Is Barack Obama Finding His Inner Churchill?
[Update: Clinton hints at putting North Korea back on the list of state sponsors of terrorism, and calls the charges against Laura Ling and Euna Lee “absolutely without merit or foundation.” Does that mean Clinton’s best information is that they were inside China?]
I continue to be gleefully amazed by the toughness and seriousness of Obama’s words on North Korea. Now let’s see if they translate into effective action. In his young presidency, Obama has already jettisoned some of the sillier foreign policy fantasies he’d articulated in his campaign. One early casualty is the idea that the U.N. can be an effective tool for dealing with sociopaths. Obama now seems completely prepared to act with or without the assent of Russia and China, and thus, the U.N. The result will be a tougher resolution and better diplomacy:
His patience tested, President Obama on Saturday promised a new and stronger response to defiant North Korea, saying that while he prefers diplomacy he is now taking a “very hard look” at tougher measures. A Pentagon official said no military moves were planned. Obama’s blunt language seemed to point toward nonmilitary penalties such as financial sanctions against North Korea, either within the United Nations or by Washington alone. U.S. allies in Asia may consider new moves to improve their own military defenses.
“We are not intending to continue a policy of rewarding provocation,” he said, alluding to recent North Korea nuclear and missile tests. [….] “We are going to take a very hard look at how we move forward on these issues, and I don’t think that there should be an assumption that we will simply continue down a path in which North Korea is constantly destabilizing the region and we just react in the same ways by, after they’ve done these things for a while, then we reward them,” Obama said. [AP, via USA Today]
More here:
Obama said North Korea’s recent actions, which also include testing missiles, were “extraordinarily provocative” and would not be met with appeasement as they had been in the past.”I don’t think that there should be an assumption that we will simply continue down a path in which North Korea is constantly destabilizing the region and we just react in the same ways,” Obama told reporters. [Reuters, David Alexander]
That’s right. A correspondent from the famously left-wing British wire service Reuters actually used the word “appeasement,” notwithstanding the all of the political and historical connotations that word carries. Even if Obama’s own words were not meant to be a rebuke to his predecessors — including the husband of his Secretary of State — they may just as well be taken as such. Indeed, if Obama follows through with these words, making financial pressure a key element of his North Korea policy and a forced opening of North Korea to transparency its objective, a man many of us had dismissed as a naive liberal neophyte will have created a North Korea policy vastly superior to any previous American president. Obama has expressly discarded the myth that there is a purely diplomatic solution for every problem:
“My preference is always to use a diplomatic approach,” Obama said. “But diplomacy has to involve the other side engaging in a serious way in trying to solve problems. And we have not seen that kind of reaction from North Korea. So we will continue to consult with our allies.” [AP, via USA Today]
The willingness to shape our diplomatic efforts around nations that share our interests, as opposed to those that willfully undermine them, will make our diplomacy more effective. So will dovetailing our diplomatic efforts with financial pressure and sensible military deterrence:
“We will not stand idly by as North Korea builds the capability to wreak destruction on any target in the region or on us,” [SecDef Robert] Gates said. In meetings with South Korean and Japanese officials, he said it was time to think about additional defensive moves they could make, collectively or individually, to prepare for the possibility of North Korea continuing to develop its nuclear capability.
Gates mentioned no specific possibilities. One possible option could be to put more Navy ships in waters near the Korean Peninsula to provide more capability to shoot down hostile missiles. Pentagon press secretary Geoff Morrell said Saturday that the U.S. is not moving toward military action against North Korea.
“That’s not the focus of our efforts,” Morrell said. “Everyone’s preference is to prevail upon the North Koreans with diplomatic or economic pressure. But Secretary Gates on his most recent trip to Asia urged our allies — Japan and South Korea — to begin thinking about prudent defensive measures that might also be taken should we fail in dissuading the North Koreans from pursuing” ballistic missile and nuclear bomb capabilities. [AP, via USA Today]
Gates is now said to be reconsidering proposed missile defense cuts, while avoiding threats to strike directly against targets in North Korea (another ill-advised call for that here).
