Another Nuke Test?

On Saturday, I had coffee with a very well-connected South Korean friend, who suggested in passing that North Korea might respond to this-or-that sanction with another nuke test. After having expostulated for the next 45 seconds about why such a move wouldn’t further North Korea’s interests at this time, I think I now understand why my friend just sat there and smiled while I yammered on:

According to a high-level source in North Korea, Kim Jong-Il instructed at the meeting with party and military leaders in Wonsan on August 26, that North Korea will carry out a third nuclear test if sanctions from the U.S. and the world are strengthened.

According to the source, on August 26 in Wonsan, Kim Jong-Il gave important instructions on strategies against the U.S. and the nuclear issue. These instructions were reflected in a letter sent to the chairman of the U.N. Security Council. [Open Radio]

As you read the rest of this post, remain mindful of the words, “a high-level source in North Korea.” Open Radio claims that the goal of this test would be to pressure the Obama Administration to engage in bilateral talks that end with U.S. recognition of North Korea as a nuclear state.

The source said it is more than possible for North Korea to carry out a third nuclear test. Additionally, if the U.S. and international community starts conversation with North Korea and relaxes sanctions, North Korea may not carry out another nuclear test. The source also said the third nuclear test will involve uranium as “stronger” nuclear test means nuclear test with uranium.

A third nuclear test, if carried out, is likely to happen between September 20 and October 10. September 20 is when the 150 days of battle is over. October 10 is the anniversary of the establishment of the Chosun Central Party.

Elsewhere, Open Radio offers this rather shocking assessment of North Korea’s uranium bomb program, alleging the North Korea has been manufacturing its own centrifuges for years at a plant near Kaechon (also the vicinity of Camps 14 and 18), using alloys specially made at Bukchang. According to Open Radio, North Korea may already have several uranium bombs, an assessment that would be dramatically at variance with most of what the U.S. intelligence community has said publicly, although the intelligence community will also tell you that it has very little idea of how advanced North Korea’s uranium program is at all. Here’s one assessment I’ll make with moderate-to-high confidence: if North Korea does test a uranium bomb, it would be a massive embarrassment for the CIA. Leon Panetta has already been the subject of resignation rumors. Panetta has denied those rumors, but this (however unfairly, imho) could cost him his job.

It’s times like this when I wonder why our presidents hate peace so much they just can’t learn to talk to their enemies. I mean, if someone had sent nice people like Robert Galluci or Wendy Sherman to sit down and sign some sort of “Agreed Framework” with the North Koreans years ago, we wouldn’t be worrying about this now, right? It’s still not too late to send Selig Harrison, or David Albright to give us their objective assessment and negotiate another one.

AFP also picks up the story, citing Open Radio, which continues to gain cred as a news source about North Korea. But who knows if this actually true? The delectable irony of it certainly is tempting, to the point where I hope they do test the damn thing. The simplest benefit of that would be that North Korea has one less nuke to sell, and hopefully, this would discredit many of the right people — not all of them Democrats by any means. Still, I have to question the authenticity of any “inside” rumors from North Korea itself. I wouldn’t think North Korea’s nuclear secrets would tend to leak to reporters for upstart dissident news services.

Frankly, I’m still mystified as to why another nuke test gets North Korea closer to those goals. They know the State Department wants to give them what they want if they just wait and sustain a moderate level of crisis. But over time, North Korea has been at least as likely to misread America as the converse. With North Korea, anything is possible and nothing is certain, except this: whatever shape of table we use, North Korea only uses talks to stall us, squeeze us for money, and ultimately, to get more nukes. If we continue to view this as an exclusively diplomatic problem, North Korea will eventually manufacture, possess, and distribute all the nukes it wants.