North Korean Isolation Creates Opening for Chinese Diplomacy
With all the drama going on so far this year concerning North Korea, there seems to be one thing missing: China. Whether this is a case of silent diplomacy that the rest of the world will never hear of or testimony to the fragility of the Mainland’s relationship with North Korea, I cannot say, but China’s influence on the DPRK has played a major role in how concerned powers have dealt with the Kim Jong Il regime in the past — and so far in 2009, China hasn’t been as publicly active as one would expect. In light of North Korea’s antics thus far this year (most recently its refusal to return to the six-party talks) an opportunity has arisen for China to steer the DPRK back to the negotiating table. However, developments so far this year have got some people wondering just how much influence China really has on North Korea these days.
From Voice of America:
Analysts say there is a lot of debate as to how much leverage China can exert on North Korea and whether Beijing could persuade Pyongyang to rejoin the six-party talks.
Drew Thompson is a China expert with the Nixon Center, a non partisan, public policy institution. “China definitely has influence and it has leverage. Often U.S. officials have stated that China is not using all of its leverage. And sometimes that simply refers to China’s essential delivery of aid shipments, of food and energy, whereas the U.S. officials have stated in the past that if China would just turn off the oil and energy going into North Korea, then North Korea would have to respond. The Chinese are very reluctant to use that opportunity to really apply coercive pressure on North Korea because they believe that North Korea would not respond kindly and it would basically ruin or undermine the existing China-North Korea relationship and take away the ability that China currently has to communicate with Pyongyang fairly effectively. So China does have leverage, but they also, at the same time, feel a little bit helpless,” he says.
The atmosphere seems ideal for Chinese involvement. There are signs North Korea has been alienating itself even more from other six-party members, creating an opening for Chinese diplomacy. The Wall Street Journal reports that the DPRK has blocked U.S. access to the detained U.S. reporters who have been held hostage for two months now; and the Swedish Embassy, which has had contact with the two journalists since their abduction, has sought additional meetings with the two women, but their requests have been denied. Likewise, a South Korean worker from the Kaesong Industrial Complex who was taken into DPRK custody in March has also not been allowed contact with representatives from his home country of South Korea. Add to this WSJ reports that Kim Jong Il did not meet with “Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov during his visit to Pyongyang two weeks ago, though Russia is an ally” and you have to be wondering,”When will China step in?” The above instances may not directly affect China or its national interests, but they most certainly pave an entryway for the country to influence North Korea in ways other six-party nations have not been able to.
I predict starting this summer, we may witness a more vocal, although always publicly restrained Mainland, regarding further North Korean misbehavior.
In October, Beijing is throwing a blow-out party comparable to its 2008 Summer Olympics opening ceremony as it celebrates its 60th anniversary this fall. You can be sure Beijing won’t want anything stealing its thunder (ie. international media attention) in the build-up to its celebration — and that includes trouble from little brother North Korea. If not for its own selfish reasons, we may see China flexing its diplomatic muscles more than it has the first half of this year should further trouble from North Korea arise. The thought is that long as North Korea is at the bargaining table, chances of it creating havoc are slim. No doubt Beijing would want to see the situation stabilize before its 60th celebration bash.
Still, it looks like the Kim regime will try and squeeze in one more missile launch or some sort of nuclear test before considering further talk. If the North goes through on its threats, perhaps then we can expect China to speak out louder than it did in April.
I’m not sure if I agree with the prediction that Beijing has any motivation in undertaking a more “aggressive” policy towards North Korea in light of its 60th anniversary. Pyongyang’s intransigence or military flare-ups wouldn’t tarnish the glory of the CCP.
I think the main objective of the 60th anniversary would be a show of power and unity to the Chinese citizens. Also, other more popular, negative associations such as Darfur, Burma, and Tibet are much more worrisome for Beijing in terms of international prestige.
Beijing’s subsidies to Pyongyang (whether it be oil or food) are more important than ever, especially with the collapse of inter-Korean relations and the recent refusal of foreign sources of aid. Along with the mentioned South Korean man in Kaesong and the two abducted American journalists, I’m pretty sure all the parties involved would not want Beijing to disturb its fragile relationship with Pyongyang.
Adding to JH’s comments, I don’t think China’s as bothered by North Korea’s antics as some observers might wish. North Korea isn’t a problem for China as long as the regime is stable. A poor neighbor firing off occasional missiles towards Japan is preferable to South Korean soldiers or worse, US soldiers stationed along the Yalu and Tumen Rivers of a united Korea. China’s armchair political analysts openly discuss post-Kim scenarios in which China either installs a puppet government friendly to Beijing or sends in troops to secure a buffer zone.
It is wishful thinking to expect China to exert real pressure on North Korea. China participates in the six-party talks to use its influence as a bargaining chip against South Korea, Japan, and the US.
While I also agree that China likes North Korea just the way it is, I am one who welcomes a Chinese occupation of North Korea just because we might possibly have a president with enough spine to ship the North Koreans the RPG-7’s and SKS’s that could make Chosun the graveyard of the ChiCom empire.
For the same reason, I hope American troops will never set foot in post-Kim Jong Il North Korea, and if our diplomats are even minimally competent and patriotic — which probably assumes way too much — they should be negotiating a deal with the Chinese to keep all armed forces except South Korea’s out of what is now North Korea. If the Chinese refuse to agree, then they ought to understand that we would aid the North Koreans in resisting them. Korean nationalism cannot be underestimated, but neither can the stupidity of the U.S. State Department.
Lady Sonagi says:
I agree with you that the Chinese are probably not too concerned about North Korean antics, and that they probably would not exert real pressure on Pyongyang given the present conditions. (But all bets are off if Japan displays a serious intent to become a declared nuclear power.)