Obama and South Korean President Lee Myung-Bak are even reviving a regional alliance that leftist presidents Roh Moo-Hyun and Kim Dae-Jung had spent the last decade undermining. This time, both South Korea and Japan appear to have joined us in a coordinated approach. As with the promising developments in America, we would never have heard words of such clarity, determination, or maturity from President Lee’s predecessor in a moment of crisis:
“I hereby make it clear again that there won’t be any compromise in issues threatening the lives of the people and national security,” Lee said at a speech marking Memorial Day to honour the Korean War dead.
North Korea was not only threatening the South but the world’s peace and stability by carrying out nuclear tests and launching missiles, he said.
“Even at this very moment, the North is ratcheting up the level of threats as we are also stepping up our defence posture, resulting in a trigger-wire confrontation,” Lee said. [AFP]
Japan and South Korea have both joined America in putting pressure on the Chinese at the U.N.:
A revised draft Security Council resolution outlined by seven key United Nations members on North Korea’s second nuclear test would obligate all U.N. members to inspect North Korean cargo if it is suspected of carrying nuclear or missile-related items, U.N. diplomatic sources said Friday.
The revised draft also includes additional financial sanctions against North Korea in line with a call by Japan and the United States, the sources said. [….]Japanese Ambassador Yukio Takasu told reporters Friday, ”We are spending day and night on it since the response of the Security Council to the nuclear test by North Korea should be very, very strong and clear.” ”How this will be formulated into a concrete way…requires very careful technical, legal and political examinations by all of us,” he said. [Kyodo News]
Naturally, the Chinese are stalling. They warn that inspections at sea will lead to military conflict. I don’t doubt that that’s true, though any such conflict would be limited, winnable for us, and a potential humiliation for North Korea. Certainly the Japanese been through the experience while trying to catch North Korea dope smugglers off their own shores:
But conflicts with North Korean ships are much less likely to expand into Korean War 2 than such ill-advised ideas of striking at North Korean nuclear sites. Kim Jong Il probably knows that his navy is outclassed, and he knows what the consequences of escalating a land war would be. That’s why past conflicts with North Korea on the high seas invited no greater reaction than more bluster from North Korea and its sympathizers in the South. Speaking of which, you’ll be pleased to know that the Hanky is aghast at the direction of U.S. policy, and in related news, KCNA is bleating about Obama’s plot to dominate Eurasia.
Myself, I’ll be very interested in seeing how Kim Jong Il reacts to this new and credible American threat. He knows how much pain financial sanctions caused him in 2005-2006. That means that the next missile test could become a test of much more than propulsion and guidance systems. If the North Koreans end up doing, say, a static motor test instead of an actual launch, it may demonstrate our capacity to influence the North Koreans’ behavior. Then again, the North Koreans must realize what conclusions America would draw from them backing down. They may feel compelled to go ahead with the test to avoid the affirmation of exactly that lesson. If we learn it as effectively as they’ve learned to extort us, it might reshape America’s entire approach to Kim Jong Il in a way not at all to his favor.
One very faint sign that Kim Jong Il could be concerned is his invitation to the South Koreans to parlay about Kaesong, but this may or may not mean anything. The North may just show up and issue a new set of demands.
My final caution would be this: just as Bush’s words during his first term failed to translate into a coherent and tough policy, Obama’s rhetoric during his campaign (thankfully) proved less than enduring in practice. Now it’s up to Obama to follow through on his words.
Related: It’s even becoming difficult it distinguish Obama’s rhetoric from Robert Joseph’s:
Some who oppose putting real pressure on North Korea argue it will lead to war. In fact, taking the above steps will likely reduce the risks of conflict and increase the chances for diplomacy to work. The North Korean regime is brittle, its economy bankrupt, and its future dim. It has come to rely on extortion for its survival. If we make the hard choices, if we deny it further benefits from its provocations, and if we act with resolve, we increase the prospects for long term peaceful change.
Success in confronting the North Korean threat demands American leadership on the most fundamental level. To date, Pyongyang has repeatedly used its nuclear program to gain concessions vital to its survival. The objective of U.S. policy must be to present the Dear Leader with a clear choice: he can keep his weapons and loose all outside assistance, or he can give up the weapons. We cannot allow him to continue to have it both ways. [Robert Joseph, Wall Street Journal]
How exactly does the US impose sanctions on banks like the one in Macau? What actions are taken to make it happen?
