NYT: Iraq’s Sunnis Want U.S. to Stay
This certainly seems significant:
As sectarian violence soars, many Sunni Arab political and religious leaders once staunchly opposed to the American presence here are now saying they need American troops to protect them from the rampages of Shiite militias and Shiite-run government forces.
….The new stance is one of the most significant shifts in attitude since the war began. It could influence White House plans for a reduction of the 134,000 troops here and help the Americans expand dialogue with elements of the insurgency. But the budding accommodation is already stirring a reaction among the Shiites, who make up about 60 percent of the population but were brutally ruled for decades by the Sunnis.
….[W]hen an American convoy rolled in recently, a remarkable message rang out from the loudspeakers of the Abu Hanifa Mosque, where Saddam Hussein made his last public appearance before the fall of Baghdad in 2003.
“The American Army is coming with the Iraqi Army — do not shoot,” the voice said, echoing through streets still filled with supporters of Mr. Hussein. “They are here to help you.
In other words, the political and military power of insurgent and militia groups, both Shiite and Sunni, has declined to the point where they avoid confrontation with U.S. and Iraqi forces and pursue civilian targets, which has the effect of driving everyone toward the U.S. goal of restoring stability, if not toward an affectionate view of the Americans.
This is the latest sign that with al-Qaeda’s forces severely weakened, the native Sunni insurgent groups want some kind of a negotiated demobilization, for which they have already begun negotiating. That wouldn’t necessarily mean our troubles would be over; two major Shiite militias, the Mehdi Army and the Supreme Council of the Revolution in Iraq, are significant potential threats to stability, although it seems unlikely that either force has broad-based support across Iraq’s greater Shiite population. It’s difficult to imagine that a political movement based on reprisals against civilians and petty religious despotism will gain much public appeal, as al-Qaeda’s example illustrates. This proved the undoing of al-Qaeda, whose unpopularity proved its undoing when civilians provided the tips that led to the killing and capture of most of its leaders.
This gives us renewed hope that the vast majority of Iraqis will conclude that the political process is the path of least resistance to their attainable goals.
—–
That wouldn’t necessarily mean our troubles would be over; two major Shiite militias, the Mehdi Army and the Supreme Council of the Revolution in Iraq, are significant potential threats to stability, although it seems unlikely that either force has broad-based support across Iraq’s greater Shiite population.
Why should we transition from fighting the Baathist and Qaedists (are actual enemies) to fighting the enemies of the Baathists and Qaedists? We know are friends in this war because they kill our enemies.
This Global War is too big and important to divert resources to protecting every homocidal tribe, or even a majority of them — even if their faith is Sunni and their language is Arabic.
There are two reasons:
1. We don’t want part of Iraq to become an colony of another mortal enemy of the United States, Iran.
2. If Iraq reverts to a state like Lebanon in the 80’s, multiple terror groups of all denominations will establish a permanent presence, much as Hezbollah did in parts of Lebanon, or as the Taliban did in Iraq. Some of those groups may form alliances with AQ.
In point of fact, I don’t care what denomination a terrorist group follows. If it’s a threat to the United States and local forces can’t deal with that threat, we need to kill them.
Interestingly enough, Mehdi Army and Badr Group (SCIRI) have been fighting against each other on and off for sometime.
US troops have difficulty stopping the guerrilla tactics of militias, so I don’t think the US can fully protect the Sunni Iraqis.
Joshua,
In the late Cold War we widely recognized that Iran is a regional great power with its own aspirations, but was nothing compared to our grand enemy, the Soviet Union. This is still true, with the Soviet Union being replaced by al Qaeda. Arguments that we must turn on our Iraqi allies against al Qaeda (the Shia and Kurds) because of a regional rivalry would seem backwards.
The only region of Iraq likely to exist in lawlessness will be the Sunni lands. The solution here would seem to be either (a) reconcile with Baathist remnants in those regions or (b) encourage a strong Shia government to crush local opposition in Sunni provinces. I’d rather go with (b), but neither requires an American presence.
I agree we need to stop threats and have local authorities able to do so. That’s why I oppose efforts to hobble our natural allies in Iraq in order to appease our foes.
James,
No doubt. In a state of anarchy groups will resort to violence in order to achieve their ends. It thus frustrates me that so many of our actions in Iraq seem designed to increase anarchy (because we would oppose a government able to create order).
Mi-Hwa,
I suspect that ultimately we will have the same desire to protect the Iraqi Sunni Arabs as we currently have to protect the Kosovar Serbs.
We can protect groups if we desire to, and take steps to realize that desire. We desired to protect the Kosvoar Albanians and succeeded in that. For a while we dreamt that it might be nice, perhaps, all other things being able, if the Serbs weren’t ethnically cleansed. They paid for our lack of will (and their previous actions, of course). Like the Iraqi Sunni Arabs will.