What Removing North Korea from the Terror List Means
If tomorrow’s Big Announcement from North Korea isn’t that the Great Leader has gone to the Great Meat Locker, it may well be that the North, having met with such stunning success at blackmailing the United States, will throw some new tantrum at South Korea. I would not credit the North with diplomatic genius for its success at isolating and blackmailing its enemies one at a time. The trick isn’t new. It seems more fair to credit us for the crashing stupidity of letting them.
The loss of South Korean aid, which added up to billions of dollars, must have been painful for the regime, and thus far, nothing the United States has given them has made up for that loss. That may soon change.
1. The regime gets bailed out again.
Two years ago, our Treasury Department nearly strangled Kim Jong Il’s palace economy. Today, in exchange for an incomplete freeze, partial disclosure, and no disarmament at all, we’ve thrown away our best economic leverage.
The State Department, incidentally, wants you to believe that the North still remains under a variety of U.S. sanctions and lists a myriad of bilateral sanctions, most of which have no real effect. De-listing the North as a terror sponsor opens the way for a massive inflow of international loan money in the form of IMF, World Bank, and Asian Development Bank loans (executive orders 12,938 and 13,382 apply to individually designated North Korean entities — various mining and trading companies — not the regime as a whole). Given the North’s past history, we can be certain that not one chon of that will ever be repaid, and if the loans don’t flow soon, it’s just a matter of time before the North reverts to what always works and resorts to extortion.
In other words, de-listing has incalculable significance where it matters — the palace economy. Just imagine all of the centrifuges, barbed wire, cognac, and sarin they can buy now.
2. We lose influence in Japan and upset the entire regional security framework.
The Washington Post also describes the bitterness Bush’s decision has caused in Japan:
“I think it is an act of betrayal,” said Teruaki Masumoto, a brother of one of the eight Japanese who were stolen away by North Korean agents in the 1970s and ’80s and who the Japanese government says are still alive in North Korea. Masumoto is secretary general of the Association of the Families of Victims Kidnapped by North Korea.
“Why did the United States remove North Korea from the list when it is clear to anyone’s eyes that the North is a terrorism-assisting country?” asked Sakie Yokota, 72, whose daughter, Megumi Yokota, was 13 when she was kidnapped nearly 31 years ago and is by far the most famous of the abductees.
Struggling to explain the emotional resonance of the abductee issue for the Japanese people, a Foreign Ministry official in Tokyo earlier this year compared Megumi Yokota to Alexander Solzhenitsyn, the late Nobel Prize-winning novelist who made the world aware of the network of Soviet prisons known as the gulag.
In Washington on Saturday, Japanese Finance Minister Shoichi Nakagawa told reporters that the U.S. decision was “extremely regrettable.” He said that “abductions amount to terrorist acts. [Washington Post]
It’s already clear enough that meaningfully disarming North Korea will not be a part of President Bush’s legacy, but this move will badly damage relations with out most important ally in the Pacific and could begin a long decline in U.S. influence in that region. The message received by everyone in Japan is that the United States can’t be relied on, and they will feel greater pressure to build a defense that doesn’t rely on us, either. Our decision makers have placed their own egos over statesmanship, our national interest, and the interests of our friends.
Nothing kindles an arms race quite like tossing aside the security interests of nations that has counted on you to play regional peacekeeper. Granted, I question the returns on the cost was pay to fill that role, and I welcome the rearmament of Japan and South Korea, so long as they don’t shoot at each other. The inevitable result of dependence on America, beyond expense to us, is that either we keep our commitments or we won’t. Damned if we do and we get ourselves embroiled in Korean War II. Damned if we don’t, and you can already see the seeds being sown for Taiwan to go the way of one country/two systems, which gradually becomes Beijing’s system.
Don’t you remember where power comes from, silly?
3. Nothing is solved, but feel-good diplomacy triumphs.
You can’t help but think that it serves Bush right that Colin Powell, who stayed Bush’s hand against North Korea for the duration of his first term, has turned around and kicked Bush in the teeth by endorsing Obama. Then again, if you’re watching closely enough, Obama can seem more like a continuation of the Bush administration than Bush’s co-partisan. It tells you something about what’s in store for us that McCain opposed Bush’s decision and Obama supported it. Not long ago, Obama said he’d oppose de-listing without a strong verification mechanism. So how strong does this sound?
