Obama Policy Watch: Reality Sinking In?
There have been several signs this week that the Obama Administration is reaching an early recognition of the realities that eluded the Bush Administration for most of its two terms. Recent statements from the new administration reflect a growing acknowledgment that unconditional aid and easy concessions have failed as tools for the “management” of Kim Jong Il. That acknowledgment would not have been possible without the inspiration of Kim Jong Il. I will give you some quotes, and then I’ll suggest some reasons for caution about all of this:
Over the weekend, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton said Washington would not be “blackmailed” by the North. The United States and its allies will “tighten the band around North Korea,” she said. [….]
Washington’s current stand on North Korea has raised some concern in Seoul. After recent policy discussions in Washington, Moon Chung-in, a North Korea expert at Yonsei University in Seoul, described the American attitude as “just like the first-term Bush administration.
Shin Nakyun, a South Korean lawmaker, who also attended the discussions, said: “Although they said they keep their door open for North Korea, I felt they were turning uniformly hard-line. They said there will be no carrots for the North. [N.Y. Times, Choe Sang-Hun]
The United States says it will not give North Korea further economic aid until Pyongyang returns to nuclear talks. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton told lawmakers Thursday that the Obama administration has “no interest and no willingness” to give North Korea further economic aid.
But Clinton said the administration has requested funds for economic aid to North Korea in case Pyongyang returns to nuclear talks and re-starts disablement measures. She said, in her words, that North Korea is “digging themselves into a deeper and deeper hole with the international community.” [Chosun Ilbo]
So Mrs. Clinton has conditioned economic aid on something she considers “implausible, but not impossible.” Fine with me.
A U.S. Defense Department spokesman, a few hours after the North Korean statement, said, “Let me just say very clearly that these threats only further isolate the North.” The Barack Obama administration is disappointed by the North’s recent antics but is treating it with a kind of benign neglect. [Chosun Ilbo]
The administration’s new Special Envoy even made some vague commitments to press North Korea on human rights in the context of North Korean Freedom Week, though I believe that about as much as G.I. Korea does.
As I hinted before, there are reasons to be skeptical that these statements will translate into a potentially effective policy — structured negotiations with hard deadlines, consequences, and meaningful benchmarks for North Korea’s transformation into a more transparent society. To borrow a crude expression: plata o plomo (lead or silver). In the highly unlikely event North Korea makes meaningful progress toward becoming a peaceful, open society, I would support the provision of various forms of aid and a guaranteed ride to China to offset the risks. But because it’s overwhelmingly likely that North Korea only means to stall and renege, negotiations must be backed by the acceptance of and preparation for regime collapse as a consequence.
If only such a coherent policy were likely.
First, never underestimate the power of the U.S. State Department to disregard reality for the sake of “realism.”
Second, the people who inhabit the policy-making echelons of the Obama Administration show no signs of the toughness necessary to articulate and stick to such a policy. Indeed, their reaction to North Korea’s first nuclear test, though perhaps excusable because of the administration’s not-ready-from-day-one novelty, reverted to the tired liberal reflex of deferring to the Nations That Are Not United.
Third, the administration shows few signs of considering a new North Korea policy with the sort of pressure that would be necessary to force real concessions from North Korea. Here, I mean the sort of pressure to which Caroline Leddy, Jamie Fly, and Christian Whiton refer in this piece for the Weekly Standard:
Furthermore, the United States should step up its implementation of UNSCR 1718. Absent U.S. leadership, enforcement will remain nonexistent. Every North Korean ship suspected of carrying illicit cargo should be boarded by the U.S. and allied navies. This should include Japan, which we can encourage to take on new missions that broaden its traditional view of self-defense.
Beijing is highly unlikely to help with these efforts. While there are limits to what can be done about this, the U.S. can dispense with the fantasy that China is a cooperative partner on North Korea. Beijing is concerned about its international image, and a policy of truth-in-advertising could have a beneficial effect.
Next, the U.S. should return to the successful tactic of targeting the finances of the North Korean regime and organizations related to it. This was done with great success early in the Bush administration, but abandoned to entice North Korea to agree to talks and concessions, which then went unfulfilled. Macau’s seizure of a relatively small amount of Pyongyang’s cash after the U.S. Treasury designated Banco Delta Asia as a primary money laundering concern in 2005 was one of the few measures that got North Korea’s attention–until it was reversed at the request of the Bush administration.
First among those sanctioned should be the North Korean individuals and entities who were involved in the construction of Syria’s plutonium reactor, destroyed by the Israeli Air Force in September 2007, which was the first step toward making a state sponsor of terrorism a nuclear power. It is unfathomable that the U.S. has yet to designate a single North Korean nuclear entity. Moreover, the U.S. should undertake efforts to expose, target, and sanction Kim’s personal cash reserves and assets scattered around the globe. [TWS]
One could be even more specific and enumerate the financial and legal tools for pressuring the North, as I did here. Bruce Klingner’s discussion of how to tie pressure to negotiations is also worth a second look.
