Does North Korea’s “Combative Behavior†Signal the Beginning of the End?
For years, I have heard predictions about the fall of North Korea. During my second year in Korea, a South Korean government official told me he thought the Kim Jong Il regime would crumble within two years and reunification would follow. That was in 2003.
Since then, I have heard numerous predictions from Koreans and the international community alike regarding the state of the DPRK and how much longer it has to survive. With the Kaesong project in the dumps, you have to come to either one of two conclusions: 1) North Korea is confident it can get by with help from other nations like China, or 2) if it’s going to go down, it’s going to go down fighting and it will take everyone it can with it – no Kaesong for South Korea, no journalists for the United States, and a nuclear test for the rest of the world. (Why not take the whole world with it by starting nuclear war, you may ask? Actually, if put in a situation where nothing can be saved, North Korea under KJI is one country I could see actually doing that given it has the capabilities. But it’d have to take a lot more than what is happening right now for that to become a serious possibility, in my opinion.)
Coincidentally, just as North Korea’s Worker’s Party supposedly spearheaded a campaign “mobilizing the Party cell organization to send petition letters to Kim Jong Il asking for the swift nomination of his successor,” former President Bill Clinton recently said during a Q & A session in Seoul following an opening speech he delivered for a conference on the global economy that “North Korea’s combative behavior is a symptom of the political turmoil inside the country,” and he advised “the United States and South Korea to be careful not to overreact.
Clinton referred to North Korea’s recent actions as “disruptive conduct” related to concerns over political infighting and the health of its leader, Kim Jong Il.
I think Clinton is right — North Korea’s recent aggressive behavior is a reflection of some kind of internal instability which it wants to hide from the rest of the world through bold, outward behavior, although, I’m not sure what he means when he says he doesn’t want the U.S. or South Korea to “overreact. (I assume he means militarily, but to the best of my knowledge, that hasn’t really been a serious consideration at this point.)
Still, I certainly would like to think we are seeing the beginning of the end of Kim Jong Il’s regime with his health being an apparent factor as well as the peculiar fact that unlike his father who groomed KJI for succession back in the 1970s, nearly 20 years before Kim Jr. actually took control, KJI has waited until recently to show any sort of favoritism toward a possible successor – perhaps signaling acknowledgement of his unavoidable mortality, which may come sooner than later.
As for the political in-fighting Clinton says is taking place, my guess is some sort of power struggle has developed in anticipation of a weakened Kim (both physically and pehaps politically). This is something I predict will continue even after Kim Jong Il passes away, Kim Jung Un be damned.
What follows is only my general sense of how Pyongyang assesses the stability of its rule: it’s focused on the “center” — Pyongyang-Nampo-Pyongsong and environs, the most trusted military units, and a narrow slice of the elite that executes its writ in the provinces.
Pyongyang’s recent behavior and its profligacy on such useless projects as the Ryugyong Hotel and its missile test convince me that the regime has cash to spare. Food shortages that reached Pyongyang last fall suddenly ended last fall, probably due to Chinese assistance. The regime seems capable of feeding “the center,” and thus, it concludes that the center is holding. In reality, there are probably a lot of latent dissenters even among the center, but they’re not desperate enough to risk everything to get rid of a system that at least keeps them less miserable than everyone else. Envy, and being envied, are powerful things to most people.
But if the center is holding, the periphery is fraying. I’m convinced that in the countryside, conditions are ripe for a cohesive, broad-based resistance movement to take hold — first, as a nonviolent political movement, with the potential of eventually forming an armed wing. But absent some unifying ideology and a means of intraregional communication to spread a particular ideology of dissent, resistance will be limited to periodic outbreaks that the regime can isolate and quell.
Would a resistance movement succeed? In the short term, not if the center holds, as it probably would. In the medium term, however, any serious threat to North Korea’s brittle and decrepit infrastructure (roads, power grid, rails, tunnels, bridges) would quickly cut the country to pieces, destroy the regime’s capacity to exploit the rural population and the surviving economy, put severe economic and mechanical strain on the military, and eventually, threaten the economic jugular between Pyongyang and the Chinese border. Counterinsurgency is expensive. Could KJI quell it without Chinese intervention? If not, America could exploit Korean nationalism against China. And through any number of means, a rural insurgency could crack the center:
– A bloody crackdown could split the security forces.
– The “center” could split if it doubts the regime’s capacity to keep it fed, or to prevail.
– The center could crack as a nationalist reaction to Chinese intervention on the side of the regime.
The regime, however, seems to see only the center, and consider only the center as an indicator of its own stability.
That’s how Ceaucescu fell in 1989. One month after his re-election (yes, a 1-party system election) a Christian pastor condemned the idolatry of the Generalissimo Father of Romania. Ceaucescu wanted him rounded up but Christians formed a perimeter around the pastor’s apartment building. Non-believers sympathized with the resistance and a mass movement materialized out of thin air. Ceaucescu overreacted with the military firing on the protesters effectively galvanizing the resistance – and he and his wife were executed within a week.