Officials acknowledged that they do not have permission to visit the site of North Korea’s 2006 nuclear test or any military facilities possibly involved in the nuclear program. Experts will have access to facilities at the Yongbyon reactor site and some academic institutions; visits to additional sites will be subject to negotiations. Officials said it will be months, if not years, before questions about North Korea’s nuclear program are answered.
“This is going to be a bumpy road,” said Assistant Secretary of State Paula A. DeSutter, the chief of the verification bureau. “However, we are building a road.”
In a sign of internal tensions, DeSutter, whose office was barred from knowing the details of the deal until Friday morning, declined to dismiss complaints about it from John R. Bolton, the former ambassador to the United Nations and her former boss as undersecretary for arms control in Bush’s first term. “John is the epitome of a skeptical policymaker, and that’s appropriate,” she said.
Although Bolton is a well-known hawk on North Korea, other experts also have expressed concerns.
“There is a real danger that Pyongyang will pull a bait and switch now that sanctions have been lifted,” said Michael J. Green, Bush’s former top aide for Asia policy. “The credibility of this agreement really hangs on what happens next, including how we repair the damage done with Tokyo.” [Washington Post]
We — and our allies — can expect much more of this silky, self-gratifying cotton candy diplomacy in the future, but it’s not as if the Republicans have exactly earned the nation’s continued confidence on this issue. It may take an Obama presidency for the Republicans to learn to stand for something again.
I think you have really identified the crux of the matter – a unilateral decision that puts us at variance with Japan. This could have very serious consequences for the region and our long term partnership with the Japanese government.
If the result of this feel-good diplomacy is a prop-up of the Juche regime, regardless what the Big News is today (its Monday the 20th here in Korea), that is bad for all concerned. Propping up the Juche regime AND alienating our allies in Japan is unacceptable.
I think we will endure 4 years of very bad judgment in Washington, DC and that will not be a good thing for anyone. The only possible positive dividend of a failed Obama administration would be the re-emergence of a true Conservative leadership in the GOP.
I definitely share your frustrations with the Bush administration that spurns Seoul and alienates Tokyo while getting no tangible results from Pyongyang and ends up enabling the Juche regime to tyrannize indefinitely.
Here’s how I see it. Tell me what you think.
The de-listing will have three primary effects:
1. First, it will allow Nork entities access to American and International financial markets. With the North’s failed economic policies, it is unlikely that this will provide all that much benefit, because there simply isn’t that much money laying around for long-term investment, and no one will trust them with loan money (International development lenders have be cheated by them before, and will be unwilling to loan more without significant reform). Furthermore, allowing NK to do business with the financial markets gives American intelligence the ability to keep a closer eye on Nork money. It’s harder to do that if all their money is in secret Chinese accounts. Also, as a Marmot’s Hole reader notes, the financial system is a disaster at the moment, anyway.
2. Second, it will allow American entities to do business in NK. Person-to-person interaction of any kind will only bring the NK regime closer to destruction. Not that it will make much difference anyway, as few American companies are stupid enough to make long-term investments there.
3. Finally, it will remove the symbolic (though entirely accurate) insult of being labeled a “state sponsor of terror”. Diplomats are not paid to tell the truth, and if real rewards can be gained from symbolic concessions, the diplomats should probably support it (short of worshiping the statue of Kim Il Sung at Mansudae). If the Norks cheat on the agreement, well, it’s only symbolic, and we can just as easily add them back.
As for Japan, it’s important to note that while those directly hurt by the abductions are understandably upset, long-term inter-government relations will probably not be deeply affected. Japanese officials are a bit more pragmatic than their Korean counterparts, and they don’t want to display a divided front with the US. In fact, a united front is their only hope of resolving the issue. But if influence with Japan is indeed lost, you can be sure that an equal amount of influence will be gained in China, which is sensitive to the issue of Terrorism, with its terrorist policies in Xinjing, Tibet, and, well, Beijing and Seoul (witness the thuggery surrounding the Olympics). China has more influence in NK than Japan.
