MUST READ: ‘Finding America’s Role in a Collapsed North Korean State’
[Update: Is this an invitation to Munich? China promises to “cooperate” with the West, but admits that it might move into North Korea to “restore order,” and for strictly humanitarian reasons, of course. We all know what humanitarians rule the People’s Republic of China.]
Not a moment too soon, as the Red hordes mass to reclaim the Outer Koguryo Autonomous Zone, there is a much-needed advancement of the discussion of the future former North Korea. It comes from U.S. Army Captain Jonathon Stafford in the latest Military Review (here, link opens in pdf). Stafford offers us a military officer’s analysis of how the United States and South Korea ought to be preparing for the reconstruction of North Korea after Kim Jong Il goes to meet Ceausescu at the ash-heap, but aren’t.
(You will note that CPT Stafford cites Richardson‘s opinions and my own; that’s because he’s a reader and a friend.)
Reconstruction and post-collapse conflict avoidance is something that’s been given far too little thought, considering the stakes. If a garrison in North Korea’s far north revolts tomorrow, would China move in to restore order? Would they leave when the regime arrives to “restore order?” Or if South Korean and American troops move in after the central government collapses? Depending on how stabilization and reconstruction are planned and executed, North Korea could become either the Outer Koguryo Autonomous Zone or the scene of the first front of World War III, with Sinuiju playing the role of Danzig.
Here, in a nutshell, is what Stafford says the Pentagon and the Ministry of National Defense ought to be doing:
- Recognizing that North Korea’s current trajectory isn’t sustainable;
- Recognizing that China has designs on North Korea or its resources;
- Planning for an occupation of North Korea using South Korean — not American — forces;
- Coordinating logistical and financial support from the United States, Japan, and other allies;
- Using information operations and the recruitment of refugees to gather human intelligence and influence the local population;
- Planning, in meticulous detail, how we will feed, shelter, and otherwise provide for 23 million citizens in a failed state.
Above all, Stafford stresses the need for us to have clear plans to avoid chaos and mass migrations that would justify a Chinese occupation. Essential to this is careful planning, training, and pre-positioning equipment, materials, and people that will be needed for the post-collapse humanitarian crisis. It will also require some effective diplomacy, public and otherwise (and if that depresses you, it should).
A cynic might suggest another course: why not let China wade into the North Korean morass? Politically, it will allow Lee Myung Bak to refocus Korea’s inexhaustible reservoir of nationalist enmity against China. North Korea would cost a fortune to rebuild and is one big arms room waiting to be looted. Its regime has spent the last five decades teaching its people to be xenophobes and kill foreign occupiers. I don’t doubt that China has some degree of ambition in North Korea. The more interesting question is whether China’s military, political, and economic system could handle the strain of occupying North Korea if the North Koreans don’t welcome them in.
Great post Joshua. There is not much else to say.
Andrei, I see you’re having trouble with the comments. I’m sorry about that. Sometimes it takes a while for comments to appear because of the spam filter. Thank you for your observations — wise and informed, as always.
Excellent posting Joshua. Another name for the Outer Koguryo Autonomous Zone could be the “Greater Bohai (Balhae) Autonomous Economic Development Zone” (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Balhae)?
Dark humor aside, what worries me is the thought that when NK ultimately collapses (or implodes) we will have concerned citizens around the world chanting “if only the world had known sooner about the camps we would have done something” and/or blame the US for not sending enough aid fast enough.
Bearing in mind the decades of NK’s xenophobic propaganda, I doubt the Peace Corps will send volunteers to NK because they would be “softer” targets than USFK personnel. I know you get this question a lot about NK human rights organizations and charities, but what charities and organizations do you recommend for those who want to help “prepare” for the end game?
I wish there were someone I could recommend. I think the ICRC will end up being the only charity with the resources to have much impact. In all likelihood, it’s going to be militaries that do the literal heavy lifting, since the country’s roads, ports, and railroads are too decayed to handle the traffic.
A question for Dr. Lankov (and anybody else who is uptodate on China’s thinking and familiar with the North)….
How likely is armed violence against Chinese occupation forces
and how likely would it be against South Korean forces?
My guess, with the little information I have on China today, and what I know about North Korean history, leads me to believe Chinese forces would find continous trouble with insurgency freedom fighters even if they moved into North Korea unopposed by the US, UN, SK, and whoever.