One month before Ceaucescu’s execution he wielded absolute power – some would say his stranglehold on the Romanians was even tighter than his porcine majesty’s.
The point? The underground Church was far more mature and extensive than anyone thought. They had a national communication apparatus. They had field leaders and networks. They also appeared noble in the sight of their fellow oppressed citizens.
There are 500,000 secret Christian believers in North Korea. They are being hunted down like animals as we speak – for what? Because its well known that the leaflet campaigns have infected the KPA as well as the general population.
There are not less than 176 South Korean Missionary agencies with mature plans and abundant resources ready to surge into North Korea at the slightest hint of an opening. This is not lost on the Juche regime.
While I cannot predict a Romanian style coup, it is far from implausible in the DPRK. I realize this is not a religious blog, but the Almighty only allowed the USSR to last for 70 years. Time is running out on the idolatrous regime and cult of the Kims. The blood of countless Christian martyrs cries out from the soil of North Korea. Justice is not sleeping.
When the debris is cleared after the DPRK collapses, we will find that the faith of religious believers never waned, never went away, never quit, never stopped expressing the indomitable will of people animated by the Spirit of God.
The end of KJI’s regime cannot come soon enough for the North Korean people. Then the real work will begin: Reconstruction.
I can imagine many different and reasonable ways the regime could come to an end – stretching across both extremes.
I favor two versions: 1. That when the end comes it will be breath-takingly swift. Something like KCJ pointed out: some event will happen that will instantly galvanize enough of the population into actively turning against the regime and not giving a damn if significant numbers of them (the members of the uprising) are killed in the process of bringing the regime down or the provincial/regional authorities. What we could call a “straw that broke the camel’s back” scenario.
2. A small group within the power structure finally decides that its best hope for survival long term is a coup that will slaughter Kim’s family and closest associates with the hope being that much of the society and much of the other powers within the ruling structure will simply let them do it – not putting up much of a counter-coup effort because they realize the regime has to go.
I wonder — could a Tiananmen Square Incident in NK succeed today where it failed in China?
I doubt it could in Pyongyang – but what about in one of the key cities in other regions?
Like KCJ points out, in 1989 there were a good number of authoritarian communist regimes that were ready to fall. Enough people were primed enough to stand up and demand change no matter what happened to them, and the numbers were so overwhelming, the governments could not hold. In China, enough of the masses apparently weren’t ready for a reformation or willing to sacrifice themselves for it.
What about in NK today? I don’t have a lot to work on, but my gut suspects it is ripe for such an event.
We know more and more of the people have lost faith in the regime and system. We know the regime is no longer capable of maintaining the same level of totalitarian reach throughout the provinces as it once was.
And I simply can’t image human beings in a society can live this long under such deprivation without being primed for a willingness to rise up and perhaps throw away their own lives for some revolutionary hope.
I wonder how much a successful Tiananmen Square Incident in NK would depend on outside agencies – especially info distributing ones?
I’d say the Chinese dissidents were counting on gaining world opinion in their favor through their acts – like the March 1st Movement in 1919 – but greatly over-estimated what actions that favorable world opinion would lead to.
I think it is highly likely North Koreans wouldn’t be counting on world opinion much at all given how isolated the society has been for so long.
And now that I think about it, I doubt the Koreans would need to depend much on outside agencies to help spread the news of an uprising within NK. If they are primed for resistance – word of mouth inside NK would be enough. The regime wouldn’t be able to stop the spread of info. no matter how many people they stopped from moving from region to region. Some would get through, and if the masses were ready – if they’d had enough – nothing would stop them. — Of course, outside agencies helping to pass the word via a variety of means at their disposal would help….
usinkorea says:
“And I simply can’t image human beings in a society can live this long under such deprivation without being primed for a willingness to rise up and perhaps throw away their own lives for some revolutionary hope.”
But plenty of people have done precisely that historically. Many slave classes or abject poor in different regimes have gone hundreds of years without rising up in rebellion in the quest for a better life. In this context, the suffering of the North Korean example, I am afraid, has been rather brief.
Ultimately, I am not so certain the prospects of an indigenous, people’s rebellion in North Korea without external or elite help is all that bright. I tend to agree with Tocqueville’s view that revolutions emerge when things begin to look up and the people glimpse a better tomorrow, not when people are habituated in a cycle of unremitting hopelessness.
KCJ, I’m sure you know that it’s dangerous to make historical comparisons, and one could even be too zealous when finding commonalities between current events and historical precedent:
1) Was Ceausescu’s regime indeed more oppressive? If so, how?
2) The role of the Church in Romania and missionary activity in NK are not a commonality. The degree, scale and circumstances of the Romanian Church was allowed to operate was a completely different scenario to that of religion in North Korea.
3) In my mind, there are 3 major factors that stifle any sort of dissident movement: lack of freedom of movement, lack of communication, and an unfathomable flow of arms (and the lack of cash to supply it).
I suspected what JH said, but I did not say anything, because I know little of the situation in Romania. But thanks for throwing some further light on the inappropriateness of the comparison between KJI’s regime and Ceausescu’s.
