Kim Dae Jung, Fallen Liberator (1925-2009)

A few days ago, a well-informed reader and commenter on this site informed me that former President Kim Dae Jung would soon pass on, yet the time proved inadequate for me to work out my own internal conflicts about Kim, or “DJ” as many called him. Maybe Kim’s contradictory legacy just isn’t amenable to mutual reconciliation. Much will be said in the coming days — deservedly so — of DJ’s role in democratizing the South. Less will be said of all he did to forestall democratization in the North, a nation that is dying for want of a government that is accountable for its errors, crimes, and atrocities.

The great symbol of DJ’s legacy will be one act that symbolized so much else about his era — the illegal payments he asked ex-spymaster Lim Dong Won to make to Kim Jong Il, which he used to buy himself his Nobel Peace Prize and to accelerate a North Korea policy that not only failed completely to realize its stated objectives, but which probably extended Kim Jong Il’s misrule for a decade and, by extension, probably resulted in tens of thousands of North Korean deaths at the very least. The Sunshine Policy eventually meant turning a blind eye to the suffering of North Koreans in bilateral relations, at the U.N., and at South Korean consulates where refugees would be discouraged and occasionally betrayed. These things will be just one more source of bitterness that will impede the reunification process for decades.

Unlike his successor, Roh Moo Hyun, however, DJ’s legacy contains legitimate accomplishments and redeeming qualities.

For example, I’ve sometimes thought Kim’s election forestalled South Korea’s collapse into chaos in the bitter years of the Asian financial crisis. I still remember how bitter Koreans were in those times. Characteristically, they found a way to turn the bitterness outward toward foreign scapegoats — chiefly, the IMF for insisting on austerity measures as a condition of its financial rescue of the Korean economy, much more than at on the chaebol and government policies that caused the crisis in the first place. As president, Kim had such cred with the unions and the left that protests were (or so I speculate) relatively muted.

I don’t think anyone can dispute that DJ was personally courageous, that he put his life on the line for his beliefs, or that he made a significant contribution to South Korea’s democratization. Certainly he wasn’t the only prominent political figure who pressed for democratization, something that was probably inevitable one way or another given growing U.S. pressure for change. But in the course of fighting for it, DJ suffered more than other politicians of his time. The most dramatic example must be his remarkable hair-breadth survival after being abducted by South Korean agents in Japan, who had already brought him to the middle of the Sea of Japan, drugged him, and tied the weights to his legs. It may have been the bitterness of Park Chung Hee’s hatred of Kim that marked his transition from being a relatively benevolent dictator (compared to Syngman Rhee and Kim Il Sung, he certainly was) to an increasingly isolated and malevolent one. South Korea’s abortive descent into tyranny under Chun Doo Hwan was terminated in part by the massacre at Kwangju, but also by the combined efforts of Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan — through outgoing Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke and incoming National Security Advisor Richard Allen — to spare Kim from execution on trumped-up charges.

Some (I would not be one of those) would find it ironic that Allen is now one of the leading lights of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea.

It’s less well-known, however, that DJ’s first close scrape may have been when he was jailed by the North Koreans in 1950 and scheduled to be shot. Then, it was the Incheon landings that saved him — the North Koreans fled before they got around to massacring the prisoners. If this vignette is true, it’s telling that Kim Dae Jung said very little about it in his later years (was the story embellished to give Kim anti-communist cred in the 1960’s, or was Kim’s silence just another case of covering for the North Koreans?). The North Koreans arrested Kim for being a “capitalist;” Kim had taken over the Japanese shipping company for which he’d worked until the end of the occupation in 1945. Like Park Chung Hee, Kim found his own accommodation with the Japanese and began his rise before their departure.

In any event, you would think that a man whose life was saved by the Americans no less than three times might have come to recognize the United States as more of a positive influence, but in his later years, Kim turned positively anti-American. Or maybe you forgot that back in 2006, he constructed this elaborate theory for blaming “neocons” and the military-industrial complex for the North Korean nuclear crisis:

“How North Korea will do with its missiles and nuclear weapons”¦ Those will be just children’s toys in front of the U.S.,” Kim was quoted as saying in the interview. [Kim Dae-Jung] also blamed Japan’s right-wing politicians, including Shinjo Abe, for exploiting North Korean issues to boost their popularity. “Shinjo Abe, certain to become Japan’s new prime minister, eventually garnered more popularity by attacking North Korea,” Kim said.