The good news is that there is little appetite today for giving Kim Jong Il more concessions or regime-sustaining aid. Ironically, Obama’s election may have contributed to this trend by shifting the partisan dynamics. Republicans no longer have anything to gain by supporting appeasement by a president of their own party and to follow their natural proclivity to oppose appeasement by a president of the other party. Democrats, who have been placed on the defensive by North Korea’s provocations, must now contend with the danger that they will be made to look weak on foreign policy if the Republicans ever present a coherent message. The policies supported by their liberal wing have been discredited. New Republican-sponsored sanctions bills suggest the slender possibility that that could happen this year.
The bad news is that there are no signs that the new administration is prepared to articulate a coherent plan for eliminating North Korea as a proliferation threat — and if USFK left South Korea tomorrow, North Korea’s proliferation threat would still be an immediate danger to our security. Instead, the administration seems to be migrating toward a position of malign neglect. I’ve already laid out the reasons why such a policy won’t work: North Korea’s proliferation can’t be ignored, and North Korea has a gift for attracting attention no matter how much we may wish otherwise.
Still, this would be a dramatic improvement over the last administration’s policy. The North Korean regime will continue to decay and will eventually collapse without foreign aid. The question is how much damage it will do before the Götterdämmerung. We can do much to limit that damage with more aggressive containment and by doing what we can to curtail the regime’s endurance.
I think Bush destroyed things. He let Hill and Rice destroy them.
At best, I’d guess, we can hope for from Obama is indifference and NK accepting being ignored.
Clinton is saying no aid until talks restart. Not giving the North something for absolutely nothing is OK, but this is still just saying we’ll give NK something for simply agreeing to sit down at the table – where we’ll map out how we’ll give them even more for the sake of signing an agreement and then even more to show our good faith in implementing it — until the North reneges and forces us to go back to —– giving them things for agreeing to sit down at another table….
With Bush taking the North off the terrorism list and showing its open hand to the North and pretty much completely ignoring the nuke plant in Syria — he has left us with nothing to move forward with of any value.
Before he flipped, we had banking sanctions and movement toward setting up an effort to interdict North Korean shipping – which would attack its proliferation and drug running and other illicit acts. We had China slowly and begrudgingly accepting these things if not helping.
That has all been destroyed with no momentum at all toward “getting tough” with the North again.
It would be hard for Obama to set this stuff up again even if he desired to do so. It took Bush a long, painstaking time to do it, and he had named NK one of the three parts of the Axis of Evil — showing a direct interest in doing something about the North.
The only movement we are likely to see out of Obama is of the Hill variety, and unfortunately, that is what I have to put my money on, because I don’t think NK is going to allow itself to be ignored.
I expect to see NK pick up the pace significantly in all its illicit acts that gain it hard currency – missile and other military hardware proliferation, drug running, printing US 100 dollar bills, and things like the Syrian nuclear reactor.
If Obama ignores these and NK is able to do enough of it, maybe it will be satisfied with being ignored.
If not, I’d expect another nuclear test and some sea provocations.
With Bush – the unpredictable cowboy neocon gone – and perhaps the second coming of Jimmy Carter in the White House – from NK’s point of view —- and with Lee and the GNP in firm control in South Korea — I might even give some percentage of chance to —- Pyongyang deciding on a prolonged campaign of infiltration and disruptive acts inside South Korea – something like Terrorism Lite to bigger acts of terrorism……I’ll have to think about that one….
Overall, I see NK as being in the driver’s seat. It will act based on its perceived needs, and the US will react, and what we’ll do is what we’ve been doing for many years – minus a few better years early in the Bush administration: The only thing we know how to do is put our faith in talks….talk talk talk talk talk — because at least there is hope in that, right? And hope makes us feel better — (especially when we can’t bare to contemplate the negative aspects of a regime collapse….)
Joshua,
Your writing is always lucid and relevant – yet its always placing the blame of the ROK’s abysmal Sunshine Policy (liberal appeasement of the worst sort) on Bush. Perhaps you could refer your readers to an old posting where you delineated responsibilities between Washington and Seoul. I find it very difficult to believe that Bush/Powell/Condi were soft and Obama/Clinton are hardlining Pyongyang. I think the tenor of the policy must be formed more in Seoul than Washington. There are not 15,000 pieces of artillery aimed at our capital.
The Sunshine Policy implemented by leftists in Seoul for a decade left the Bush administration only so much lattitude for unilateral action, or am I mistaken? I am not a diplomat nor the son of a diplomat, I just chafe at the idea that the same administration that invaded two of the most dangerous countries on earth was some how softer than Comrade Obama’s ‘make nice with thugs’ policies. How much of appeasing Pyongyang are you willing to lay at the feet of liberals in Seoul? And how much of the impetus behind the current policy will you concede is coming from the Lee Myung bak administration and not Comrade Obama’s?
