We Can’t Ignore North Korea’s Proliferation Threat

I’m a very big fan of B.R. Myers and very seldom disagree with him, but he’s dead wrong when he tells us that the best way to deal with North Korea’s threats is to ignore them. First, the idea would only be practical if B.R. Myers set editorial standards for all the world’s news media. In fact, Kim Jong Il is very good at not being ignored, and if the media comprise the fourth branch of our government, any minor civil servant can verify that it rules the other three. Second, the world’s news media are right that Kim Jong Il is a threat, though not necessarily for the reasons they dwell on.

I agree with both Heritage and the overwhelmingly left-of-center media that Kim Jong Il’s missiles are a threat — in limited circumstances — and that missile defense is therefore a necessity for our security and that of our allies. But because North Korea poses a direct threat only in certain narrow circumstances, the probability of massive retaliation mitigates the risk of a direct North Korean attack.

The probability of massive retaliation does not mitigate the far greater risk that North Korea will supply weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, to those who are undeterrable. North Korea, the world’s most promiscuous peddler of WMD technology, knows that it would get away with this, and it has repeatedly threatened to sell nuclear weapons to terrorists. In the two years since North Korea signed up for Chris Hill’s Agreed Framework 2.0, it was caught building a nuclear reactor for Syria and flying some still-undisclosed WMD-related cargo to Iran. And then, there is this:

Aggravating the insult, Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad sent a delegation of 15 senior Iranian launch experts from the Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group to help out. Pyongyang announced it will fire the rocket sometime between April 4 and 8. [Henry Sokolski, National Review]

Ignore that at your peril.

0Shares

4 Responses

  1. If this rocket flops like the last one, which is more than likely, than any terrorist organization still interested in top of the line NK WMD technoglogy deserves to get the product they payed for and not complain that it was bought from a lemon dealership.

  2. I agree with everything you say but I do question from time to time if the concept of “assured destruction” will work as effectively as most consider.

    North Korea – and nations like Iran and others – want nukes not for their offensive capability but as a deterrent, and they don’t need to have enough assure the destruction of the United States for their nukes to be effective. The tactical use of having nukes for them is terrorism – making the US and world community fear the consequences of going to war with them.

    And it isn’t a bad idea on their part: They know the masses in the world democracies are squeamish about sending young men off to war already. They know that the potential horrors of a mushroom cloud consuming tens of thousands of their young men while fighting a battle on foreign soil will terrify them. And this fear makes questionable whether the US and world community will have the guts to follow through on the “assured destruction” threat if a nation like North Korea can openly demonstrate it has a working nuclear bomb.

    If the North can also prove it has the raw capability of putting a nuke on a missile and hitting the US mainland with it, it believes the deterrent will be even more advanced — and that will give it more freedom to do as it pleases in its region.

    In other words, the better the nuke deterrent a nation like NK has, the more it believes the US will not have the guts to destroy them and will go much more out of its way to avoid a military clash with them – which will make it easier for them to bully their neighbors or blackmail the international community.

  3. The nuclear threat posed by the DPRK is real, and must be treated seriously. Rogue nations like the DPRK and Iran may claim that they only pursue nuclear and/or missile technology for peaceful purposes, but, I doubt they really expect many to believe that cock and bull story. Both of those nations intend exanding and extending the reach and power of their destructive capacity.

    The DPRK has need of foreign currency, and almost nothing it can export… except weapons. Their associations with Iran are especially worrisome. Iran wants and ‘needs’ both nuclear warheads and a reliable delivery system capable of striking Israel, and as a means of demonstrating their leadership claims of the Radical Islamic Movement. The DPRK has a good partner and customer in Iran. The launch a few days ago from N. Korea was a success in demonstrating they have a launch vehicle that meets Iran’s need to threaten Israel. It was a sales demonstration, and must have boosted the Iranian confidence in one of their major arms suppliers.

    Kim Jong-Il needed a high profile event to bolster his support in the wake of the uncertainty that followed reports of his probable stroke. This event reassures the N. Korean masses that the Beloved Leader is still effective and in charge. As a diversion from Jong-Il’s health problems, the launch worked admirably. As the DPRK begins its new five year dictatorship, the supposed launch of a satellite will lend luster to the regime. We’ve witnessed some jockeying about in what appears to be the top leadership, and the time for getting ready for a successor to Kim Jong-Il is getting shorter. This event will be featured as part of his, and his family’s, legacy. It will be interesting to see which of Jong-Il’s son’s will be associated with the recent test… and the series of launches that are almost certain to come.

    The DPRK is a master at negotiations by threat. Threats must at least appear credible to be useful. In a land where secrecy and casual brutality are the rule, extraordinary claims can be made that have to be taken with some degree of seriousness. The ‘nuclear test’ probably was a practical failure, but it served it’s purpose and many today talk of it as if it proved the N. Korean’s probably have nuclear warheads. The potential harm and destabilizing effects of a nuclear armed DPRK with even a mid-ranged delivery system is enough to bring regional leaders to the negotiating table. They are intransigent and threatening to the degree that we (US, ROK, Japan, Russian and the PRC) feel that something must be done to reduced the threat. Soooo, we agree to supply food for starving civilians that will be diverted to the Kim’s and their military machine. We agree to provide petroleum that remains a major constraint on the North’s military capacity. We agree to help the DPRK in other ways… if only they’ll play nice. They promise, and then default on their promises while thumbing their noses at the world. “What you going to do about it? Do anything effective, and we’ll overrun the ROK behind a nuclear shield.” Even if you don’t believe a word of it, who wants to take a chance on upsetting the stability of the region by a resumption of the hot Korean War? We’ve demonstrated time and again over the past fifty years that we’ll back off leaving the DPRK the ‘winner’.

  4. Let me just point out, Joshua, and thanks for your kind comments, that newspapers usually create their own headlines, as the NY Times did in this case. This one is, alas, at odds with the thrust of my article, especially the last paragraph! I agree that ignoring the country would be a terrible idea.