Little things—- like having read once that students at Pyongyang University couldn’t read the works of Lenin or Marx without special permission from the government —— tend to make me believe China will end up not as unwelcome as the evil Americans — but violently unwelcome nonetheless.
I would think only South Koreans have a chance of working with North Koreans with minimal violence once the regime is fully collapsed.
That is why this article makes perfect sense but might not be a great blueprint for handling other trouble spots in the future.
Nobody has been so successful at demonizing the outside world as a whole as North Korea.
“Nobody has been so successful at demonizing the outside world as a whole as North Korea.â€
usinkorea: Sad, but true.
I apologize that I keep asking questions, but one thing that has been in the back of my mind for some time is: What will be the costs (emotional and financial) of “de-programming†North Korean citizens to: (1) help them let go of their “DPRK vs. the world†mindset, (2) let go of their visceral anti-Americanism, (3) help them adjust to life in the 21st century, and (4) accepting that their government routinely lied to them for more than 60 years? I have read articles that focus on the lives of North Koreans adjusting to life in South Korea, but how do you help an entire country? I think the world will have to keep an open wallet and an open heart for many years to see this through. I am not a specialist in human psychology, but I think it will be a challenge for the world like no other.
“Nobody has been so successful at demonizing the outside world as a whole as North Korea.â€
usinkorea: Sad, but true.
I apologize that I keep asking questions, but one thing that has been in the back of my mind for some time is: What will be the costs (emotional and financial) of “educating†North Korean citizens to: (1) help them let go of their “DPRK vs. the world†mindset, (2) let go of their visceral anti-Americanism, (3) help them adjust to life in the 21st century, and (4) accepting that their government routinely lied to them for more than 60 years? I have read articles that focus on the lives of North Koreans adjusting to life in South Korea, but how do you help an entire country to adjust? I think the world will have to keep an open wallet and an open heart for many years to see this through. I am not a specialist in human psychology, but I think it will be a challenge for the world like no other.
We have at least three hopes – small but at least hopes.
1. That the ingrained habit of the idea of total obediance to the state will cause North Koreans post-collapse to be more manageable than we might imagine. (This seems to have been what happened in Japan after WWII).
2. That North Koreans become so antagonistic to their government that they rally around outsiders (like South Koreans) who come in to help overthrow it.
3. That the complete brainwashing of the juche religion coupled with the total failure of such a despotic state will leave such a mammoth hunger for salvation that when collapse comes, North Koreans will seek outside knowledge and faiths and ideologies to fill the void the lies have left.
Koreans have historically shown such a hunger for Christianity — like in the Hermit Kingdom period that has parallels to today – and like today with the underground church in NK and among refugees in China and refugees who make it to South Korea.
……and that is certainly an avenue into conditioning for the collapse that the US government could and should be working on right now…
My guess is we’ll have to wait a couple of generations before North Korea becomes managable, however.
The only way I can realistically picture a “successful” handling of the North after collapse is by relying on the South for that couple of generations.
This has recently been released from the CSIS: Keeping an Eye on an Unruly Neighbor.” China’s plans in case of an emergency in North Korea. Well worth a read…. a downloadable PDF file option is available.
http://www.csis.org/component/option,com_csis_pubs/task,view/id,4255/type,1/
Synopsis:
This report is based on discussions with Chinese specialists on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) during a CSIS-USIP delegation visit to Beijing, Changchun, and Yanji, June 25-30, 2007. Topics discussed included trends in North Korea’s economy and prospects for reform; current trends in Sino-DPRK economic relations; China’s policy toward North Korea in the wake of the nuclear test; Chinese debates on North Korea; Chinese assessments of North Korea’s political stability; and potential Chinese responses to instability.
This Working Paper was commissioned by the Korea Working Group (KWG) at the U.S. Institute of Peace. The KWG brings together the leading North Korea watchers from the government and think tank communities to discuss pressing policy issues in the political, security, social, and economic fields.
The Chair of the KWG is Ambassador Richard Solomon, President of the U.S. Institute of Peace. The Director is John S. Park, a Northeast Asia specialist in the Institute’s Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention.
The CSIS recently released this report: Keeping and eye on an unruly neighbor,” dealing with China’s plans should a crisis arise in N. Korea. Well worth a read…..
http://www.csis.org/component/option,com_csis_pubs/task,view/id,4255/type,1/
Synopsis:
This report is based on discussions with Chinese specialists on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) during a CSIS-USIP delegation visit to Beijing, Changchun, and Yanji, June 25-30, 2007. Topics discussed included trends in North Korea’s economy and prospects for reform; current trends in Sino-DPRK economic relations; China’s policy toward North Korea in the wake of the nuclear test; Chinese debates on North Korea; Chinese assessments of North Korea’s political stability; and potential Chinese responses to instability.
