliferation expert Henry Sokolski has his doubts).  But the key fact is that this small reactor had probably reached the end of its useful life anyway.

But the channel added, “Even now, piecing the facility back together is seen as a symbolic gesture because so much already has been taken apart.” Experts predict that it will take more than a year to restore the nuclear facilities. Another U.S. official said North Korea’s intent might be “to put further pressure on us.” “The cooling tower is gone but the reactor could be back in operation in two to three months,” the official said. [ Chosun Ilbo]

But the crucial fact that none — none — of these sources bother to mention is that the disablement left some of North Korea’s other reactors completely untouched.  That’s a key point to pick at when you examine exactly how State is downplaying this, and it’s where I ask you to follow me in some baseless yet plausible speculation.  Because if the North Koreans really want to scare us, they’re more likely to fire up this reactor, a brand-spanking-new fifty-megawatt model right next door:

       

In 2005, the Washington Post reported that the North Koreans had accelerated construction of this reactor to prepare it for completion within two years. The report and the photographs suggest that they’re probably close, though we probably don’t know how close.  But if they’re as close as they seem to be, this is more a plausible destination for that equipment the North Koreans are rolling out of storage.  And no, no disablement was done on this reactor. Nor, for that matter, was any done on this 200-megawatt reactor, although this photograph suggests that that one is much less far along.

Here, I predict, is your next North Korean nuclear crisis.

Oh, and what are we going to do about any of this this?  Bupkes:

MR. MCCORMACK:  Well, nobody’s talking at this point about any punitive steps beyond those that are already in place.  There are already Security Council resolutions.  There are already bilateral sanctions that are in place.  We have a whole host of them that are on the books.  We’re focused on the positive aspect of this, the positive pathway of trying to get North Korea, along with our ““ we as ““ we along with our partners in the process to engage North Korea, get them to fulfill their obligations.  But ultimately, they are the ones that have to make those decisions.  So I don’t ““ I’m not aware of any other punitive steps that are under consideration by us or anybody else.

It’s as though these guys don’t realize we have other options.  Transcripts below the fold.

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 3, 2008

(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

12:36 p.m. EDT

MR. MCCORMACK:  Good afternoon, everybody.  I don’t have any opening statements, so we can get right to your questions.  Who’d like to start?

Matthew.

QUESTION:  North Korea, Sean.

MR. MCCORMACK:  Yes.

QUESTION:  Sorry.  North Korea.  What’s your understanding of what’s going on at Yongbyon?

MR. MCCORMACK:  Well, our understanding is that the North Koreans are moving some equipment around that they had previously put into storage.  I don’t have a whole lot of details beyond that.  Our monitors, our personnel are still on the ground, as are some IAEA personnel, and that’s why we have some real-time insight as to actually what it is that they’re doing.

Now with respect to moving the process forward, North Korea knows what it needs to do.  The United States has made it clear to North Korea, China has made it ““ made clear to North Korea, as have Japan, South Korea and Russia.  Part of what they need to do is to complete work on the verification regime.  So this isn’t asking anything beyond what is the internationally recognized standards for a verification regime.  As I mentioned yesterday, this is all part of the process of building up trust, as well as actually terrifying the facts that the North Koreans have given us.

So North Korea knows what it needs to do.  It needs to act to meet its obligations.  It needs to complete work on the verification regime.  And once those things are done, the process can move forward, and we will ““ we are prepared to fully meet our obligations as well.

QUESTION:  And when you say moving some equipment around that they had previously put into storage, what exactly does that mean?

MR. MCCORMACK:  I don’t ““ I frankly don’t have ““

QUESTION:  I mean, are they just moving it from one locker to another or are they ““

MR. MCCORMACK:  Matt, I don’t have more detail than that.

QUESTION:  Are they trying to glue back together again the cooling tower?  I mean, what ““ how significant is this movement of equipment?

MR. MCCORMACK:  Well, yeah, I’m not going to try to assess it from a technical standpoint, Matt, because I’m not a physicist.  I, you know, can’t put together a nuclear reactor for you.

But certainly, it ““ what it does tell you is that the North Koreans are not at this moment moving forward on the process.  And by that I mean they are not ““ they have not completed work on a verification regime.  So beyond that, I’m not going to try to give you a technical assessment of it. What it means is the process is not moving forward at this point.

Part of what we are going to try to do to understand better what the situation is and to consult with our partners in this process ““ specifically in this case the Chinese ““ Secretary Rice has asked Chris Hill to go to Beijing for consultations.  Ambassador Sung Kim will accompany him on those consultations.  Chris will be leaving ““ is it ““ on the 4th and should be back this weekend.  We’ll have more for you as those plans develop.

But again, it’s for ““ it’s to consult with the Chinese, who are the chair of the Six-Party process and who also do have a unique relationship with North Korea, to consult with them about how to move the process forward.  But the standards are clear.  We have laid them out, as have others for North Korea how they ““ what they need to do.

QUESTION:  But if I’m getting you right, you’re not, at this point, able to tell us from the podium that they ““ that the North Koreans are reassembling?

MR. MCCORMACK:  I can’t give you that level of detail.  To my knowledge, Matt, they ““ based on what we know from the reports on the ground, you don’t have an effort to reconstruct, reintegrate this equipment back into the Yongbyon facility.  It has been taken out of where it was being stored, I guess, is the best way to put it at this point.

QUESTION:  But should they stop that?  Should they stop that moving of equipment around?

MR. MCCORMACK:  What they need to do is live up to their obligations, Charley.  And they should reverse this step.  But more importantly, they need the complete work on their political obligations, and that includes work on the verification regime.

Yeah, Sue.

QUESTION:  Have you got monitors there are at the facility (inaudible)?  Are they able to see what is going on?  Where are they?

MR. MCCORMACK:  Well, they’re at the facility, as they have been for quite some time, some months now.  They’re the ““ it’s the same mission that observed the cooling tower coming down, for example.  I can’t ““ I don’t have the granularity of detail to tell you exactly what it is that they are ““ what they are seeing.  But they are still on the ground.  They are able to observe some of what’s going on there.  I can’t imagine that they can see everything, but they do ““ they have been able to observe some of this activity that has been reported starting yesterday.