All banks that operate in the international financial system require “correspondent accounts” in other countries to engage in transactions and transfers with other banks, companies, and persons in those countries. The United States continues to the be world’s financial center. If Treasury orders U.S. banks to block the correspondent accounts of an overseas bank, it effectively freezes that bank out of the world financial system and could have a dramatic effect on the bank’s ability to service other customers’ accounts, and therefore, the bank’s liquidity. The action against BDA caused a run. Similarly, the AWSJ story caused panic at the Bank of China, which is China’s largest bank.
I to find Obama’s position on North Korea, much like his positions on Iraq, wiretapping, etc. to so far to be a welcome change from his campaign rhetoric. Now lets see if he follows up his new rhetorical positions with action. The first test will be if he indeed does follow through with the financial sanctions. This time it will be a bit harder to implement since North Korea has a variety of front companies in China they are reportedly using to move their cash around. If they can find out which companies the North Koreans are using and hit their banks with financial sanctions it would be a big blow to the regime elite.
I am honestly having trouble — in the academic sense — squaring Obama’s words on North Korea policy square with those on Iran policy…
What makes it easy for him to take a hardline against Pyongyang and a soft one with Tehran?
I can’t picture a reasonable or likely answer to that. It’s a mystery.
I guess you could say that NK’s actions are more provocative because they are testing nukes they have already built with weapons grade nuclear material they have already processed — while Iran hasn’t gotten that far yet —– But that would mean that Obama feels we have to wait to see what Iran does with its weapons grade material once it has enough to build a bomb…That, until proven guilty, you can’t rule that Iran isn’t really just processing nuclear material for peaceful energy-producing purposes…
…but I give Obama more credit than that.
But why the difference? Why is holding out a hand, even after they slap it away, to Iran the noble policy but fighting against appeasement the right one for NK???
A quick question maybe someone here, maybe DPRK Studies, can answer: What is the longest range of missile Iran has tested so far? Have they tested one with the range of the latest NK missile test?
It’s not really that important for me here — because it has been clear for a long time that NK and Iran are partners in missile development.
So, again, why is the North’s actions too provocative but Iran isn’t?
And then, last but certainly not least, we have Hezbollah and Hamas:
Two of the world’s most active terrorist organizations with ties directly to Iran — who gives them all kinds of support — and uses them to keep the Middle East unstable to further Iranian goals of being the lead nation in the region…
NK has done pulled some brazen terrorist stunts in the past, and used to work diligently to stir up trouble in South Korea, but it hasn’t been active like that since it collapsed in the 1990s. It is not close to being the type of terrorist supporting nation that Iran has been and still is —
— but Obama feels like it is best to reach out a kind hand to Iran and pull it away from NK?
I can’t square the two positions. I think of how they gell in Obama’s thinking….
I know it can be politically useful to conflate the two situations, but in real life they just not the same thing. I suppose a major reason for not treating them the same way — without wanting to sound like I’m oversimplifying things here — is that Iran does not have, and has not tested, nuclear weapons (yet, at least, and it appears that it will take some time before they may be able to do so). Further, the domestic political situations are quite different and, as such, could be seen to call for different approaches. As bad as the Iranian establishment is (and please, let’s avoid the pathetic and offensive accusation, all too regularly aired against those perceived as ‘leftists’, that this argument is somehow made in defence of the Iranian establishment’s political programme), it is a different animal to that of North Korea; there is slightly more room for manoeuvre, there is slightly more domestic debate and dissent which may be exploited; obviously, the lack thereof in the DPRK is what makes it unique to some extent, no? They’re just two different situations which call for two different responses. As it stands, there is only one nuclear power in the middle east with religious fundamentalists in its government.
I agree that different responses are appropriate in Iran and North Korea because the circumstances are very different. Iran is not yet nuclear and doesn’t have 10,000 artillery tubes pointed at an overpopulated neighbor. We have military options with Iran that we don’t have against North Korea, and we have an urgent need to keep the world’s most prolific sponsor of terrorism from acquiring nuclear weapons. That is arguably our greatest national security threat today. The only way, it seems, to prevent that from happening is a military strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities.
I am not advocating invasion, which would be extremely ill advised. But we’ve wasted a lot of time with the EU’s diplomacy, and we need to buy some of that time back.