My opinion: It is true that the US has had less room to put pressure on NK since the Sunshine Policy began in 1998. I wouldn’t say SK has been in a position to influence policy more, however. I think people have (rightly) argued that China is the bigger key, and the US has had less of an ability/willingness to pressure China to go along with harsher measures on the North.
But, Bush gets the blame for the state of US policy – not Seoul or Beijing.
The flipflop brought about with the placing of Hill as point man on NK policy is too clear and the break too stark. That is the most frustrating part, at least for me:
For years, I’d defend Bush against the critics who said he had a “do nothing” NK policy just because talks (for the sake of talking) were not underway. I’d say not caving into NK demands for something for nothing was not a “do nothing” policy. That Bush was trying to tighten the screws, but there was only so much he could do without having to battle China and SK for their reluctance to risk regime collapse.
Then, finally, Bush’s admin found something that worked – a good pressure point: the Treasury banking sanctions that it got China and the world financial system to go along with, and it was clear those sanctions hurt immediately and would also strike at the heart of Pyongyang’s illegal activity. — It looked promising.
Then Bush caved. NK tested an ICBM and then a nuke. The “do nothing” policy critics stepped up their attacks. And Bush flipflopped.
He ended up taking measures under Hill that went a good bit past Clinton – especially removing NK from the list of state sponsors of terrorism.
And he completely ignored, pretty much, NK building a secret nuclear reactor for Syria.
That is a whole lot of failure and shame that rests squarely on Bush’s shoulders the last two years he was in office. And after having doggedly worked for so long to find a way to pressure the North effectively and having just found a good pressure point…..It was fairly tragic.
KCJ, The Bush Administration could have done plenty to influence South Korea away from unrestricted aid and appeasement, starting with the winding down of our defense commitment to South Korea, something that as currently structured doesn’t serve U.S. interests anyway.
Of course, Bush’s “Sunshine” excuse disappeared in January 2008, and it was clear several months before then that Roh’s party was going to be replaced by something much more conservative on NK. I criticize the Bush Administration not just for putting up with Roh’s back stabbing and continuing its military welfare to Seoul, but because it aggressively appeased North Korea even after Lee Myung Bak and the Japanese were telling Bush that he had gone too far.
Finally, I criticize Bush because it would be partisan and hypocritical of me not to. I have no insoluble affiliation toward either party, nor do I think other Americans should have. The Republicans lost most of their consistency and cred on NK policy precisely because they said nothing while Bush screwed everything up. If a particular administration handles NK policy well or badly on some particular aspect, I’m just going to deliver my most honest criticism notwithstanding party affiliations. If Obama does a terrific job in the next four years, he could overcome my skepticism (though early signs aren’t good).
“The Bush Administration could have done plenty to influence South Korea away from unrestricted aid and appeasement, starting with the winding down of our defense commitment to South Korea…”
Bingo.
While I may not agree with Joshua on the specifics, we agree on the general outlines here.
I too have argued in the past that one powerful lever that the U.S. has in terms of influencing Seoul is to make a credible threat to withdraw military aid/cooperation, and thus force Seoul to face the proverbial reality–a small, friendless country hemmed in by three giants with a history of belligerence and a quasi-lunatic regime bent on its forcible occupation. While it appears that Rumsfeld tried to move in this direction, I don’t think Seoul ultimately took it seriously, because different actors in Washington did not present a united front on this score, and Rumsfeld’s proposals seemed not dramatic enough to sound as if Washington truly wanted to wean Seoul away from its dependency.
All:
Thank you for the respectful commentary and enlightening insights. China indeed appears to be the determining factor for a cohesive multi-national approach to NK, I think we’d all agree on that.
However, I think the prevailing wisdom was that Sunshine Policy would achieve the kind of neo-capitalist success in the DPRK that has greatly softened repression in the PRC. As usual, US/western thinkers failed utterly in their religious/cultural analysis and wasted a decade of propping up the Juche regime. The difference between the PRC and the DPRK is that the Chinese do not worship their dictator as a god. That critical fact went over the heads of both Seoul and Washington (and perhaps Beijing) and is even now undetectable to most of the DoS, DoD and USFK planners.
Until we come to grips with the reality that Juche is the state religion of the DPRK and is the glue holding it all together, we will continue to proceed along a misguided trajectory of applying hard power in cold war paradigms to what is essentially a religious war between the priests of the Juche Cult of the Kims and the zealous missionaries of the ROK.
I am deeply dissapointed in the Bush adminstration who appeared to be preoccupied with OIF. The de-listing is troubling; at the time, I was anticipating the imminent collapse of the Juche regime. It will take time to reverse the legal barriers that will restrict international investment in a post-Juche Korea – my hope was that de-listing was a necessary legal step in anticipation of regime collapse. Its still not too late for that course of action to play out, but all indications are that the Obama administration is even less engaged in Korean policy issues than the Bush administration.