Yeah.

QUESTION:  Are U.S. officials who have been dealing with this issue surprised by the North Korean action?

MR. MCCORMACK:  I can’t say that we’re surprised, Charlie.  I think the ““ we have been in contact with the North Koreans as well as other members of the Six-Party process as part of trying to move it forward, as part of trying to hammer out a verification regime.  So we’ve heard rumblings about this kind of action from North Korea.  Again, we urge them, as have others, not to take the steps that they have taken.  And we’re going to continue to engage in the process and try to use the leverage of that process to get them to focus their energies on where we think they should be ““ and by we, I mean the other members of the Six-Party Talks ““ and try to move the process forward.

We’re prepared to meet our obligations.  As we have said many times over, this is an action-for-action kind of process, and should North Korea fulfill its obligations, complete the verification regime, we are fully prepared and committed to moving forward with our obligations, as are the other partners in the process.

QUESTION:  And just to follow up, when he’s in Beijing, will Chris Hill meet with any North Korean representatives when he ““

MR. MCCORMACK:  Don’t have any ““ no plans that I am aware of at this point.  We’ll keep you up to date on what his activities are, as well as Sung Kim’s.

Nicholas.

QUESTION:  Sean, is ““ the process is not moving forward.  Is it moving backward?

MR. MCCORMACK:  No.  I would say it’s stuck in neutral at the moment, because you are not moving it forward, they have not completed their obligations.  But in these kinds of ““ we ““ in the Six-Party process, we have learned that it is important to have consistency of principle, it is important to have patience, but it is also important to emphasize to all the parties, most importantly to North Korea, the urgency and the importance of moving the process forward.

There is nothing inevitable about this process.  You’ve heard that from Secretary Rice.  And we have made clear that it will not move forward absent the fulfillment of all the parties’ obligations.  At the risk of sounding like a broken record, North Korea knows what it needs to do.

QUESTION:  But he has ““ from what I can tell, one of the reasons they’re citing for doing this, for moving the equipment and trying to “reassemble,” quote, unquote at least part of the plant is that you did not meet your promise to take them off the terrorism list within the 45 days.  Now I understand that the 45 days was the minimum period, not ““

MR. MCCORMACK:  Right, right.

QUESTION:  But they don’t seem to agree on that.  So where do you go from here?  I mean, is there any space for negotiation on this, or what do you do?

MR. MCCORMACK:  Yeah, well, in terms of our actions, we’ve made it clear.  We’re prepared to meet our obligations.  The President and the Secretary of State have stated ““ have made that very clear.  Part of ““ part of Chris’ mission, if you will, to go to Beijing is to talk with the Chinese about how to move this forward.  But we have stated where ““ our positions.

North Korea knows what it needs to do.  It’s not being asked to do anything that is extraordinary in terms of international verification regimes.  It may be difficult for North Korea, given its history and given the kind of regime and the kind of society that it is.  But this is part of the process of North Korea taking the necessary steps to have a different kind of relationship with the rest of the world.  And we’ll see if they choose to follow through on the commitments that they have made.

QUESTION:  And the last thing on verification:  So if the process were to go backward or get stuck even longer, then you would say that verification really is the issue here; that’s why they’re not doing what ““

MR. MCCORMACK:  For us, I think that is the bottleneck, I guess is the way to put it, in terms of the process.  Because all the parties ““ I guess all the five parties, other than North Korea ““ are completely united on the question of the fact that North Korea needs to fulfill this verification requirement in order for the process to move forward.  Should that happen, I think North Korea would see that in quick succession, the process would move forward.

But as I have stated many times over, this is an iterative process, it’s an action-for-action process.  To sum it up, looking at the phrase “trust but verify,” we’re not to the trust part.  We’re still working on the verify part.

Yes, ma’am.

QUESTION:  North Korea is (inaudible).

MR. MCCORMACK:  Well, nobody’s talking at this point about any punitive steps beyond those that are already in place.  There are already Security Council resolutions.  There are already bilateral sanctions that are in place.  We have a whole host of them that are on the books.  We’re focused on the positive aspect of this, the positive pathway of trying to get North Korea, along with our ““ we as ““ we along with our partners in the process to engage North Korea, get them to fulfill their obligations.  But ultimately, they are the ones that have to make those decisions.  So I don’t ““ I’m not aware of any other punitive steps that are under consideration by us or anybody else.

Anything else on this?  Yes, sir.

QUESTION:  With respect to Chris Hill’s visit to China, is China already giving you some ideas, like suggestion or recommendations on verification protocol or ““

MR. MCCORMACK:  I’m not aware of ““

QUESTION:  ““ compromise?

MR. MCCORMACK:  I’m not aware of anything we’ve heard back from the Chinese.

QUESTION:  Who is he meeting with ““

MR. MCCORMACK:  The ““ excuse me?

QUESTION:  Chris Hill ““ is he meeting with Wu Dawei or ““

MR. MCCORMACK:  Well, like I said, we’ll try to fill you in on the details as they become a little bit more clear as to with whom he’s going to meet.  Right now, it’s bounded by his leaving Thursday, tomorrow, and being back this weekend.

You had your hand up, sir?  We’ll go down, and then you.

QUESTION:  Just when did ““ do you have any confirmation of when North Korea started moving this equipment around ““

MR. MCCORMACK:  I don’t have the dates.  Recently.  Within the past several days.  But I will try to pin that down for you, if we can.

Yes, ma’am.

QUESTION:  Same question.

MR. MCCORMACK:  Okay.  Anything else on North Korea?  (No response.)   Okay, thank you.

QUESTION:  Yeah, just a quick one.  Can you give us a sense of how worried you and other people in the building are about this?  Is it threatening to unravel many, many months of very hard and important work?

MR. MCCORMACK:  The North   what the North Koreans have done?

QUESTION:  Yeah, the moving back of equipment ““

MR. MCCORMACK:  Look, there have been ““

QUESTION:  The reassembling, whatever it is that they’re doing.

MR. MCCORMACK:  Look, there have been a lot of ups and downs, starts and stalls, in the Six-Party process.  And as I said, we have a certain set of operating principles here, and that is action for action, and you know, standing on principle, looking for ““ but looking for ways to move the process forward.  And I think that we’ve shown that while standing on principle we are prepared ““ we have been prepared to be flexible.