Kim said America’s military industry has enjoyed windfall gains by selling their weapons to Japan and others throughout North Korea’s nuclear standoff. [Le Monde, via Yonhap, archived here]

It gets worse:

Former President Kim said, “We give the United States everything to give, and yet we don’t hear good things. After mentioning Vietnam, the deployment of Korean troops to Iraq, the transfer of the Yongsan Garrison, the redeployment of the 2nd Infantry Division to rear positions and the KoreUS FTA (sic), he said, “Americans don’t talk about that, and ask why we’ve forgotten their help. [….]

Kim explained, “Refusing dialogue with North Korea, U.S. neocons keep pushing North Korea down a mistaken path while misusing [the North Korea issue], and this is because of China. He added, “Neocons, thinking of China as a hypothetical enemy, is expanding its armaments like missile defense (MD) and re-arming Japan”¦ It’s looking for an excuse to do this, and that’s North Korea. [….]

About Japan, he said, “You have to solve the kidnapping issue as the kidnapping issue, and handle dialogue as dialogue, but Japanese rightwingers are boosting their popularity by attacking North Korea”¦ North Korea should see through the meaning of the hardline policies of U.S. neocons and Japanese rightwing forces and do the opposite, but instead it keeps wrecking the situation by giving them excuses. [Robert Koehler]

DJ’s suggestion that those policies were “hardline” or “neocon” would later be undermined by none other than President Barack Obama, who continued and expanded North Korea’s economic isolation in the face of more North Korean provocations, and North Korea’s refusal to disarm in exchange for significant U.S. concessions.

Nor did Kim ever come to terms with the failure of the Sunshine Policy, its failure to change North Korea, or North Korea’s responsibility for destroying the crumbling facades it built at Kaesong and Kumgang. Toward the end of his life, Kim’s criticism of the current South Korean president grew increasingly shrill and distanced from the reality of North Korea’s refutation of Kim’s own legacy. Most bizarre was the juxtaposition of Kim’s accusations against Lee of “dictatorship” and “strong-arm politics” with his criticism of Lee for failing to censor North Korean defectors who floated anti-Kim Jong Il leaflets across the DMZ to their homeland.

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14 Responses

  1. Mixed thoughts on this event. I don’t doubt his love for the country and his sincerity in desiring for democracy. He didn’t deserve to be treated that way by the KCIA.

    Having said this, he was corrupt, and forever tainted by those allegations that he funneled half a billion USD to the DPRK for 2000’s summit. Didn’t he apologize on TV?

    He may have meant well, but he was way too soft on the DPRK. Even before he left office, he didn’t take enough of a hardline against the North Koreans when the latter didn’t abide by the “spirit of 2000.” Anyone forget his government’s lame reaction to the West Sea Battle of 2000? Let’s not mention, as Joshua Stanton points out, his attitude towards DPRK human rights abuses.

    Nonetheless, rest in peace, Mr. ex-president Kim.

  2. Excellent post, Joshua.

    Thank you for including the link to the NYT article that references KDJ’s 1950 incarceration by the KPA. This episode is also described in his official biography at the KDJ Convention Center in Gwangju where they have a small museum dedicated to him.

    On a side note: I wonder what effect(s) his passing, in addition to Roh Moo Hyun’s, will have on contemporary Korean politics?

  3. KDJ’s criticism of the balloon launchers betrays the fatal flaw in his thinking. These balloon launchers will most certainly be a greater part of the solution than Sunshine Policy ever could.

  4. Can anybody else think of a similar long-time “democracy” advocate who actually helped real democracy come about and then followed it after gaining the top spot?

    How unique is Kim Dae-Jung (and Kim Young-Sam) and South Korea in that regard?

    It seems to me the general rule of thumb in modern history is that the champions of democracy often ended up establishing the “democratic people’s republic” type of “democracy”. And South Korea was full of enough disruptive elements committed to that form of communist despotism that it could have gone that route. But it didn’t…

    And until I can come up with some other examples of similar cases, that will mitigate for me some of the not so grand aspects of Kim Dae-Jung’s career (and that of Kim Young-Sam).

