Agreed Framework III Watch
There isn’t much to say about this that I haven’t already said so many times that I’m tired of saying it:
North Korea on Wednesday signaled a willingness to freeze its uranium enrichment program in exchange for “confidence-building” incentives from the United States such as a suspension of sanctions and a resumption of food aid.
The statement, carried by North Korea’s state-run news agency and attributed to a foreign ministry spokesman, was the first sign that North Korean heir Kim Jong Eun might be open a deal discussed last year, and then put on hold following the death of leader Kim Jong Il. [WaPo]
For extra irony, North Korea is accusing us of politicizing food aid and demanding that we earn their trust. It’s the little things like this that sustain me.
So what we learn from this is that Jang Song Thaek is receptive to taking our money, which I’m sure plenty of people will want to confuse with openness to reform or actual disarmament. Really, if the Obama Administration wants to make this kind of deal, I wish it would hurry up and do it now, in time for it to be an issue in the presidential election. But for the record, I strongly doubt that we’ll see an Agreed Framework III this year, for reasons of domestic politics in the U.S. and North Korea (South Korea’s government might have an interest in looking conciliatory right now).
Up until now, Obama’s North Korea policy has been notable for its absence of awfulness, but his placement of the likes of Wendy Sherman, Sung Kim, and Glyn Davies in the State Department’s top Korea policy-making roles is profoundly disturbing and suggests a pre-positioning of people who are inclined to execute a hard turn toward appeasement once the presidential election is over. All of the “insider” accounts I’ve heard tell me that Obama came into office fully prepared to appease, even on the very heels of the collapse of Agreed Framework II. It was only Kim Jong Il’s awful behavior during the next two years that shifted him toward sanctions (however imperfectly implemented) and “strategic patience.” Assuming no colossal provocation intervenes, my guess is that the patience will run out in December of 2012.
after the (good) Bushies such as Jay Lefkowitz and, most recently, Michael Green consistently stated publicly that food aid should always be separate from political considerations (http://www.cnn.com/2011/12/20/opinion/green-north-korea-rights/) — i can’t find a link from a radio panel (npr?) where he says food aid has essentially been used as a bribe — it seems like the north korean regime’s accusation is not that far from the mark.
as such, i propose a new government position that will transcend political turnover and bad policy so that we can actually have a consistent and strategically coherent north korea policy: a north korea czar
Obama is unlikely to do anything before 2013 because he is focused on getting re-elected plus he does not care about north or south korea. At that time if he is still the president he will most likely dither and vote present. Should he do anything you can count on it being really stupid and harmful like all his foreign policy moves. The first step towards reunification is getting rid of our bozo the bumbler.