But at this point, it’s really a question of North Korea performing on its obligations.  And you look at recent statements from the Chinese President, from the South Korean President, about verification, and I think it’s pretty clear that all the other members of the Six-Party Talks are completely united on it.  North Korea really needs to fulfill its obligations here in terms of the verification regime.

Okay.  Other questions?  Yes, ma’am.

QUESTION:  (Off-mike.)

MR. MCCORMACK:  To my knowledge, the only stop is Beijing.

Charles.

QUESTION:  Different issue.  In Pakistan, there were two different incidents today ““ two different things today.

MR. MCCORMACK:  Right.

QUESTION:  One is an attempted assassination of Mr. Gillani.  Do you have any information about that?

And also, there was a raid into Pakistan by some forces this morning.  Do you have any information on that?

MR. MCCORMACK:  Right.  On the latter, I don’t have any information for you.

On the former question, I think Pakistani officials are in a better position than I to answer any questions about this.  Certainly, we have seen violence and attempts at violence in Pakistani politics, and it is certainly of concern to Pakistanis.  It’s, of course, a concern to us.  We are pleased and relieved that the Prime Minister is unharmed, as are all of his entourage as well.  I haven’t seen any reports of any other ““ any casualties.

Kirit.

QUESTION:  (Off-mike.)   Pakistani sources (inaudible).

MR. MCCORMACK:  We’ll let the Pakistani officials speak for their side.  Of course, we have on a daily basis contact between our Embassy and the Pakistani Government.

QUESTION:  (Off-mike.)

MR. MCCORMACK:  I’ll let the Pakistani Government speak for themselves.  For our side, I would say that we have daily contact with the Pakistani Government.

Yes, sir.  In the back.

QUESTION:  Yeah, on Pakistan.  I’d like to have your comments on Pakistan’s decision to postpone military operations against and related to militants during Ramadan.

MR. MCCORMACK:  Let me try to get something for you on that.

QUESTION:  Sorry?

MR. MCCORMACK:  I’ll try to get something for you on that.

Yeah, Sylvie.

QUESTION:  Apparently, according to a specialized website, al-Qaida in Maghreb called its fighter to kill the Secretary during her stay in Maghreb this week.  Will they change the travel program of the Secretary?

MR. MCCORMACK:  There are no changes to her program.

Matthew.

QUESTION:  Somewhat related to that, has the ““ is the bank account or the special mechanism, or whatever you guys are calling it that is being set up to pay ““ has that been ““ is there cash in it now or is it still not ““

MR. MCCORMACK:  Not at this point.  Same answer as yesterday.

QUESTION:  And ““ but you still have reason to believe that it will be topped up soon?

MR. MCCORMACK:  Yes.

QUESTION:  (Inaudible.)

MR. MCCORMACK:  I’m not going to try to circle a date on a calendar.  We expect that it will be soon.

QUESTION:  Sean, does the money need to be there before she goes?

MR. MCCORMACK:  No.  She’s going to be proceeding on this trip.  We have every reason ““ rational expectation that the Libyans will live up to their commitments.  They have, in terms of their dealings with the United States Government, lived up to their commitments at every step along the way, and we have every expectation they will continue to do so.

Charley.

QUESTION:  Sean, some families of victims of Pan Am 103 have been critical in general of the Secretary’s trip to Libya, but specifically her trip, scheduled and going forward, without the money being put in.  Do you have anything to say directly to those families?  And was there any effort to meet the representatives of the families before ““

MR. MCCORMACK:  We have been, throughout this process over the years and across administrations, been in close contact with the families, and their considerations and their feelings about this process.  And the ““ at one point, the potential for an evolving relationship, and now the reality of an evolving relationship between the United States and Libya, has taken account of their input.  And part of the reason why we ““ the President was able to sign into law the legislation that was recently passed that allowed for and gave ““ allowed for Libyan compensation ““ full compensation to all the victims of terror was because of the efforts of the families and because of the United States Government’s awareness of their input and their thoughts on this.

All of that said, the United States is also going to move forward in its national interest.  And we believe that it is in our national interest to move forward with this relationship, absolutely mindful of the history of U.S.-Libyan relations as well as the existing reality within Libya.  We do not”“ we’re not ““ we’re certainly mindful of how far Libya has come, but also very mindful of how far Libya needs to go in terms of fulfilling certain ““ the requirements that we would expect of an evolving relationship in terms of human rights, in terms of democracy.

So, you know, look, I can’t pretend to stand up here and speak directly to families and speak about the loss that they’ve suffered.  You know, I can’t do that.  I can’t even imagine it.  But I can assure them that we have been certainly mindful and taken into account their thoughts and their feelings regarding this.  But we also have an obligation as an administration and stewards of the national interest and our foreign policy to try to move forward relationships where we can that we think are in our national interest.  And in the case of Libya, it extends beyond the bilateral relationship.  It extends into fighting terrorism in North Africa, which we’ve talked about.  It extends to trying to find a solution to the myriad problems in Sudan and elsewhere in Africa involving Sudan and Chad, for example.  It also extends into the Middle East and to helping resolve the complex issues there.  So there are a number of different aspects to the U.S.-Libya relationship and how it could potentially benefit the United States, benefit the region, as well as benefit the world while being mindful of the thoughts and feelings of the families of the victims.

QUESTION:  Thank you.

MR. MCCORMACK:  Okay, thank you.

(The briefing was concluded at 12:56 p.m.)

# # #

On-The-Record Briefing

 

Assistant Secretary of State for Verification, Compliance, and Implementation

Paula A. DeSutter, Coordinator for Counterterrorism Dell L. Dailey

and Special Negotiator for Non-Proliferation Donald A. Mahley

On the History of Libya’s WMD Effort and Dismantlement Program,

and Libya’s Renunciation of Terrorism  

  September 3, 2008

Washington, D.C.

MR. MCINTURFF:   Well, thank you all very much for coming.  This is a wonderful turnout for the first day of school.  (Laughter.)   We have a special briefing this morning on Libya.  We’re going to run through our three speakers ““ each have a few quick opening remarks ““ and then we will open it up for questions.  Our speakers have limited time, so we’ll try and keep to that and let them get back to their workday.