This Working Paper was commissioned by the Korea Working Group (KWG) at the U.S. Institute of Peace. The KWG brings together the leading North Korea watchers from the government and think tank communities to discuss pressing policy issues in the political, security, social, and economic fields.
The Chair of the KWG is Ambassador Richard Solomon, President of the U.S. Institute of Peace. The Director is John S. Park, a Northeast Asia specialist in the Institute’s Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention.
Gillian, this looks very interesting. Thank you.
Jamestown Foundation’s China experts have a very detailed, insightful report on PRC/PLA contingency plans and options for the succession of leadership in the DPRK. Their report includes possible factions within an ascendant military around the traditional divide between those who see Beijing as either friend or foe. This paragraph really got my attention:
“More specifically, the source of KPA’s political power is institutionalized along two parallel lines. The first line is the regular command structure of the KPA. This consists of field armies and garrison troops. Most senior officers are loyal followers of Kim but relations are less personal in comparison with the second line of commanders who manage Kim’s security units. They actually form the inner circle of the military clique serving as the “big brother in the back†in the KPA. Kim is highly dependent on their loyalty to execute his succession plan since they also maintain close contact with his sons. These units are a subsystem within the KPA, responsible only to Kim, although theoretically their superiors are those in the formal structure of command. The biggest uncertainty is whether there is any powerful figure in the current DPRK leadership who can prevent the strife between these two camps of top brass. If there is not one, then civil war might be a real possibility.”
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Bswords%5D=8fd5893941d69d0be3f378576261ae3e&tx_ttnews%5Bany_of_the_words%5D=korea&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=5229&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=7&cHash=bb09abec1f
I knew there were risks of disunity and regionalism in the wake of a DPRK collapse; I did not know that the military itself is divided on relations with the PRC in either scenario (unforced collapse or struggle for power upon KJI’s expiration).
This makes the role of the ROK even more dicey…
Why doesn’t China simply intervene under the premise of protecting nuclear materials from falling into the wrong hands and humanitarian reasons to prop up the North Korea regime, replace the current dynastic leadership with a less menancing, obedient, and loyal pro-Beijing government that favors economic reforms and liberalization?
In fact, the world would be much better off in China simply annexed North Korea or at the very least, installed a less menacing, obedient, and loyal pro-Beijing gov’t that favors economic liberalization…..that is much more preferably than a dynastic family heir system with a lunatic in charge of nuclear weapons.
I’m all for China instituting regime change in North Korea. A Pro-Chinese gov’t in North Korea will institute Chinese style economic reforms, which will be great for the starving North Korean people, and will aid greatly for Korean reunification.
North Korea is more likely to adopt Chinese-style economic reforms than collapse.
If North Korea liberalizes her economy, this changes the ball game entirely.
In the event of collapse, I welcome Chinese intervention to prop up the regime (saving Kim’s butt on again), and then calling up the IOU by calling on NK to institute economic reforms. NK can’t say no to her big brother China who saved her butt during collapse.
LOL, Chinese annexation of North Korea would be a horrible tragedy. It would continue the oppression and exploitation of Norht Koreans, this time by a foreign imperial power. It would guarantee that China would be a major negative force in international relations.
If China intervenes in North Korea like LOL and Glans are talking about, I guess China will show it has “matured” as a global power: It will have made a fatal mistake like the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviets or the Vietnam War by the US (and France before it)…
If China is half as smart in geopolitics as many Western experts have said over the last twenty years, it will have learned the lesson of the Soviet (and previous Chinese) involvement with North Korea from the 50s to the Soviet collapse: Russia (and China) poured massive amounts of aid into the North in an effort to prove communism was best by making the North more advanced than the South. But the effort was failing even before Russia cut the North off. The North’s infrastructure and ability to provide basic consumer needs of its people, even with multinational support, was failing before the 1990s – though it was hard for people outside of the North to see it at the time.
I do agree with usinkorea that full-blown intervention in North Korea will likely be a costly mistake for Beijing in the long run. The problem is that many non-Chinese may end up paying for the China’s mistake with lives and treasure, not just North Koreans but perhaps South Koreans and others.
I don’t think China should have any say in North Korea’s future because they are not a free country.