Nonetheless, I am not certain whether the Chinese interest is best served by not having the peninsula re-unite. Among other things, I would think it plausible and perhaps even likely that a re-united Korea would find neither the geopolitical rationale nor the political will to continue to sustain American troops on its soil. Moreover, assuming re-unification itself will greatly weaken the U.S.-Korea ties, where else could Korea go for international support? Certainly not Japan. And going at it alone is unlikely an option but if it is, what security threat a unified but isolated Korea pose for China?
If China does occupy North Korea, I hope that North Korea would become an official province, so that North Koreans can enjoy the all the rights and privileges of a Chinese citizen.
Otherwise, if China only sent in an occupation force and set up a sycophantic government, North Korean women would just become a wholesale commodity.
If Korea has the consciousness of history that I think it has, it should know that absorption by China is a very real threat, but that absorption by America is not. If Korea wants to sustain its distinct nationhood, it won’t keep that within China’s co-prosperity sphere.
“Nonetheless, I am not certain whether the Chinese interest is best served by not having the peninsula re-unite. Among other things, I would think it plausible and perhaps even likely that a re-united Korea would find neither the geopolitical rationale nor the political will to continue to sustain American troops on its soil. “
Granted it was nine years ago, but recall that during Madeleine Albright’s meeting with Kim Jong-il, she and her South Korean counterpart told Kim that US troops would remain in the South as reunification efforts progressed, and Kim reportedly did not utter a strong objection.
China feels threatened not only by the presence of US troops in the South but by the possibility of a direct border with a prosperous democracy and ally of the US. (I know South Korea isn’t all that democratic but in the eyes of authoritarian China, it is.) With the exception of Russia, all of the countries that border China are poorer and none are thriving democracies with a free press. From a Chinese viewpoint, the grass is not greener on the other side of the fence; China’s ethnic Korean minority, in particular, are grateful to be in on their side of the river. China does not want a new neighbor to set a bad example to its people.
Based on my conversations with Korean-Chinese, the government has nothing to worry about. Korean-Chinese are loyal citizens with pride in the achievements of modern China and great hope for the future. A few disillusioned returnees have written books about their hardships in South Korea, and the average Korean-Chinese knows the streets of Seoul are not paved with gold. One Korean-Chinese colleague remarked to me upon returning from her first trip to Korea, “Seoul is not that great. In 20 years, Qingdao will look better than Seoul.”
Paranoia is the CCP’s Achilles’ heel.
Joshua,
I agree that a rational calculation of interest would lead Seoul to ally itself closer to Washington than Beijing for the very reason you enumerate (among many others). But realpolitik calculation does not always drive a nation’s policy–esp. when it comes to a nation seemingly driven more by emotion than calculation like present-day South Korea.
I think the most likely scenario post-unification is that the pull of geography (that is, proximity), history, culture, and even race will all exert overwhelming pressure to detach South Korea from the U.S. sphere. Moreover, there is also the issue of whether the U.S. would itself find a sustainable rationale for having troops in a unified Korea, which may be an even bigger obstacle to the preservation of the U.S.-Korea alliance in the long-run.
P.S. Historical consciousness works both ways. That is, it could work in favor of a Chinese hegemony, as well as opposed to it. David Kang wrote an unusually perceptive paper a few years ago about how geo-political perception in East Asia seems to defy realist paradigms when it comes to Chinese hegemony. In particular, most of the nations in the region sees future Chinese hegemony in the region as relatively benign, at least in part due to the memory of actual benign hegemony. Certainly, there seems to be very little remembrance of the evils of Chinese hegemony in Korea, in contrast to Japanese hegemony.
Lady Sonagi says:
“Granted it was nine years ago, but recall that during Madeleine Albright’s meeting with Kim Jong-il, she and her South Korean counterpart told Kim that US troops would remain in the South as reunification efforts progressed, and Kim reportedly did not utter a strong objection.”
Yes, I remember that. Nonetheless, here is the problem:
Generally-speaking, it is difficult to take anything KJI says without a dose of skepticism, given the Pyongyang’s history of lies and broken promises. So you have to do some guess work and see if what he says meshes with his past behavior and long-term interest. I am not sure it does.
Moreover, context is king when you evaluate a statement. And as you concede, KJI made that statement (if that’s what he really said–one can never be sure with the incompetence of the State dept. translators) nine years ago, when KJI thought he had a very pliant partner in Bill Clinton. Given the context, he was in a condition where he wanted to give the maximal impression that he was innocuous and pro-U.S. in order to win himself more aid in the future.
“China feels threatened not only by the presence of US troops in the South but by the possibility of a direct border with a prosperous democracy and ally of the US. (I know South Korea isn’t all that democratic but in the eyes of authoritarian China, it is.) With the exception of Russia, all of the countries that border China are poorer and none are thriving democracies with a free press. From a Chinese viewpoint, the grass is not greener on the other side of the fence; China’s ethnic Korean minority, in particular, are grateful to be in on their side of the river. China does not want a new neighbor to set a bad example to its people.”
What about India? It is a thriving democracy with a free press–though not quite as prosperous as South Korea.
India is arguably less democratic than South Korea and not nearly as prosperous. Chinese and foreigners who have been to India perceive it as chaotic and less developed. The Chinese do not envy India. In fact, owing to its slower pace of development larger population of extremely poor people, India is cited as an example of why democracy is not a good idea for a large developing country like China.
Won Joon Choe said,
>> In particular, most of the nations in the region sees future Chinese hegemony in the region as relatively benign, at least in part due to the memory of actual benign hegemony. Certainly, there seems to be very little remembrance of the evils of Chinese hegemony in Korea, in contrast to Japanese hegemony.