The order in which we’ll do this:  We’ll start with Assistant Secretary Paula DeSutter, who is Assistant Secretary for Verification, Compliance, and Implementation.  We also have with us Coordinator for Counterterrorism Dell Dailey and Special Negotiator for Non-Proliferation Don Mahley right here.

So, without further ado.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY DESUTTER:   Well, thank you.  I think probably a lot of you have been around throughout the Libya process.  I think I recognize a few faces.  The Verification, Compliance, Implementation Bureau was the lead and coordinator for the U.S. effort to assist Libya in their WMD elimination.  And I would remind you of just a couple things.

First, Secretary Rice was, at the time this was negotiated and implemented, the National Security Advisor.  And so back in the days when no one within the bureaucracy really knew that this deal was forthcoming, the Secretary was leading that effort to try to get them to make the commitment.  Secretary Powell at the time was very much involved and had said, at the very beginning, look, verification and elimination comes first, and only following the verification and elimination are we going to start to have the benefits begin rolling.

So we had set up benchmarks.  And once the Libyans met those benchmarks, there were a clear set of activities that would flow from it.  Early on, it was mostly lifting sanctions.  There were ““ there was a interlocking web of international and national sanctions on Libya that, in some cases, made it very difficult even for us to implement the WMD elimination.  What was critical at the time was that ““ and we didn’t know it at the beginning.  And we tried to move fast.  We wanted to remove especially the proliferation sensitive materials before anybody could change their mind.  But what we discovered over time was that the Libyan Government had indeed made a strategic commitment to eliminate their materials, eliminate their WMD programs.  And that decision having been made at the top, it was fully implemented.  And there was a very cooperative and transparent program ““ not always smooth, not always easy, but we were able to work those things out.

Don Mahley, at the time, was our senior WMD rep at the beginning when we were trying to move fast and remove materials.  Karin Look, who is my Deputy Assistant Secretary, is here and she was ““ has been the senior WMD rep for ““ a year and a half, two years?

MS. LOOK:   After that ““ after Don —

ASSISTANT SECRETARY DESUTTER:   After Don was finished.  With that, I’ll just say one other thing.  We ““ the Secretary and I chatted about this a little bit this morning.  And she was remarking on how important this model was, and it’s true and we’d like to build upon it.  It demonstrated that even when there is a country whose leadership we’ve had very difficult challenges with over a long period of time ““ if that country changes critical behavior that you have a terrible problem with ““ in this case, terrorism and WMD acquisition ““ that change in regime behavior can move ““ remove the necessity for calling for regime changes other administrations had done.

And with that, I’ll stop and turn it over.

MR. DAILEY:   My name is Dell Dailey.  I’m the Coordinator for Counterterrorism.  The Secretary’s September visit to Libya really does show a change and a new chapter in our relationships, our bilateral relationships with Libya.  It’s the first visit since 1953, John Foster Dulles, almost 50 years or so ““ 55 years, so it is a heck of a signal.

It’s going to allow us to expand cooperation in a lot of areas:  education, culture, commerce, science, technology, human rights, and security.  My aspect is, of course, counterterrorism security.  I’m pleased to be here with folks who have been part of this process for a heck of a long time.  I frankly had just watched it up until a year and a half ago as a concerned citizen; saw it as a success story and now, I’m pleased to be a part of it in the governmental perspective.

Coming off of the state sponsor terrorism list is a pretty powerful tool.  And both with the Libyans and with the North Koreans, it was a request on their part for us to extend this if they went through the appropriate WMD and nuclear and denuclearization process.  It is a model for other countries to use and I’d like to echo what Paula said.  We both took it from the same source:  from the Secretary.  They’ve been off the list since June 2006.  And in that timeframe, there’s been some very close cooperation in virtually all the areas of counterterrorism across the national aspect:  diplomatic, military, intelligence services, economics.  So it’s been a good move.

Where Libya has really been strong as ““ they’ve slowed down the movement of foreign fighters from their country through North Africa and ultimately, into Iraq.  They’ve been good team members and partners on that.  They’ve additionally been good team members on looking inside their own borders for potential foreign fighters that have gone across Northern Africa into Iraq.  And now, we see a little bit of a shift possibly even into Afghanistan.

And my final comment is an example of their cooperation not just with the United States, but with there are other countries there, foreign fighters that have moved from Libya into Syria that have been stopped by the Syrians have gone back to Libya.  So there is a level of cooperation that’s increased dramatically in this timeframe, too.

With that, I’ll close my comments, turn it over to Don, and I’ll be prepared to field any other questions you have in the future.

AMBASSADOR MAHLEY:   Well, thank you.  Let me just say that while you heard some sort of overviews up to this point, I’d like to focus for just a minute or so on a vignette which is a specific element of what kind of things we want to talk about concretely from the positive benefits of this kind of cooperation.

I would like to note that we are in the process, with United States financial assistance, of building in Libya a regional nuclear medical center.  Now, this is something which is not yet present in Africa and will allow Libya to assume a role of leadership in some of the preventive medical capabilities that go about there.  It is something, obviously, that involves nuclear technology and therefore is possible in Libya only after they made their 2003 decision to get rid of their nuclear weapons programs.  It will benefit both the Libyan people and the Libyan Government in terms of its regional capabilities and its regional reputation.  It is a significant outlay of United States dollars.  It is also a significant outlay of Libyan talent and resources.

And so with all of that, I think it’s just an example — and I want to point out that it’s only an example, of the kinds of things that this kind of behavior change by Libya opens the door for and allows us to go forward with in a very cooperative fashion.  We’re doing some other things that we’re working with the Libyans on, but I think this is really a centerpiece that they’ve asked for, that satisfies some needs in terms of the use and employment of some of the people that were previously engaged in things of not such useful behavior with their same technologies, and, at the same, time does indeed advance not only Libyan interests, but also interests within the region.

So with that ““ with that just as a vignette of an example, I’m like everybody else, I’ll turn it over to questions and answers to folks.    Thank you.