I’m not saying all this is going to work towards disarmament, but it seems we’re paying a rather small price to find out.
So … it’s finally happened … the abject and utter betrayal of the memory of those murdered by Pyongyang … as well as those still patiently waiting their own turn to be murdered in the camps.
May God have mercy on our souls … we certainly haven’t shown any to those hapless souls.
I weep.
Red Army still in North Korea? What Red Army?
Sorry — where’s the “red army” reference?
Eunsong —
1. You’re missing the key point that financial leverage — most especially access to international capital — is the only effective leverage we have, and without effective leverage, diplomacy can’t work. The last 20 years should have proven that to the satisfaction of every intelligent observer. Our military deterrent is no deterrent against the North acquiring nukes, either, because the North Koreans know we won’t strike first. Financial leverage was the one thing we had that actually worked. No wonder the North Koreans focused their negotiating strategy on that. In effect, they talked us into unilaterally disarming ourselves of our only real deterrent and negotiating leverage. How stupid of us. We’ve just guaranteed that diplomacy will continue to fail, the ironic result of which is to make war more likely, not less.
2. Yes, I think we all heard exactly the same argument ten years ago when it was the South Koreans investing in those hermetically sealed cash depositories known as Kaesong and Kumgang. I’d give you a progress report on that, but Park Wang Ja is unavailable for comment.
3(a). We agree that the decision is symbolic, but I see it as symbolic of our willingness to give in again and again, demanding no quo for our quid. Advocates of endless unconditional concessions, of course, always say that their patience has an end and there will be a reckoning one day. They’ve been saying that for 20 years, all the while advocating that “just one more” concession. In practice, the has never really been a limit to the concessions for which they (yes, I generalize) advocated, and no provocation has ever been so great that they actually favored increasing pressure. In the last 10 years, we’ve watched them shoot missiles over Japan, try to launch a missile into the waters off Hawaii, kidnap and kill a U.S. resident, hold an unknown number of abductees of various nationalities for years, set up a banned uranium enrichment program, withdraw from and reenter the NPT, force IAEA monitors through the revolving door a few times, test a nuke, and attempt to build a reactor for fellow terror-sponsor Syria. I’ve concluded that if North Korea actually used a nuke against Seoul, Bill Richardson would try to call it George Bush’s fault for alienating them and then suggest that we respond by extending full diplomatic relations. Maybe that serves South Korea’s interest, at least as some Koreans see it. It doesn’t serve ours. So please, let’s not kid ourselves about this designation being reimposed. It won’t be.
3(b). You also invite us to join in your acceptance that the terror sponsor designation is symbolic and meaningless, but if that is true, then either you’re saying that we should abandon the deterrence of terrorism or deter it with military force alone. There is no higher immediate U.S. national security interest than the deterrence of terrorism, and terrorism needs state sponsorship. The terrorism sponsor designation has numerous specific and important consequences under U.S. law — in short, it means plenty. To politicize it for the personal aggrandizement of lame-duck politicians goes far beyond its impact on North Korea policy; it cheapens and undermines the entire spectrum of our list of non-violent options for deterring the sponsorship of terror. Ironically — and without question — the single worst North Korean offense of terror sponsorship was its very recent proliferation of nuclear technology to Syria, which has the means and will to proliferate nuclear technology and/or material to Hezbollah, the PFLP, and any number of extremely violent terrorist organizations that would in fact use them. The de-listing of North Korea just months after the outing of this grave offense tells the world that nuclear proliferation to terrorists and rogue states won’t just be tolerated, but rewarded.
A criticism of U.S. policy, not you; several Japanese Red Army members remain in the DPRK following their involvement in a 1970 jet hijacking.
Eunsong; For any of what you say to be correct, the underlying assumption is that North Korea will allow such deep and assuredly destabilizing interaction. But they won’t.
Joshua, do you have a link any open source intel on the dealings between NK and Hezbollah? I’d like to explore that some more.
Sure. Start here.
Ok,
1. If financial leverage is the only leverage that we have over them, wouldn’t that leverage only increase with them becoming more involved in our markets? I mean, it’s one thing to deny them access. It’s another thing to let them get heavily involved, and then threaten to pull the rug out from under them if they don’t behave. (Of course, this assumes that world financial authorities would demand collateral for any loans; them merely stealing loan money obviously undermines my point, but I think that lenders have learned their lesson by now.)