I’m not what you would call the biggest fan of China, but I can’t imagine how Chinese rule of North Korea could possibly be worse than the system in place now, unless they work out something where North Korea remains “independent”, they reap all the economic benefits and leave KJI/KJU and thier cronies to keep the population in line. That could actually be worse.
One of the primary problems if China decides to setup shop in NK post-collapse is that it will block whatever effective stabilization and rebuilding effort concerned nations would offer under different conditions.
Stability will be top priority for those nations. SK, Japan, the US, and then the EU and Russia will be interested in preventing the worst from happening post-collapse. SK, Japan, and the US will be willing or forced to provide large amounts of aid for a considerable period of time. But, if China moves in with the territorial outlook typical of previous examples like and prior too Kosovo, but especially an example where only 1 nation was in charge (like the US and Soviet Union in the Koreas post-WWII), it will be politically difficult (and inadvisable) for those nations to pump in that kind of money and resources.
Stabilizing NK and beginning the long process of rebuilding its infrastructure will take a large multinational effort. China could and should be a part of that, but if it decided to move boots on the ground and run the show, the multinational effort that could have been will collapse, and NK will remain a source of trouble (not as big as now) until China gives up wasting massive resources and works out a pull out deal with other nations.
I don’t think the US should put soldiers into the North or put enough bureaucrats on the ground to try to run the show either. I think that would unnecessarily retard stabilization and rebuilding too due to the amount of hatred propaganda generated over the entire life-times of most North Koreans.
It should be a South Korean show with much oversight in South Korea.
South Koreans will be the most acceptable people for Northerners to stomach post-collapse. South Koreans will also be palatable to both the US and China and Japan – the three nations who will end up paying gobs and gobs of money and resources for the North post-collapse. And South Korea is capable for spearheading such an effort.
They would certainly be capable of the job —– if the concerned nations could put aside differences and do much planning to handle things post-collapse. But, even the US and SK could not sit down to hammer out real plans before the current occupants in the Blue House took up residency. And forget about Japan, SK, and China being able to make detailed plans on how to bury the NK regime once it dies…
Eamonn, you couldn’t imagine. Until you imagined.
usinkorea, have you heard about the Glans Plan for North Korea? Here it is:
1. PRC stays out.
2. ROK annexes DPRK.
3. USA gets out.
What do you think?
Ummmm . . . Eamonn? I kinda think that what you describe hypothetically actually describes the present situation. With fine accuracy.
I’d vote for that plan. There would be trouble implementing it – not sure how severe:
Japan, China, and South Korea would have some trouble accepting withdrawal of all US troops from the South, because they would (somewhat rightly) fear it would reduce US interest in rebuilding North Korea, and major US involvement there is vital to its success and stability in East Asia post-collapse.
Japan would be highly disturbed about a US pullout of South Korea – fearing – as some have predicted, it would naturally lead to a pullout of Japan as well. I have never bought that idea. I’d think the opposite is more true: that Japan and Japanese society would take a look at the prospect of no US troops in East Asia, crap their pants, and then smooth over some of the rough spots Okinawa, Japan, and Japanese society has had in hosting USFJ. I could even imagine Japan asking the US to significantly beef up its forces in Japan if/when the US leaves South Korea.
Regardless of that, however, a US pullout of SK would lead Japan to significantly beef up its military — which in turn would send big ripples throughout the region.
It will be interesting to see what South Korea does with North Korea’s nukes post collapse if/when Korea is unified.
Even if the South destroys the North’s nukes and the North Korean threat is gone, if the US takes troops out of South Korea, there would be a push in Japan to nuclearize in the face of an militarily strengthening China —- and China will step up its already considerable effort to beef up after the North collapses.
I don’t know if China would want to see US troops stay in South Korea post-collapse and unification in order to keep some limits to the East Asian arms race. I kinda doubt it: I think China thinks the 21st Century is going to be theirs and they will triumph no matter what anybody does. I don’t think they are going to be overly scared of an arms race with Japan and eventually not too worried about the US either.
usinkorea, if unification comes, the southern part of Korea should accept the national duty of rebuilding the northern part. China will beef up in any case; the arms race is has already begun.
Greg Andrews said,
January 26, 2011 @ 5:36 am
Ummmm . . . Eamonn? I kinda think that what you describe hypothetically actually describes the present situation. With fine accuracy.
Yeah, point taken unfortunately. I was thinking at first more along the lines of China just outright annexing parts or all of North Korea, but why would they want to do that?