A (Blue) House Divided Against Itself

Kim Jong Il can count dividing the U.S.-Korea alliance as one of his recent  successes, but in the process, he’s also divided his friends in South Korea.  The left finds itself  split among  accomodators, appeasers, and  outright agents, and those factions  are going into an election year  at  war with each other.  One of the most divisive of the internecine struggles is Seoul’s to-join-or-not-to-join agony over the Proliferation Security Initiative.  Today, Yonhap has a long story on the subject.

President Roh Moo-hyun’s silence on the U.S.-led nonproliferation initiative in his latest speech reflects the government’s dilemma over whether to fully join it, officials said Monday.

….

Roh’s speech came at a sensitive time, with U.S. Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Robert Joseph set to arrive here later in the day with his colleague at the State Department, Nicholas Burns, who handles political affairs.

When Joseph, in charge of the PSI, visited Seoul two weeks ago with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, he stressed the need for South Korea to join the initiative. His trip has left South Korea with some “homework” to do in terms of clarifying its position on the matter.

South Korea has merely been an observer at the PSI exercises, out of fear that formally taking part may lead to armed clashes with its communist neighbor.

If the alliance between the U.S. and South Korea were in reasonably good health, this wouldn’t be that difficult a decision, but if Roh had installed some reciprocity in his Nort Korea policies years ago, we’d be looking at a much less dangerous situation there  today.   Parts of Roh’s own administration (the Foreign Ministry) want him to join up, while others (UniFiction and most of Uri) are adamantly opposed.  With Ban Ki-Moon on his way out and Song Min-Soon on his way in, my money is on Seoul not participating in a significant way.  And then, there’s this:

“The Mount Geumgang and Kaesong projects will be continued but carried out in line with the spirit and purport of the U.N. sanctions resolution against North Korea,” Roh said in the speech read by Prime Minister Han Myeong-sook.

Further damage to the alliance to follow, if it could possibly get worse.  Speaking of Kumgang, Geumgang, Kumkang, or however you spell it, Kim Jong Il continues to be the worst enemy of his best friends:

The nuclear test has discouraged many potential visitors. Some canceled trips because of security concerns; others because they disapproved of the provocative act by North Korea. Hotels and restaurants were more than half empty last week. And new tour reservations have fallen significantly since the test, according to Hyundai Asan. The company originally projected a record 400,000 visitors to Mt. Kumkang this year, but its latest forecast is 260,000. Next year could be worse; Seoul is likely to eliminate some incentives for prospective tourists. One possibility: canceling the subsidies it now provides for student visits in the off-season.

My violin, please.  For its trouble and expense, Seoul is now caught between American pressure to end subsidies for the unprofitable project and North Korean threats of ”    ” if it ends them, as Resolution 1718 clearly requires  unless North Korea accounts for its share of the proceeds.

Postscript:  Jonathan Last on Anti-Americanism (via the Nomad).  Last has written a very good piece on the subject that grasps the essential nature of the problem, but Last is one of many who can’t make a convincing case — at least, not convincing to me — that American ground forces should remain in South Korea notwithstanding the growing political hostility of that terrain.  Here’s his best effort:

In the real world, we have responsibilities we can’t shirk. Japan – one of our real allies – would be in harm’s way if America pulled out of Korea. So would Taiwan. And others. A nuclear North Korea destabilizes the entire region, from Australia to Vietnam. America is, for better or worse, stuck protecting the South Korean people so that they can keep making money, playing baseball, and enjoying their home-theater systems with the peace of mind that comes from knowing that no matter how much they antagonize America, we will always be there to protect them.

I have to question the added protective value  keeping U.S. ground forces in Korea has for Japan when  the main  North Korean threat to Japan didn’t even need to  fly over the USFK. Having two airbases at Osan and Kunsan would seem to be a good forward screen to protect Japan, in addition to whatever naval assets we could put in the Sea of  Japan.  And unless a land bridge opens  there in the near future, it will be our  air and naval forces that will help protect Japan.  If there is a legit threat of invasion, I’d think that we’d get new  basing options on Honshu in a hurry. 

The greater problem with Last’s argument is its implicit assumption that we’ll actually have the option of keeping our troops in Korea.  If, 10 years from now, we were ordered out, would the whole region be destabilized?   To be sure, you’d have to wonder about South Korea’s stability if that happened, but mostly for other  reasons.   I do agree that it would be bad for regional stability, but not an irrecoverable setback.  Our goal should be to preserve those parts of the U.S. presence that bring the most power to the fight.  Hint:   they float and fly.

Anti-Americanism isn’t just a problem because it pisses us off.  It interferes with readiness, increases the danger to which our  troops are exposed from what ought to be  their rear echelon,  and makes our presence there politically unsustainable in the medium term.