JH: I would like to suggest that there is a fourth factor, which has helped dictators of any era and any political system stifle dissent: Fear.
JH: It wasn’t the Romanian Church that preciptated the Romanian revolution; it was a Hungarian pastor, not licensed, permitted or recognized by the Ceaucescu government that caused the uprising. You must not be familiar with the extensive underground church, underground railroad, leaflet balloon activity nor the zeal of Christian defectors.
Kim Jong-il fears nothing so much as the Christian message which obliterates the Juche religion.
I was not making an historical prediction per se, but I was trying to demonstrate how a powerful dictator with iron-fisted 1-party rule which seems invincible can be suddenly brought down in a heap.
Ceacescu was re-elected just weeks before the coup. He never saw it coming.
1) By Romanian Church I was referring to Christians in Romania in general. Semantics aside,
2) I was merely pointing out the correlation you drew about the downfall of Ceausescu’s regime, the role Christianity played in it, and the role Christianity can play in the North Korean regime. They are two very different scenarios, two very different regimes, and two very different ways they control(led) their populations.
3) I am quite familiar with the “extensive” underground church, underground railroad, leaflet balloon activity. And it doesn’t bring me any pleasure whatsoever to point out the fragility of them:
I believe you’re overstating the “extensiveness” of the underground church – the numbers you may cite are exaggerated estimates and speculation.
The underground railroad: China has effectively shut down many refugee routes before and after the Beijing Olympics.
Leaflet balloon activity: yes, I agree that the attention they received from the regime proved their effectiveness. However, balloons are only capable of reaching a few kilometers beyond the North-South border.
Won Joon Choe,
I can see what your saying, but I think modern technology has made a break from the traditional past.
North Korea is one of the best at keeping outside information in, but it still gets in. More of it these days. And that is likely conditioning the society for an uprising, because they are seeing that they have been lied to for so long and also seeing that life doesn’t have to be as harsh as their government has made them live.
South Korean videos are a good example. They’ve been smuggled in and have had an impact. People see that – contrary to everything they’ve been told over and over and over and over again – South Korea is not much more poor than the North with a much worse standard of living. In fact, they see that the exact opposite is true – that South Korea is a full fledged materialist culture and a high standard of living that pleases the people far beyond anything the North Koreans have realistically dreamed of for themselves.
Before the post-modern era, information did flow across continents, but at a fundamentally different pace and scale from what it does today, and even in a place like North Korea, the people can see and hunger for a better life in a more free, stable society.
JH: And just who is just a few kilometers beyond the DMZ? 60% of the PKA ground combat forces. Who is policing up those leaflets? North Korean regulars.
A Bible is fetching $100 USD on the NK black market right now – not to mention possessing it could get you killed. Why such sky-high demand?
Its good to hear your side of the argument and in the interest of full disclosure, I am a person of faith and I pray for the success of the Christian Church in North Korea. If you are looking at the situation without faith, of course the church appears to be weak, outnumbered, beleaguered, powerless. But the Church’s power is not in her numbers or her worldy strength. It is in the God who hears the cries of his tortured people and who will answer when His own timing is ripe.
My point about Ceaucescu (again) was that his grip looked invincible and that he never saw his overthrow coming – and that it was a religious believer who’s faith stand precipitated the revolution. I am in South Korea, JH – I know that Korea is far away from Eastern Europe and that the similarities are limited.
FWIW, I was in Iraq when Baghdad fell and experienced firsthand what happens when a brutal dictator with absolute power is suddenly toppled. There are some very striking similarities in all these depositions of dictators. The moral of the story: these populations behave one way while oppressed and controlled by the despot and completely different when they are no longer under the screws. Maybe ya had ta be there!
Blessings,
KCJ
Sadly, I don’t really see any evidence of any imminent collapse of the North Korean government. I think the regime will receive sufficient support from its neighbors to survive.
China has no desire to see North Korea collapse, and will probably provide support to the regime as necessary to maintain the status quo. China does not want to deal with inevitable flood of refugees that would result. Additionally, the Chinese and Koreans have had problems for centuries. In the long run, a divided Korea is weaker than a united Korea, and China would rather not have American forces parked near its border. Finally, if nothing else, North Korea provides a nice bargaining chip for China when it comes to dealing with the United States over the future of Taiwan.
South Koreans long to be reunited with their countrymen to the north, but on their terms. A precipitous and chaotic collapse of the North would be a nightmare for the South. In addition to the flood of refugees, the South would be burdened with the enormous task of integrating two huge populations that are worlds apart economically and rebuilding the North. It would be significantly more challenging than what Germany had to deal with. The South would be more interested in an orderly process that would happen over a period of years.
The biggest test will come with the death of Kim Jong Il. Thus far he has avoided creating a clear line of succession. This serves to keep various political factions divided and unwilling to throw their support behind any candidate out of fear of one day discovering that they backed the wrong person. If this situation continues and he dies, it sets the stage for a major power struggle within the regime — the end result of which is rather unpredictable.
The “combative behavior” is more likely a continuation of the North Korean strategy to extract concessions from others.