N. Korea Marks Terror De-Listing By Threatening to Turn Seoul into ‘Debris.’

Never mind North Korea’s sponsorship of terrorism.  I’ve said it before and I’ll say it again:  any government that delivers messages like these should be listed as a specially designated terrorist group:

“We clarify our stand that should the South Korean puppet authorities continue scattering leaflets and conducting a smear campaign with sheer fabrications, our army will take a resolute practical action as we have already warned,” the official KCNA news agency quoted the military spokesman as  saying.

At a rare round of military talks on Monday, North Korea complained about the leaflets while South Korean activists sent a new batch of 100,000, despite warnings from Seoul not to do  so.

“The puppet authorities had better bear in mind that the advanced pre-emptive strike of our own style will reduce everything opposed to the nation and reunification to debris, not just setting them on fire,” the spokesman  said.

South Korean groups have been sending the leaflets into the North for years. Analysts said the recent wave appeared to have touched a nerve because they mentioned a taboo subject in the North — the health of leader Kim  Jong-il.  [Reuters, Jack Kim]

This is how North Korea responds to mere words.  In the wake of America’s extorted de-listing of North Korea as a sponsor of terrorism, Let’s compare this, or any of those “sea of fire” threats the North regularly levies at Seoul or Tokyo, to how the laws of the United States define “international terrorism:”

As used in this chapter – (1) the term “international terrorism” means activities that … (B) appear to be intended – (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and (C) occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum.  [United States Code, Title 18, Section 2331(1)]

Someone tell me how I’m off base here.  And if any doubt remains that terrorism works, ironically, it’s South Korean President Lee Myung Bak who’s helping to remove it, and he does so to adhere to a predecessor’s agreement to censor speech that “defames” the North.  South Korean officials now suggest that this agreement, which is reasonably interpreted to apply to actions by the respective states, will now be interpreted broadly enough to censor private expression:

The South Korean government announced today regarding the sending of anti-Kim Jong Il leaflets into North Korea by non-governmental organizations that it will take “measures according to the law and principles (of inter-Korean agreements). North Korea repeatedly brought up the issue during South-North military working-level talks yesterday.  [….]

In the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement of 1991, the South and the North agreed not to slander or defame each other, and during the summit talks of 2004 both the South and the North agreed to halt all propaganda activities such as anti-regime broadcasting, placing defamatory placards or dropping leaflets near the DMZ from the 15th June that year.

As spokesperson Kim put it, “According to the laws and principles of the agreements, necessary measures will be taken against these organizations in the private sector, after requesting that they cooperate”. The government has twice requested the private sector to control itself, but this is the first time the term “necessary measures” has been used.  [Daily NK]

But Lee is doing the “practical” thing, of course.  And in Lee’s case, practicality has never been restrained by any great love of free expression.  Just as I condemned Lee for censoring the expression of ideas I despised, I condemn his imminent censorship of ideas and methods I emphatically endorse.  A society where both cannot coexist isn’t really free.
But the “practical” argument always goes this way:  why must mature adults tease the armed whooping loonies with the [circle one:  leaflets, cartoons of their prophet, uncensored newspapers]?  There’s no denying the practicality of an argument that defers the threat of violence, and so the practical argument is that we should accede to the violent threats of thugs to censor what we say today — or to enforce the unnatural containment of free expression within our own borders — until the next terrorist threat comes tomorrow.

It’s not hard to see how a society that listens to such “practical” advice eventually enslaves itself.  I doubt that it’s mere coincidence that in Canada, the state had no visible interest in the preemptive censorship of some of its most prominent publications and writers before international terrorists began operating inside Canada.  If this is not Canada’s surrender to terrorism in a direct sense, there certainly is a strong temporal correlation between 9/11 and Canada’s new-found sensitivity to words and ideas that offend radical Muslims.

We have also seen that the North’s proxies — often assisted by a leftist government that mixed easily with them — are willing to censor ideas within South Korea itself; to list a few examples, the selective taxation and governmental agitation used against opposition media, the threats against Radio Free North Korea, the blocking of a U.S. Ambassador from attending a media interview, attacks on non-violent human rights activists and publishers, and the alleged attempt to shut down “Yoduk Story

In some of these cases, it wasn’t clear what, if any, connection the thugs had to the South Korean government.  The identity of the actors is ancillary to the point.  The point here is that North Korea respects no borders but its own, and that there is no political or military boundary at which North Korea will cease to demand the enforcement of its own rules of censorship except the limits of what it thinks it can get away with.  But what else should we expect of a regime that calls the very idea of free expression “nonsense?

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7 Responses

  1. Isn’t the language and interpretation of the text of the statute irrelevant? There was never any attempt made by the administration to justify removal from the list in terms of North Korea’s progress in having ceased terrorist activities. The value of the designation has now forever been debased as to all nations against which it is applied. If nations can be removed from the list for “good” behavior wholly unrelated to its terrorism related activities, then isn’t the flip side of that an argument that designation in the first place was just an illegitimate attempt to extort non-terrorism related concessions of some kind from designated nations? (I’m not arguing that North Korea’s designation was illegitimate, only that we’ve provided fodder for other nations to argue just that.)

  2. In response to the article posted by James, I am honestly searching for an answer as to what explains State’s idiocy over the last several years. Can it really be as simple as that – that State is peopled by incompetent bufoons? I really don’t believe that is the explanation, these people are not dumb. Could it be explained by Condi’s and W’s desire for legacy building? Going back to my last statement, if they are not stupid they would know that banking a legacy on the good word of the Dear Leader makes about as much sense as feeding your child Chinese made baby formula based on high Chinese food standards. Do they know something we don’t: that the regime is on the verge of collapse, and all this masturbatory diplomacy is aimed at keeping them from doing something really stupid until they cease to exist in a few years? Again going back to the assumption of intelligence, State can’t possibly believe that drafting deliberately ambiguous agreements, and giving significant benefits to the DPRK for the simple act of signing the worthless agreements is accomplishing anything? Are they a bunch of masochists who take some sick pleasure in being repeatedly humiliated? What? Honestly, someone please explain to me what is going through those “minds” at State?

  3. Joshua, colleagues:
    This may sound zany, but there is some scuttle online about the following possible scenario.

    Let me preface by saying I am not an ambassador, a state dept official, and I have not slept in a Holiday Inn Express in months. So my comments are the summation of a rank amateur based on my own ground level view and some erratic data mining on the internet.

    There are some that believe de-listing was a choreographed procedure performed in anticipation of an imminent collapse. The thinking is something along the lines of preparing the world opinion shapers to view the US as a ‘good guy’ here, trying to work with implacable Pyongyang, and that the collapse of the Juche state will be seen as unforced and inevitable. That may free the US for a larger menu of strategic options in dealing with the aftermath of a failed state in serious humanitarin crisis.

    If any of this is true, and there is enough evidence to credibly predict an imminent collapse of the DPRK, then the de-listing will have no serious long-term consequences and may even be a shrewd move in anticipating the type of legal and trade policy reversals that will surely be required in a post-Juche North Korea.

    Now this could be total baloney. And it could be partially true. But there is a great deal of posturing and posing that occurs here on the peninsula and choreography plays a role here, for good or for evil. I am hoping that regime collapses with the ‘soft landing’ scenario, but starvation could be a strong motivation to welcome peacekeepers from the ROK and the UN – and *gasp* even the US Military.