2. There are numerous, less glamorous projects that you don’t mention. For example, American charities (Bethlehem project, etc.), a number of business and technical schools, and other projects with direct interaction. (A Canadian that worked for a year at a technical university in Pyongyang gave a fascinating lecture at the Royal Asiatic Society. He claimed to date an NK woman, and smoke pot with NK construction workers. That’s real interaction.) Also, remember that the general public doesn’t have to be involved for interaction to make a difference. The elite attempting a coup is more likely than a peasant’s revolution, I think.
3b. I’m suggesting no such thing. I’m merely saying that fighting terror, and giving out the label of “state sponsor of terror”, are not one and the same thing. Obviously, our focus on terrorism should continue, focusing on terrorist targets, with or without such a label.
By the way, Terrorism does not require a state sponsor. Witness Tim McVeigh, or bin Ladin in earlier years (he funded a number of his earlier projects with his inheritance money).
1. First, what basis is there for you to believe they want to be involved in our markets? The weight of evidence suggests that they fear the sort of interaction you promote like Jagger fears rehab. They’re on to you, you know:
North Korea’s interest in access to international capital doesn’t extend beyond its interest in the unencumbered laundering of drug money, plus access to aid and extortion money (they can be hard to distinguish at times). To paraphrase David Asher, you wonder what the North Koreans would be capable of if they put half as much effort into manufacturing decent textiles as they have into the quality of their counterfeit c-notes. But they choose to set their own priorities.
2. Define “numerous.” To rephrase a man named Diego, I do not think that word means what you think it means. To even concede your point I first have to concede that your friend (a) exists, (b) is telling the truth and (c) is not unwittingly “interacting” with regime spies. If the answers to (a), (b), and (c) are all yes — though if (b) is true, (c) probably isn’t — the regime would rather forego contact with the outside world than tolerate that sort of interaction.
3. So are you saying that for two rogue states and terror sponsors to exchange nuclear technology does not implicate counter-terrorism interests?
I’ll give you McVeigh, but Bin Laden was sponsored by the Taliban regime.
1. You cite a good reason why the Norks wouldn’t want to be involved. My point was that it might be to our advantage to have them involved. They might get involved anyway, out of necessity. Actually, if they were to ever learn that textiles are more profitable than drugs and counterfeits, maybe they would do that instead. I think we should give them that opportunity.
We should be wisely skeptical of any NK “reform”, but at the same time, we should not have a stance that discourages reform. So, skepticism, not cynicism.
2. His name is Michael P. Spavor. He did a lecture at the RAS in Seoul. I suppose that he could have been making everything up, but he backed everything up with pictures and detailed accounts, etc.. The publicity wasn’t of the sort that NK would like (smoking pot, watching SK movies, etc.).
3. I’m not saying that. I’m saying that having them on a list called “state sponsors of terror”, and working to discourage the state sponsorship of terror are two different issues. Did the Armenian Genocide happen? Yes. Was it wise to publicly implicate, and thus alienate, a regional ally last year? No. Diplomacy is about using dialog to put your country in a better geopolitical position. It’s not about always presenting accurate views of foreign countries to the public.
I was referring to the time before the Taliban was a national government. Most of his terror was against middle eastern governments at that time. Terrorist nonetheless. Anyway, not relevant.
Oh, and as for “numerous”, of course that’s relative. But there are joint construction projects for bakeries, nurseries, orphanages, etc. with NGOs, plus a joint shipping company (Poland), a joint computer programming company (France & Germany), and schools with foreign professors and students. This amounts to hundreds of foreigners “carry[ing] out ideological and cultural infiltration …. paralyz[ing] people’s ideological consciousness”. Americans should be among them.
Joshua,
Just to clarify in #2….dude’s name was Inigo and someone with 6 fingers killed his father.
Oh, and he’s not really left handed either.
he he.
Thanks for that awesome reference!
Josh, thanks for the link. Great OSINT product on that page.
James, you’re so right. How could I get that wrong?
Inconceivable!