QUESTION:   Sue Pleming from Reuters.  Could you talk a little bit more about this nuclear medicine unit?  How much is it worth?  How far along are you?  And also, if you could specify a little bit more exactly on where else — you mentioned educational, scientific, cultural.  Could you provide some specifics on exactly where ““ what you’re going to achieve over the next few months, you think?  Or broader if next few months it’s not going to happen.

AMBASSADOR MAHLEY:  Well, let me give you a couple of figures on the nuclear medical center.  We’ve got $3 million that are obligated in the current fiscal year.  This is of U.S. money, another 11 for the coming fiscal year, and 25 for the following four years after that.

It is not something which is finished.  It is something which we did by a very deliberative process.  We decided that we wanted to start a planning process to make sure we strategically had it aligned, we had everybody in place that was going to be able to make it work.  We’re now proceeding along that.  And this $3 million allocation we have right now is to begin groundbreaking for the construction of this.  And we will have it finished, we hope, in about three to four years.

Now that doesn’t mean we’re not going to be able to use some proceeds from it in the process.  But it’s ““ it’ll be about four years before that’s really, really finished and up and running in all its aspects.

QUESTION:   And how much will the whole thing cost?  And what exactly will you be doing in terms of nuclear medicine?  Can you give some examples of what this means in layman’s terms?

AMBASSADOR MAHLEY:   (Laughter.)   It would have to be in layman’s terms since I’m not a nuclear medicine man.

What this does is it provides for example, a very advanced diagnostic capability as well as some treatment capabilities in which nuclear medicine is a component, when we talk about radiation therapy for some kinds of diseases, as well as the use of radioactive isotopes, for example, in terms of the diagnostic processes you’re going to get.  All of this is something which, as I say, organically has been largely missing from the African continent with the exception of South Africa for a whole ““ for history.  And therefore, not only does it provide that, but it provides it in a Libyan base which, frankly, we believe at least will help the Libyan reputation and their capability to cooperate with some of their African colleagues.  This is something which is important to the Libyans, as well as is important to us.

Now, I would note, for example, that the plans for the conversion of Rabta, their former chemical weapons facility, is to make that into a pharmaceutical output in which they’re going to be providing materials in terms of cocktails of medicines and other kinds of things for treating ““ treatment of AIDS and malaria in Sub-Saharan Africa, so that this is all a part of a general attitude on the part of Libya to be helpful.

What is going to be the total cost?  Frankly, I can’t tell you because a lot of that gets involved with in-kind contributions from the Libyans in terms of labor and operations and ongoing operational expense.  So I would say probably it’s going to represent an overall investment of about $35 to $40 million in capital and probably an operating expense of 750,000 to a million, at least, a year.  But that’s a very rough estimate and please don’t hold me to that as being an authoritative figure.

 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY DESUTTER:   Let me draw in one more just a rough data point that has nothing to do with verification.  The death rate among women in Africa from breast cancer and cervical cancer is outrageously high and a part of it is the lack of access to diagnostics and treatment.  And so the nuclear medicine field where radiation treatment and diagnostics are going to be available far more than they have been before, I think, is going to have a tremendous beneficial effect.

QUESTION:   I’m sorry.  Just one more thing on this — is the Saudi-U.S. funded nuclear medicine thing or is it ““ are the Libyans putting money into it?  I mean, this $38-$40 million, is that just ““ is it just going to be funded by the U.S.?

AMBASSADOR MAHLEY:   The United States is providing a great amount of the actual capital funding.  But as I pointed out, the Libyans are providing both in-kind funding and supplemental funding to that so it is a truly joint operation between the United States and Libya.  It does not have other foreign contributors other than the United States.

QUESTION:   Are there any other U.S. ““ I’m sorry, Viola Gienger from Bloomberg News.  Are there any foreign companies, like U.S. companies that are involved in either that project or in the pharmaceutical project at the former nuclear plant?

AMBASSADOR MAHLEY:   Well, the Rabta conversion, for example, is being done cooperatively with an Italian firm.  So yes, there are a number of other countries and a number of other fund sources that are going on within Libya for that.  Now, don’t ask me for a catalog of what those are because I can’t tell you.

MR. MCINTURFF:   Charlie.

QUESTION:   Can I ask a question of Dell?  You mentioned that Libya cut down the flow of foreign fighters ““ you said greatly reduced, I think.  Can you give us any more specifics either by way of numbers or percentages of the numbers that used to go and that you think now are going still through Libya?

MR. DAILEY:   The movement of foreign fighters from around the world into Iraq is best calibrated by what our forces in Iraq are able to say has taken ““ has arrived.  They assume at this point now that they get approximately 10 to 20 people a month that are foreign fighters from a myriad of countries, probably up to 22-plus.  Prior to this time, you could go back about a year, they were receiving somewhere to the neighborhood of 60 to 80.

Now, obviously, Libya’s not integral ““ is not the factor that slowed down this number.  But going into the countries that have provided ““ I’d say the source countries that provide the foreign fighters ““ giving them phone numbers and addresses of folks who have departed, who are going to go to Iraq, and letting those local law enforcement officials go back to the families, to the communities, to that area and say, do you know X, Y, and Z about one of your sons or brothers, that has turned out to be a pretty effective tool.  And you couple that with interdiction in the air ““ correction, interdiction through air movement at particular ports, and you couple that with interdiction across the border, and you couple that with actually killing or capturing inside Iraq and we’ve got these reduced numbers.

Excuse me.

QUESTION:   Michele Kelemen with National Public Radio.  Going to ask ““ both of you have talked about this as an example, but it’s taken a really long time ““ you know, you look at what’s happening with North Korea now.  They’re backtracking where they are because they’re not formerly off this terrorism list yet.  And then on the terrorism side, Qadhafi never accepted responsibility for Pan Am 103.  So aren’t you worried that you’re, you know, letting them off without really accepting that responsibility?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY DESUTTER:   Well, in terms of the model, I’ll start there.  One of the things that ““ I think Libya originally thought that the benefits of moving forward were going to flow really fast.  And in terms of the removal of sanctions, that did begin to happen very rapidly.  The Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, they were removed from that very quickly, the terrorism list.  They were the first country ever removed from the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism.  To some degree, there have been impediments —

QUESTION:   Hold on one second.  Weren’t they removed once before and then put back on?  Or is that someone else?