    Many post-colonial nations failed at establishing true democracy and an economy that benefited the society as a whole. South Korea managed it, and Kim Dae-Jung was a vital part of that.

  5. A re-try:

    I didn’t think too hard about this but at least four names immediately came to mind in about four seconds: Havel, Walesa, Mandela, and Mrs. Aquino. Of course, it depends on what you mean by “long-time.”

    I am not sure if you are making the same error, but I’d like to emphasize that the first “democratic” president was not Kim Young-sam nor Kim Dae-jung, but Roh Tae-woo. And he was more of a proximate cause in the emergence of Korean democracy than either of the two Kims.

    Finally, given South Korea’s economic and political maturity by 1993 (which was when Kim Young-Sam took over), there really was a very little chance that Korea would go back to a dictatorship, Left or Right. Korea in 1993 was hardly the Korea of 1961 or 1979. For instance, when Kim Young-sam purged the top military officers connected with Chun, there was nary a whimper from the military, because it knew that another coup was not an option. In contrast, we all know what happened when Chung Seung-hwa tried the same in 1979.

  6. Joshua, I appreciate your thoughtful tribute to Kim Dae Jung, but I have to disagree with some of your criticisms of him.

    “Nor did Kim ever come to terms with the failure of the Sunshine Policy”

    Based on recent news from North Korea, the Sunshine Policy has not failed. North Korea announced that it will resume all previous joint activities with South Korea, such as Kaesong, Mt. Kumgang tours, family reunions, and an open border between the two countries.

    In addition, Kim Jong Il recently met with Hyundai’s Chairwoman and granted her company the tour rights to Mt. Paektu, for the first time in ROK history. North Korea also freed the Hyundai manager held captive.
    In light of all these developments, President Lee Myung Bak has proposed a high-level meeting with North Korea to discuss economic cooperation.

    Just when Kim Dae Jung has passed away, the legacy of his Sunshine Policy is continuing with renewed vigor.

    “Less will be said of all he did to forestall democratization in the North”
    “a North Korea policy … which probably extended Kim Jong Il’s misrule for a decade”

    This argument has a big flaw. China’s support for Kim Jong Il far outweighs any impact produced by the Sunshine Policy. China is the main source of economic aid and trade for North Korea.

  7. Mi Hwa, I am beginning to think that you’re not very well aware of what is going on. The Sunshine Policy was very well-intentioned but for the most part it bore no fruit for the South.

    2 years after the summit in Pyongyang, the North Korean navy attacked South Korean navy boats on South Korean territorial waters. It has never relinquished war as a means to unify the peninsula. It has murdered a visiting South Korean tourist. And it used billions sent by Seoul to pay for nukes and missiles – which could be used on the South. And it has yet to account for hundreds of abducted South Korean citizens.

    The family reunions are valuable and important to those elderly Koreans separated by the war. But overall, the DPRK has given way too little to the ROK in light of what it received.

    Most importantly, Kim Dae Jung became a champion of human rights as his political career developed. How ironic that he remained silent in the face of human rights abuses suffered by fellow Koreans on a scale far harsher than anything seen in South Korea during military rule (and those were significant human rights abuses).

  8. Choe,

    I thought of the Philippines and South Africa but don’t know enough about the people and situations to say how close or far they are from the SK example.

    I think Poland would be worth some exploration as a comparison.

    On your other points, I agree based on what I’ve read, but I also was not suggesting that Kim Dae-Jung or Kim Young-Sam were unique in their environment. That they were the key reason South Korea managed to maintain real democracy once it got started.

    I am just looking around to see if other post-colonial nations can be included beside what South Korean society accomplished…including how the leading dissidents behaved once the reform movement gained the upper hand. Whatever level of importance you can assign to Kim Dae Jung and Yong Sam, you’d have to say that they were for real democracy, and I think that has proven somewhat rare in social history around the world in the post-colonial areas.

  9. usinkorea,

    Two hurried responses:

    1. I would be the last person to reduce politics to economics, as I hate any simplistic, mono-causal analysis.

    Nonetheless, I agree in principle with Lipset, Fukuyama, and other advocates of the “modernization” thesis who argue that it is extremely difficult to resist the democratic impulse once a country hits a certain level of economic advancement. (Singapore is the only country that refutes this thesis, but Singapore is a sui generis case in so many ways.)