This needs a very short summary, no more:
We should have never delisted the North.
Once Iraq had elections in 2004, we should have sent Kim an official communique… tell me what you think…
Mr. Kim,
“The United States, having accomplished its mission in Iraq, is now targeting you. We have unilaterally decided that there will be a free North, presumably to merge with the South again, as Korea. In furtherance of this policy statement, American and NATO troops will enter the DPRK at their discretion and secure its entire territory. Upon the arrival of Western forces, the DPRK will cease to be sovereign, and will be placed under the protectorship of the United States of America, assisted by the United Nations, for such time as they may think proper.
“The following are direct orders to you. They are non-negotiable, and you will obey them to the letter. If you are in doubt as to our meaning or intent, we invite you to watch the directive spoken to Saddam Hussein prior to the start of the Iraq conflict.
“Please note further that the United States is prepared at any time to charge you and others named herein, in our military courts, with crimes against humanity, to include mass murder. Said crimes are punishable by death.
“You, your sons, and any other family members in positions of authority are subject to these following orders. When we refer directly to you, the same orders and allowances apply equally to them, and they are included by reference. Failure to comply, by you or the other named persons, within the prescribed time limits will result in said offenders’ arrest, summary battlefield court-martial, and execution. The United States will view any non-compliance with these stipulations as an act of war, and since you have perpetrated crimes against humanity as a civilian while disguising yourself in a military outfit, the United States has no qualms about denying you the rights granted under the Geneva Conventions. Said rights may be denied to any illegal combatant, including a civilian operating under, or overseeing, a criminal, irregular combatant force.
“You WILL, within 48 hours:
(1) Free, or cause to be freed, all political prisoners on DPRK soil;
(2) Close, or cause to be closed, all internment, re-education, and concentration camps which a reasonable person would see as such;
(3) Arrange for the return of all kidnapped Japanese citizens;
(4) Relinquish power, but before you do, you will:
(5) Announce that the KWP is no longer an active entity;
(6) Resign every position you have in the KWP and order its Politburo, Party Congress, and Central Committee dissolved permanently;
(7) Order free elections as your final act;
(8) You WILL then depart the DPRK for a second country of your choosing, Provided: that said country shall NOT be the ROK, the ROC, or the United States or any of its territories or possessions. If you are discovered in any of these prohibited lands, you shall face incarceration for life;
(9) You may remove from the DPRK your wholly personal possessions: clothing, toiletries, non-valuable hobby items, basic foodstuffs, and other ordinary creature comforts, to include one land-line telephone, one cellular telephone, and one personal computer, programs necessary for its normal use, and essential hardware and peripheral devices. Said items shall be inspected by the United States to ensure compliance with other sections of these orders.
(10) You may remove not more than $250,000 in such media of exchange as you might wish, Provided: that no moneys removed shall be American currency or euro, or bearer documents, travelers’ checks, debit cards, credit cards, or any other medium readily convertible into dollars or euro;
(7) You will surrender all other property, both real and personal, within and without the DPRK, whether owned wholly by you or otherwise used at your discretion. You are forbidden from taking any motorized vehicle, of whatever kind, out of the DPRK for personal or business use;
(8) You will surrender ownership of all other bank accounts, savings, or monetary or valuables caches of any kind, wherever located throughout the world; and you are put on notice that said accounts will be used to repay the North Korean populace for the evils you have committed against them, and to facilitate the reunification of the two Koreas under a democratic government;
(9) That any attempt by you or those authorized by you to hinder the collection of moneys and property under sections (7) and (8), or to retain them, shall result in your arrest and summary execution.
(10) You and such members of your household who might be covered under this decree are hereby forbidden ever to return to the Korean Peninsula; to any location on land within fifty (50) statute miles of the Rivers Yalu and Tumen; to any location on land within fifty (50) statute miles of the current border between the Russian Federation and the DPRK; or to any location within the territorial seas of the current two Koreas, Provided: that the prior clause shall be construed as to prohibit your travel within twelve (12) miles of any point of land controlled now or in the future, or claimed, by either or both Koreas, or by a single Korea, whether such claim shall be in dispute or not.
It’s just a first draft; what do you all think? 🙂 John…