MR. DAILEY:   I don’t know.  I can’t answer that.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY DESUTTER:   I remember when we were working the process, it was very difficult cause it was the first time anybody had been through the process.  Maybe a thousand years ago.  But for us, they were removed in June 2006, and that’s when we did the process.

So that all has taken a long time.  There were some elements where they didn’t want public acclimation, which was difficult for the United States as we were removing the WMD equipment.  But they certainly are a demonstration, and I think the Secretary’s visit is going to be a huge demonstration of the fact that by changing behavior a country can change the nature of relations.

That doesn’t mean that there are no issues between the United States and Libya that are going to have to continue to be worked, just like there are with the hundreds of other countries in the world where we have differences and have to work those things out.  But what’s different is that we work those things out as two countries that have a number of common interests and purposes.  Libya made the decision to eliminate their WMD without the requirements to be ““ we didn’t pay them for any of the equipment that we removed, over a thousand tons of WMD-related equipment and documents that we removed from there.

They ““ there were many cases where Libya took us to facilities that we could have never known about.  And so that level of demonstration ““ in fact, on the biological weapons issues, we said, okay, we are now convinced that there ““ you know, while there was an early program that’s terminating, how are we going to be sure that you’re not going to pursue that in the future?  It’s very difficult to verify.  And their answer was, oh, get U.S. companies to come in in co-production with us and then you’ll know everything that we’re doing ““ a little bit of a misunderstanding about how much U.S. companies report to us.

But the openness and the transparency ““ but I think the Secretary’s visit will help be a reminder of the model and help give a very public international face to the fact that countries that change WMD behavior, change terrorism behavior, cooperate with us, have a way forward.  It’s not, this or nothing.  It’s walk away from the WMD path, make your country more secure, which Qadhafi himself said he had done for Libya.

Mr. Dailey, did you want ““

MR. DAILEY:  15 August, 2003, the Libyan Government accepted responsibility for their actions.  Whether Qadhafi signed on the dotted line or not, I don’t know.  But it was adequate for international courts and national courts to proceed forward, so I think it’s appropriate to accept the fact that they received ““ they accepted responsibility for it.

QUESTION:   Andrei Sitov from TASS, from Russia.  Thank you.  Obviously, the Libyan deal is very important.  I congratulate the U.S. on achieving it.  But there is a much more important relationship that seems to be sort of in limbo at this point.  How do you see further contacts, professional contacts with Russia, developing in each of your respective areas?

MR. MCINTURFF:   I think we’re going to keep this on the Libya track for the purpose of the short briefing.  But ““

QUESTION:   Can I ask after —

MR. DAILEY:   What country did you say?

QUESTION:   Russia.

MR. DAILEY:   Sorry, I’m going to just stay on the ““ inside the bounds.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY DESUTTER:   I would just give one quick answer, and that is we have hoped very much over the past few years ““ and I in my role as a verifier ““ to work closely with the Russians.  One of the areas that we hope to work ““ we’ve hoped to work closely with them on is how to do verification and elimination of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.  That, however, is a bit in abeyance, but it’s not because the United States isn’t interested.  We’d very much like to work with them.  We and the Russians have more experience in verification and elimination than any other countries in the world, and we hope that things can evolve in a positive way so that we can move forward on a post-START agreement that we can bring the Russians back into compliance with their obligations under the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty and a number of other areas.

QUESTION:   Why is that in abeyance?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY DESUTTER:   Russia ““ you may have noticed some activities in Georgia, where —

QUESTION:   Right.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY DESUTTER:   And so we are trying to focus, as a government, on those.

QUESTION:   But is it ““

ASSISTANT SECRETARY DESUTTER:   But ““ yes.

QUESTION:   Are we putting it in abeyance, or are they?  I’m just trying to ““

ASSISTANT SECRETARY DESUTTER:   The Russians haven’t ““ the Russians put in abeyance their compliance with the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty.  They’ve refused to accept any inspections.  They’ve not been providing data.  That decision was made a little over a year ago, and then they ceased their compliance ““ was it December, Karen?

MS. LOOK:   In December.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY DESUTTER:   And so that has been a focus for us.  I think the post-START effort is very important to us, and we’ll try to continue forward.  They haven’t been very forthcoming in a number of areas.  And on North Korea, I think we just ““ it remains to be seen.  But the Six-Party process continues and their role in the Six-Party process will continue.

QUESTION:   One last thing.  We’re supposed to present a —

MR. MCINTURFF:   Let’s just stick with Libya for now.  There was a question in the back here?

QUESTION:   Just another question for Ms. De Sutter.  Could you give a bit more of a sense the difference it’s been working with the Libyans and the North Koreans?  People ““ the North Koreans now apparently are rebuilding the Yongbyon facility, but people I’ve talked to on the Libya front said it was clear from day one that they’d made a strategic decision, we’re going to do it, and they brought everyone in; and that’s never been the case with the North Koreans, and now you see the situation now.  But maybe just a bit more on that, the difference of working with the Libyans and ““

ASSISTANT SECRETARY DESUTTER:   Well, let me start with ““ let me do it this way.  Verification is usually seen in the arms control/nonproliferation world as the hard part.  It’s usually very easy to negotiate things, or you negotiate them over a long period of time.  You argue about it, and then you go and implement it.  But it’s never been seen as a very easy process.  That’s why people consider the verifiers to be the skunks at the garden party, and you end up getting people to work verification who like being called skunks at the garden party.  That’s who we are.

And one time, I went to the Secretary.  We had brought a piece of missile baffle out of Libya, and I took it to her and gave it to her as a present.  And I told her, “Remember back when we were negotiating START with the Russians, and you would spend months and months arguing over how you were going to eliminate a rocket nozzle?”   You know, are we going to cut this much or that much, bigger, bigger?  And it was very difficult.  Okay?  You had to ““ each bit of agreement took a lot of work.

In the Libyan case, there had been some leftover engine equipment.  Our missile team went in and pointed to all of the things that needed to be eliminated.  And the Libyans came in with blow torches and sledge hammers, and by the end of the day, all of the things that needed to be eliminated had been eliminated, to the degree where there was no way they could ever be used for those purposes again.

