In the New Ledger Today: Japan’s Unendurable New Prime Minister
I’ve expanded some on why I believe Japan’s new Prime Minister is a noob. To be fair, I wasn’t fond of his predecessor, either.
Has anyone else noticed that the “allied” leaders who are the first to decry “unilateralism” and demand that we act more cooperatively are also the first to kick Americans in the teeth gratuitously? For the life of me, I can’t see how a suckle-and-bite approach to America is either diplomatic or multilateral, and I suspect that one day, Japan will need its own Lee Myung Bak to repair the damage Hatoyama may yet do to bilateral relations.
You might not know from reading this, but I loved Japan itself — wonderful, polite people; great beer and food; confusing but efficient trains; and gems of cultural and architectural beauty around almost every corner.
Update: In my piece, I noted that public opinion in Japan would probably prevent Hatoyama from shifting Japan’s North Korea policy substantially, and I see that even the Hanky agrees with this:
It appears, however, one cannot hope for an immediate transformation in Japan’s North Korea policy under a DPJ administration. During a campaign debate when Prime Minister Aso Taro attacked DPJ leader Hatoyama Yukio by claiming Hatoyama would avoid enacting laws to inspect North Korean cargo ships, Hatoyama responded by saying he would pass the laws if his party came to power, revealing an active posture on North Korean sanctions. Professor Io Jun, who has served as a policy advisor to the DPJ, says that when hardline opinion on the kidnapping issue is overwhelmingly against North Korea, it is highly likely than until the new administration settles in, the DPJ will be steering North Korea policy in a safe rather than bold direction.
The Daily NK also agrees, as a general matter, that policies aren’t likely to change, but it also picks up the point — which I also made — that North Korea may try to trade abductees for sanctions-busting:
North Korea may adopt an appeasement policy towards Japan in the midst of the Japanese power shift as North Korea has seemingly adopted appeasement policies towards the U.S. and South Korea in order to have international sanctions currently in place lifted. Therefore, if North Korea adopts a conciliatory policy, and works to solve the Japanese abduction issue, it is possible that the Democratic Party may work form a good relationship with the North.
Professor Lee Young Hwa of the Kansai University, an expert on North Korean issues, predicted that, “North Korea may solve partially the abduction issue in order to back the Democratic Party, which takes moderate policies towards North Korea.
Read the rest on your own.
I had a chance to meet a couple of DPJ guys at a conference this year, including the guy who was the author of that North Korean human rights bill a few years ago. No question they’re just as hardline on the abductee issue (and even on some other points re: North Korean human rights) as their predecessors were.
I’m no expert when it comes to Japanese politics, but I was always under the impression that the Japanese PM was not as “all powerful” and influential within their own governments as the prime ministers of other westminster type systems (eg. Canada) – and that there are always other underlying forces that sway Japanese electoral politics more so than the PM (for eg., the bureaucrats at MITI, et al).
North Korea probably did kill off the abductees long ago, leaving an honest accounting the best they could possibly offer Tokyo now. But, aside from the Kim Jong-il complicity question, who would ever use the words “honest accounting” and “North Korea” in the same sentence, with a straight face?
Since the New Ledger article about Japan’s prime minister-in-waiting Yukio Hatoyama is mentioned at this blog, I guess it’s fair game to comment on the article here.
“Remember, this is the leader-in-waiting of a nation that achieved its prosperity by
depressing the value of its currency in relation to the dollar.”
The 1985 Plaza Accord? The US used that agreement to force the drastic upward revaluation of the Japanese yen relative to the dollar (and other leading currencies). The yen went from 260/$1 to 130/$1 in 18 months. Japanese imports became hugely more expensive to American consumers, a strategy US officials hoped would reduce its trade deficit with Japan.
On the other hand, this meant that production in Japan became prohibitive in terms of labor costs, forcing Japanese companies to move the more labor-intensive parts of their manufacturing operations to low-wage Asian countries, which later became export platforms to the US.
Wouldn’t you agree, however, that Japan had essentially reached the pinnacle of its economic power by 1985, and that manufacturing would have shifted to lower-wage countries for other reasons anyway?