A Loser Explains How We Lost South Korea

A few days ago, I missed this editorial in the Korea Herald, a left-leaning rag from Seoul, written by former U.S. Ambassador to South Korea (Bush-41 era) Donald Gregg. The editorial mourns the demise of the U.S.-South Korean alliance. It is an astonishing admission from the same diplomatic quarter that had denied for so long that the alliance was even running a high temperature. Of course, the Kremlin is probably still insisting that Brezhnev and Stalin have nasty colds, but I digress. The editorial goes on to place the blame for that condition on President Bush (the new one). To admit illness, of course, suggests actions like treatment, diagnosis, and prevention of recurrences. That requires people to make decisions.

Mr. Gregg�s editorial (I strongly recommend you read the whole thing, because it�s jammed with great research and useful facts) is a perfect example of what�s wrong with the American diplomatic establishment. Ambassador Gregg has a very impressive command of the facts surrounding both Koreas’ hatred of America; he is clearly very intelligent. The only thing that impresses me more is his ability to avoid the obvious conclusions to which those facts lead. His intelligence notwithstanding, he lacks the spine and judgment to follow the facts to their logical conclusions.

Gregg makes a compelling case that: (1) South Korea’s people and government have become deeply anti-American; (2) their views of North Korea are unrealistically trusting and naive; and (3) these unrealistic views developed when the Clinton Administration was doing its best to appease the murderers in Pyongyang and keeping dutifully mum about their death camps and violations of past agreements. Amb. Gregg’s conclusion? We should have done much more of the same, in spite of where it got us.

In so doing, he places himself squarely in the �Yes, but� camp, among those who react to every report about North Korea�s systematic starvation of its own people, the growing threats from its WMDs, its million-man army poised in an offensive position just above Seoul, and its serial mendacity in violating every international agreement with a reflexive �Yes, but . . . .� To men like Donald Gregg and the Seoul academics among whom he has grown so cozy, there is simply no crime the North Koreans can commit that is too hellish, no lie they can tell that is too bold, and no provocation so dangerous that they do not instantly strain to excuse it, justify it, or place the responsibility for it on one of its victims. Here is my favorite example:

“In 1998, after North Korea surprised us by firing a multi-stage rocket, a report by Donald
Rumsfeld on missile threats to the United States made North Koreas the poster child for
national missile defense. A foundation of hostility between the Republican Party and North
Korea had been laid.”

Wha?? That’s right. Amb. Gregg blames Donald Rumsfeld for creating a “foundation of hostility” after Kim Jong-Il launched a missile over Japan–Amb. Gregg conveniently leaves the “over Japan” part out. Thus, faced with a direct threat to nuke Tokyo, Donald Rumsfeld is to blame for suggesting we plan to defend against it. The fact of the demonstrated threat from a regime with an impeccable record of disregard for human life is somehow missing from Amb. Gregg’s analysis. He begins to sound like the long-suffering and ever-forgiving wife of an abusive husband, who applies pancake makeup to cover her black eyes and tells the neighbors–and the cops–how the husband’s abuse is his strange way of showing his love and partly her own fault. What provocation would it take for Mr. Gregg to finally decide that Kim Jong-Il must move out of the trailer? Answer: a good therapist.

Finally, Amb. Gregg admits that he knew what any soldier in Korea could clearly see�that our P.R. situation was an accelerating disaster during the Clinton Administration, just after his tenure in Seoul. He admits that he never once visited a South Korean university campus. I wish he had, as I did during my years in Korea. Had he done so, and had he bothered to learn some Korean (and I suppose he has by now), he could have seen the radical pro-North Korean and America-hating banners that festoon them, and how they have come to resemble the anarcho-syndicalist communes described in Monty Python and the Holy Grail. Even the police don�t dare enter them. Mr. Gregg offers that he was not allowed to go for security reasons, which is hard to believe, even from one so obviously missing the chutzpah gene as Amb. Gregg. What if he had gone? He might have learned something alarming and important. He might also have started a riot, which would have at least awakened Washington from its pollyanish slumber and its failure to see how reliable old South Korea was falling under the sway of agitprop from the world�s most repressive state–a goofy John Birch conspiracy theory proven eerily true.

The duty of an ambassador includes finding and reporting important facts, including disturbing ones. But bureaucrats being what they are, Mr. Gregg got where he is by learning to prevent the revelation of problems on his own watch. Weaklings like Donald Gregg will always be chum for sharks like Kim Jong-Il. They congenitally ignore unpleasant facts, shrink from challenges, and assess all risks associated with action as prohibitive. Meanwhile, Kim Il-Sung’s minions were hard at work a few subway stops away, educating the next generation of South Korean journalists and politicians.

Thanks for your input, Ambassador Gregg. If only we had heard it when there was still time.