    And, by the time time DJ became president, South Korea’s GDP growth and other indices of maturation was such that a re-lapse into dictatorship was just not conceivable. So I simply find it very difficult to credit DJ for helping to prevent a non-existent, impossible scenario. Moreover, if such credit must be given, it has to go to Roh Tae-woo.

    2. You make it almost sound as if DJ was “liberal democrat” in the Western sense. On the contrary, no such creature existed among the major Korean politicians of his generation, except perhaps John Chang (whose pathetic failure indeed demonstrated why liberal democracy was not possible in Korea for a long time).

    Likewise, DJ’s presidency was not without its authoritarian remnants. Among other controversies during his administration, his national security apparatus was caught spying on opposition politicians, and he attempted to silence opposition by questionable methods–including the controversial media tax probes, as well as employing Lee Kuan Yew style libel suits to attack individual critics. Nor did he–or at least his family–in the end escape corruption conviction.

  10. To me, the ultimate legacy of Kim Dae-jung is that you can get away with murder in the Western eyes, as long as you drape yourself in democratic rhetoric.

  11. Don’t know much about Kim Dae-Jung’s misdoing during his term but as a Pole i can put some light on Walesa’s achievements. As President he didn’t have so much power he had Foreign Affairs, Interior and Defense ministries the rest was Prime Ministers, he never was accused of any corruption or crimes (seeing as he didn’t have any saying in privatization of public sector he had few chances here) He lost next election to a post-communist candidate ( i would say due to economic transformation crisis, and his sometimes untempered behaviour) but well we got a way with real democracy in the end 🙂

    Cheers 🙂

  12. So … Kim Dae-jung has passed on.

    And the purchase of the 15 June 2000 meeting with the ‘Only Fat Man in North Korea’ â„¢ and the Nobel Peace Prize (for a mere $850 million at then current prices) … got the ROK just … what?

    Apparently I was out of town and never got the memo as to exactly how many South Korean POWs, along with the fishermen who were never kidnapped, were repatriated during those heady days of ‘Sunshine Policy’ and ‘Sunshine Redux’.

    TEN YEARS of this mental masturbation … and those poor bastards in the Gulag STILL haven’t caught on that the joke is on them.

    But wait … good news! …they’re talking about trotting out a re-run of ‘Mount Kumgang Re-union of Separated Families’ … just one more time. Yeah, there won’t be a dry eye in the house.

    How incredibly sad.

  13. Good post, except for a few quibbles:

    OP:

    which he used to buy himself his Nobel Peace Prize and to accelerate a North Korea policy that not only failed completely to realize its stated objectives, but which probably extended Kim Jong Il’s misrule for a decade and, by extension, probably resulted in tens of thousands of North Korean deaths at the very least.

    So without Sunshine Policy, the KJI regime would have collapsed? Particularly with China seeking to ensure “stability” in Pyongyang, I find that extremely difficult to believe.

    In any event, you would think that a man whose life was saved by the Americans no less than three times might have come to recognize the United States as more of a positive influence, but in his later years, Kim turned positively anti-American. Or maybe you forgot that back in 2006, he constructed this elaborate theory for blaming “neocons” and the military-industrial complex for the North Korean nuclear crisis:

    I think you’re too easily conflating “neo-cons” with all Americans. Americans are not expected to accept and like everything that comes from an administration they didn’t vote for and/or whose policies they do not support, so why should Koreans or anyone else? Calling neocons on what he perceives as something they are doing wrong is not the same thing as being “positively anti-American” and it certainly doesn’t make Kim Daejung ungrateful for what different US administrations or the military did to save his life.

  14. On the contrary — it was DJ himself who conflated Americans with neo-cons, tagging every policy to the right of Jimmy Carter’s as “neo-con,” including the very idea of opposing North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. I think Americans — regardless of party — ought to be slaughtering goats and thanking Zeus that Barack Obama has put the lie to DJ’s mischaracterization. Either that, or Barack Obama is a neocon, too.

    But then, would someone please show me a coherent definition of “neocon” that (a) manages to exclude all these Democrats, and (b) bears any resemblance to the usage of that epithet by the crypto-Marxist left and the crypto-fascist Buchananite right?