That was a big difference.  That’s what was one of the things that was so unique about Libya.  Now, we can’t, you know, lose sight of the fact that verification and elimination has always been the hard part.  North Korea has made a commitment to end all its nuclear programs, to eliminate them, and we are in the difficult part of trying to move forward to be able to do the work.  And it’s more like the old process than our new Libyan model.

One of the differences is, from beginning to end, the WMD elimination in Libya was done in nine months, nine months to a year.  There was ongoing verification, but nine months to a year.  There are still a couple things that need to get done.  But it happened fast.  It happened fast because of that strategic commitment.  When we would go to a facility, they would ““ you know, the facility head would nervously phone Tripoli.  Tripoli would tell them, “Let them in.

It’s going to be up to North Korea, to some degree, to decide how quickly they want the verification and elimination process to take place, how much they want the United States to be able to testify at the end of the process, as we did in the Libya case, that we have reasonable confidence that we’ve been able to verify it.  They can make it difficult.  They can make it take a long time.  They can ensure that, at the end of the process, we don’t have the level of confidence that everybody in the world, especially here in the U.S., would like to see in that process.

We have to take it a day at a time and see what we can do.  We know what verification would entail.  Obviously, North Korea’s program is far, far more extensive than what Libya had, and so even under a best-case scenario with a strategic commitment by North Korea, it would take longer.  It would be more difficult.  We’re prepared to do that work.  Obviously, the verifiers have been worrying about how to do this for quite a long time.  And so the ““ doing that work will be difficult.

QUESTION:   You seem to be suggesting that you’re not quite sure that the North Koreans have made ““ that Kim Jong-il has made the same decision that Qadhafi did.  Is that correct?

And secondly, can ““ are you sure now that they are, in fact, reassembling Yongbyon?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY DESUTTER:   In answer to the first question, I have yet to see the sort of things that we would look for as a strategic commitment.  However, if we get on the ground and begin the verification process and elimination process in a real way, then we’ll be able to judge in a little bit better fashion.

As for Yongbyon, I’ve got to tell you I’ve been on leave for a while.  And my guys said, “I’ve got to show you what’s going on.   But you know, everyone has known from the beginning that the actions they were taking at Yongbyon were reversible.  The question is:  Are they deciding that they just want to blow it off, or are they just posturing?  They like to posture.

MR. MCINTURFF:   Let’s have the last question.  I know Dell Dailey has to leave here.

QUESTION:   Why, in your opinion, Qadhafi took this strategic decision?

MR. DAILEY:   You mean from a counterterrorism perspective?

QUESTION:   Yes.

MR. DAILEY:  I think he had spent enough time kind of on the outside of the international society and realized that turning around his nuclear program, and also soliciting to be taken off the state sponsor list, would be an advantage for him to reintegrate in the international community.  As a strategic decision, I’m not sure if the North Koreans have done that or not.

QUESTION:   There were lots of rumors in the Middle East that it wasn’t Libya, it was Syria with Ahmed Jibril, who was a Palestinian leader, who attacked the Pan Am 103.  What do you say to this?

MR. DAILEY:   Well, I think we have a pretty good legal justification of who was at fault and who was guilty, and that speculation is just speculation.

MR. MCINTURFF:   I think we’re going to have to wrap it up there.

QUESTION:   You don’t have a minute to ask about Pakistan, do you?

MR. MCINTURFF:   Thank you all very much for coming.  I think we’re going to wrap it up there.

Evening Walkthrough at Six-Party Talks

Christopher R. Hill, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs

China World Hotel

Beijing, China

September 6, 2008

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Hello, good to see you all. I had good meetings today with the Chinese. I met with Deputy Minister Wu Dawei to discuss the six parties. I also met with Assistant Minister Liu Jieyi to discuss our bilateral relations and some of the other security issues that we’re facing in the world today.
With Mr. Wu Dawei, I discussed with him the current difficulties that we’re having in getting through this declaration and verification phase. I discussed with him our concerns of how North Korea is currently handling this.
I felt that the Chinese have really done an excellent job as chair of the Six-Party process. They have worked very hard. They’ve been very active. And I think that this is an issue right now that China needs to continue to be very active to help resolve. I was reassured that China is doing all it can and working very hard to address these problems and to get North Korea on track in terms of providing a verification protocol. Now, I pointed out that we’re not asking for the declaration to be verified now. We’re simply asking for the rules of how it will be verified – that is to put together a protocol – and that we will remove North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism as soon as we know that we will be able to proceed with verification.
So, I think it is a very good opportunity to review this situation with the Chinese. And I was very reassured to see that China is working very hard to address this. And as you know, China has won a lot of gold medals in the last few weeks and I hope they are going to win one more in terms of resolving this issue. I also, in the last 24 hours, had the opportunity to discuss this with the South Korean delegation, also with my South Korean counterpart, and also with my Japanese counterpart. I briefed the Russian Ambassador today.
So I will be going back to Washington tomorrow. I’ll be reporting to Secretary Rice, who is returning from her trip to Libya. And we’ll see how we do in the next few days.

QUESTION: Sir, are you asking the Chinese to continue to do the work they are doing, and to do more possibly?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Well, simply that I was reassured that China is working very hard. You know, China is the chair of the process. The chair of the process has many responsibilities. I think China understands the importance of the phase that we’re in and the importance that – in giving us the declaration – the North Koreans also have to give us the means to verify the declaration. Not to say that the declaration has to be already verified; it simply means that it has to be verifiable. This was always what the issue was.
Now, I wanted to make clear to the Chinese that we are not, as the North Koreans suggest, looking to do “house-to-house” searches and this other type of activity. That is not what is in the protocol. That’s not what we’re trying to do at all. But we need to be able to say that the declaration that we’ve received from them is verifiable. And the way to make it verifiable is to have this verification protocol. So the declaration without a protocol is really like just having one chopstick. You need two chopsticks if you’re going to pick up anything. So I think China is very reassuring in the sense of what they’re working very hard to do to try to address this.

