This is not the Dennis Blair I knew
Dennis Blair, who tried to put diplomacy’s own Jeremiah Wright in charge of writing our national intelligence estimates, has just thrown the entire Obama Administration off message on North Korea’s upcoming missile test. (Mark your calendars for April 4th, though April 15th seems at least as likely). Blair, testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee no less, mused that North Korea’s missile test is probably just what the North Koreans say it is:
“I tend to believe that the North Koreans announced that they are going to do a space launch and I believe that that’s what they intend,” said Dennis Blair, the director of U.S. national intelligence. “I could be wrong but that would be my estimate. [Joongang Ilbo]
Until this point, the American government, the Japanese government, and the South Korean government had all been unanimous and on-message, rejecting North Korea’s spurious description of its missile test as a satellite launch and agreeing that such a spurious description didn’t make the launch any less of a threat, or any less a violation of U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1695 and 1718. The media reaction to Blair’s stoopid-with-two-O’s comment would have thrown any Republican Administration into full damage control mode, and very possibly blunted its capacity to deter the threat.
All I can say is, thank God we finally live in a country where the press never questions the government.
Related: Our Secretary of State, predictably enough, prepares to fold like a cheap pantsuit:
U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on Wednesday offered to hold missile-related talks with North Korea amid moves by the Stalinist country to launch what it says is a communications satellite but what intelligence agencies believe could be a long-range missile.
After a meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi in Washington, Clinton said, “We need to have a conversation about missiles, and it wasn’t in the six-party talks.” She added, “We would like to see it be part of the discussion with North Korea. But most importantly, we would like to see North Korea evidence in some way their willingness to re-engage with all of us and to work together on the agenda that they agreed to in the six-party talks.” [Chosun Ilbo]
And each new set of talks is yet another opportunity to carry tribute to His Porcine Majesty … as opposed to an opportunity to stand toe-to-toe with the aggressive dictator and secure one’s place in history with that tough, smart diplomacy we were promised.
The call came at 3 a.m. The answering machine picked up.
Actually, it likely will be a satellite launch. North Korea sees a political-diplomatic benefit to this, but more importantly a satellite launch is, relatively speaking, much easier; they only have to make sure the payload enters space, and not predict where an ICBM payload (i.e., real/simulated warhead) would land.
More detail on the reasons here;
http://www.dprkstudies.org/2009/02/18/long-term-goals-in-north-korean-brinksmanship/
As for what sort of satellite North Korea might launch? A satellite does not need to be complicated, it does not even need to receive transmissions. They could easily produce/power a small satellite that could broadcast a signal. Probably high school students could do so for a science project. Think Sputnik, but less sophisticated.
If their missile doesn’t blow up on the launch pad or shortly thereafter, and does make it to the intended altitude, rest assured we will know if they leave a deposit in space or not.
Having said all that;
==> A launch – for ICBM or space launch vehicle (SLV) – would be a clear violation of the two UNSC resolutions noted in the post above. No question about it.
Blair should have clearly stipulated that.
==> The first two stages of the missile in either case are exactly the same for both uses; they can be used for satellites or nuclear weapons. There might be some variation in the third stage for ICBM vs. a satellite launch, I suppose. At any rate, North Korea will test/validate the same missile design that could potentially target the U.S. and/or be proliferated.
Blair should have strongly emphasized that, too.
I’m personally all for shooting the thing down just before or after it passed into/out of Japanese airspace. Free target for us.
But the first step in having a workable ICBM is to have the raw launch capability. So, at least to me, it seems it wouldn’t matter if they strapped a cat on the top of the thing and shot it into orbit….as long as they could prove to themselves (and us) that they have crossed over the first hurdle.
Which is their goal…
But, I’ve also wondered about the targeting thing since they first shot one up in 1998: How hard would it be for them to just target the mainland US — that massive chunk of land – as opposed to a precision strike targeting a city?
My thought is – North Korea wants an ICBM as a tool of terrorism. It wants the raw ability to threaten to deliver a nuclear bomb onto the US. It is hoping that causing such fear will make it a stand-off weapon – an enhanced deterrent – that will prevent the US from attacking it and will enhance pressure points/make their brinkmanship more effective/allow them to push brinkmanship further than they currently can.
So, how hard would it be for theNorth to simply target the bulk of the North American continent?
My guess is that they will have a harder time making the warhead than getting the ability to target the thing for what they want.