North Korea’s “Business as Usual” Publicity Tactic

John McCreary made an interesting – and I think spot-on – observation about North Korea’s current publicity tactic in his most recent NightWatch email bulletin: Whatever internal instability might be going on inside North Korea with regard to succession issues or increased tensions with the outside world, the DPRK is taking a “business as usual” approach when it comes to how it presents itself to public eyes.

For example, when announcing the sentence of Laura Ling and Euna Lee, the DPRK reported the trial’s results in a straight-forward manner:

The Korean Central News Agency announced in typical terse style, “The Central Court of the DPRK held a trial of US journalists Laura Ling and Ri Su’ng-u’n from 4 to 8 June.

“The trial confirmed their hostile crime against the Korean nation and their crime of illegal border crossing as they had already been indicted, and sentenced each of them to 12 years of reform through labor.

It was not a show trial. The announcement contained no anti-US hysteria.

[Question: Can anyone explain to me the use of the name Ri Su’ng-u’n for Euna Lee?]

McCreary’s report also discusses a North Korean maritime closure announcement for the Sea of Japan and reports of a recently released photographed sighting of Kim Kyong-hui (Kim Jong Il’s sister) as she accompanied her “Dear Leader” brother during an undated visit to a music school. This is interesting because Kim Kyong-hui has rarely, if ever, been reported in such a public manner by North Korea’s State-controlled media.

While McCreary’s entire report is fascinating to say the least, his personal comments about the three incidents previously mentioned are what are really worth mentioning:

What is significant about the three vignettes above is their lack of sensational treatment. Since 25 May, barring a slight increase in military vigilance ““ not combat readiness ““ North Korean media have been consistent in projecting daily leadership actions as normal. Even the Court sentence on the two Americans was presented factually as the outcome of a routine juridical process, without sensation or propaganda diatribe.  The language was underwhelming, compared to the potential consequences.

From military events to the family visit to the opera hall, the state media have conveyed the message that North Korea is not behaving as if it is in a crisis management mode. The image is of a leadership that is proceeding with the normal affairs of a middle power, nuclear armed state.

My questions are as follows:

Is such an appearance meant mostly for the international community or more for a domestic audience? Between the two parties, who does North Korea need to convince more about its leadership stability, strength and power? The international community already knows the DPRK has nuclear ambitions (although I would argue that what we’ve seen so far suggests the country is not yet a real nuclear threat as its tests have so far fizzled – and add to that the fact that the more nuclear tests they conduct, the more material they use up which could reduce the strength of their nuclear program in the long-run).

And, if this is indeed meant to serve as a message to the international community, how do we interpret it? Compared to North Korea’s usual flamboyant remarks, the country’s announcement of Ling and Lee’s sentence seems quite tame. Does this mean we can expect North Korea to act “maturely” and agree to future dialogue on the issue of nuclear weapons development, the detainment of Ling and Lee and other issues of concern?