QUESTION: Ambassador, can you confirm the report that the North Koreans are now breaking the seals at Yongbyon?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: No, I really can’t confirm that report. I know they’ve taken some equipment out of storage. Whether some of the doors of the storage facility had a piece of wire on it, I’m just not in a position to confirm that. I know that they’ve moved some equipment around.
But, I would say they are trying to register their concern about where we are in the process. And I think we have to be very clear with them. And I think we have been – and other Six Party members have been – that we need a verifiable declaration. Meaning that the declaration they provided – I think a very good piece of work – needs to be accompanied with a verification protocol. So we’re trying to get that done and we’ll continue to try to get that done in the next few days.

QUESTION: So you don’t think the situation right now is that they are reassembling?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: No. They have taken some equipment out. As I understand, the equipment is still in its wrapping paper. But they’ve taken some equipment out. And I think what we need to do is to get on with the negotiations – which is to put together a workable verification protocol. And we’re going to keep our focus on that. And I think the Chinese, again, have been very reassuring in the fact that they understand their responsibility as chair is to be active and try to address this issue.

QUESTION: Sir, have you planned meetings with the North Koreans?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: I don’t have any planned meetings. I assured the Chinese that we’re prepared to meet with them. We’ve met with them in the past. We’ll certainly meet with them again. I’ve met with just about everyone else. We have to wait and see what they’d like to do.

QUESTION: And what steps for the North Koreans to do? What steps would you like them to do?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: All they need to do is to agree to how we’re going to verify this thing – that is, agree to a verification protocol. To say that we’re looking to make house-to-house searches in North Korea is simply not an accurate characterization of what we need.
I want to stress too that we’re not looking to verify their declaration now. We’re looking to come up with rules with how we will verify it in the future. So if we can get that, we’ll take them off the terrorism list. We’ve done our 45-day notice period to the Congress. So we’re prepared to move very quickly on that – really instantaneously – provided we get what we need in terms of the verification.

QUESTION: Ambassador, what happens from here? Is now simply a matter of waiting for the North Koreans?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: I think the Chinese are going to be working very hard on this. I think they’re going to try to be reaching out to the North Koreans. I assured the Chinese that we’re prepared to do the same. We’re prepared to talk to them. I also assured the other partners that we’re prepared to do that.
But, you know, we need a verification protocol. We can’t have a declaration without a means to verify the declaration. The declaration must be verifiable. To be verifiable you need to know how you’re going to do the verification. There is absolutely nothing new in this issue. So, I think we just need to see how this develops in the next few days.

QUESTION: When you said “China is reaching out” do you mean China may be sending officials to Pyongyang?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: I am not aware of how they will do it. But I think that they understand the urgency. But I am not saying that they are prepared to send people or make phone calls or whatever. That is up to them.

QUESTION: If it is true that the seals have been broken, what would it mean for the whole process?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Look, I can’t get into hypotheticals. I do know that they’ve been moving equipment around there, and they’ve been taking equipment out of storage sheds that are also there. You know, actually reconstituting Yongbyon is not an easy piece of work. It doesn’t happen in a matter of weeks or even months. It would really take more than a year.
But obviously our focus is on trying to get through this verification protocol. And then we’ll take them off the terrorism list immediately. And then we’ll move on and get into phase three and see what we can get done. At least we’d be able to hand over phase three in the U.S. case to a new administration — but most importantly to have a very up-and-running and successful Six-Party process.

QUESTION: Regarding the Chinese, do you have a better idea of how to move forward?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: I think I feel very reassured that China is being very active and understands their responsibilities as the chair of the process. China has done a really superb job as chairman of the process. And I think that they understand that they have to continue to do a superb job and work on this issue.

QUESTION: Has China suggested any specific ideas?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Again I don’t want to get into specifics. You’ll have to ask them.

QUESTION: Can this setback be resolved before the next U.S. President takes office?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: We have to get this verification protocol done very soon. So yes it can be. And I think that it will be.

QUESTION: Do you think China now has to play a crucial role in this?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Well, I think China has always played a crucial role as chair. And I think that this week is no different than previous weeks.

QUESTION: Did you have a chance to raise the discussions on the Indian Nuclear deal with the Chinese side?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: I did. I have been discussing that issue. I don’t want to go into details of the discussions. But I have had discussions here in Beijing. And there have been a lot of trans-Atlantic and trans-Pacific and trans-Asian telephone calls on it. But I’m not in any position to make any announcements here on where we stand with that.

QUESTION: Any impressions with where China stands on this issue?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Again, I don’t want to be the spokesman for China. You should check with China, or stay tuned to what your colleagues in Vienna come up with.

QUESTION: Do you have any meetings tomorrow?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: I don’t have any meetings tomorrow. But I’m leaving tomorrow afternoon to get back to Washington.

QUESTION: Who did you meet with just now?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Liu Jieyi.

QUESTION: (inaudible)

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: As I understand, they’ve moved around some equipment; it’s still been in its wrapping paper. I’m not sure what is meant by this “seals. I think maybe they’re referring to the fact that the doors on the sheds – on the storage facilities – have a piece of wire between the two handles. I think that’s what they’re talking about, but I’m not sure. I’ll look into it, but I just don’t know any more than that. Our problem is that they’ve taken stuff out of these storage facilities and put them elsewhere. But nothing has been done yet in terms of reattaching them. But what I want to emphasize is to try to reverse the disablement is a process that would take many, many months.
So, in the meantime, I think what we’re trying to deal with is a problem of trying to get a verification part to the declaration. And I hope that we can do that together working closely with all the other parties.

QUESTION: Why are you optimistic that this can be resolved before the next president takes office?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: I never used the word “optimistic. I didn’t use the word “pessimistic” either. I just tried to explain where we are. I’m not characterizing what I’m saying. I’m just saying that I know that China is working very hard on it. I didn’t see any daylight between any of the parties. We had complete understanding with the ROK delegation and complete understanding with the Japanese. The Russian Ambassador assured me that we have no daylight between us. And China is also very much working along the same lines. So I’m pleased that we have a lot of unanimity. But I don’t want to characterize whether I am optimistic, pessimistic, or whatever. I’m optimistic about very few things in the world except for the Boston Red Sox and beyond that we’ll just let the facts lie where they are.

QUESTION: Have you had any contacts at all with any Iranian officials while Ahmadinejad has been in town.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: (laughs) No, I have not. Not at all. Ok. See you later.

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