As much as I’d like to see another Iranian revolution — and eventually, there will be one — we have to be realistic that it may not happen soon, and it may not end Iran’s nuclear program, which is quite popular on the Iranian street.
Hi Joshua – thanks very much for your fantastic blog. I’m constantly amazed by how much you post and the level of detail! I read your site every day, so keep up the great work.
I am advocating invasion, whatever the cost. The risk from doing nothing is already to great, and the North Koreans know that every moment we stall, they grow stronger and we grow weaker.
Have we learned nothing from World War II and the Iraq War? We are beyond the point where diplomacy can solve anything. If we need to soften them up by destroying their financial system first, so be it—but I, for one, do not want to starve the North Korean people again.
I do not buy the arguments that Seoul will be wasted or that we will lose millions of soldiers. That was not true in Iraq, and I strongly doubt it is true in Korea. Even if it were true, how many more would die when the North Koreans launch a nuke over Tokyo or Los Angelos? Or how many would die if a suitcase nuke ended up in New York?
I will not be happy until American boots are physically on Kim Jong Il’s throat, and an American Flag is flying high in Pyongyang (with or without the South Korean one.) I will not be happy until we have Nuremburg trials for everyone connected to Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, and until we have slaughtered all those guilty of the Korean War and all those guilty of starving and slaughtering their own people. Justice demands it, and I cannot rest easy until the demands are met.
So, let me get this straight: if Bush acts without the UN Security Council impramatur or 100% consensus of every imaginable ally, he is branded as a cowboy and a power abuser, but if Obama eschews the approval of our partners and allies, he is Churchillian?
Uh, no. Obama hasn’t made a single meaningful foreign policy action to date other than his international apology tour. His suck up to Muslims has greatly damaged the prestige of the US and his rhetoric about “no junior partners” means “I am softer than Jimmy Carter on his weakest day”.
Obama has been all talk, and most of what he says has infuriated the military, castigated the history of the US, and demoralized the free markets.
The communist PRC is lecturing us about capitalism and the former USSR (Pravda) is laughing at our embrace of marxism. Grrrrrrr…..
There are clear differences between Korea and Iran. Let’s just wait and see what happens with the Iranian presidential elections in a few weeks. That will give a good indication of what way the folks that influence these things want to move. Ratcheting up tension in Iran is only going to benefit the extremists in the run-up to the election. Once we know who we will be dealing with after the election, things will look a little different.
No one has mentioned the soccer, which is probably because in the grand scheme of things it is unimportant. But what happens if North Korea qualify for the World Cup? People in North Korea are likely to be very pleased if they do. They really looked up for it on Saturday (when they were playing Iran in Pyongyang).
What happens if they don’t qualify for the World Cup? Could be bad news for the regime.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Football_War
By the way, one of the most likely scenarios for North Korea to qualify for the World Cup is through beating New Zealand in Pyongyang.
There’s no way the US can afford an invasion. They would have to get a loan from China, who vehemently opposes any invasion.
Mr Gardener, I am curious as to whether you would join your armed forces in the event of such a war?
KCJ, I certainly didn’t criticize Bush for acting without U.N. permission, though that gets us into a debate about whether the term “serious consequences” was permission. And I agree that Obama gets no credit until he takes comprehensive, sustained action that he keeps in place until the North Koreans make meaningful and irreversible concessions.
Ironically, I think we may soon see Obama act far more unilaterally than Bush did … and get away with it, Scot free. And if that’s best for the interests of our country, even those of us who didn’t vote for Obama should be happy about that.
When I say I’m trying to understand this academically, I mean I’m trying to guess what is going on inside Obama’s head, and I can’t make it work.
The situations with Iran and NK are different, and I don’t assume the approach to both nations should be the same. I just can’t picture well what kind of thinking is crafting the two very different approaches to these two.
For myself, on what armchair novice policy I’d tend to recommend, it seems the differences between Iran and NK would make it a better idea to ratchet up the pressure on Tehran – like OFK and a couple of other commentors mentioned here.
Iran doesn’t have the level of deterrent NK does. Iran isn’t close to NK in being able to offer the same level of destruction as a military response.
Iran isn’t also perceived as offering as much trouble if it were forced to collapse as the North. China and SK are terrified of massive refugee streams pouring over their borders. That level of concern isn’t felt with Iran.
So limited military strikes or a harder line against Iran seems much more possible.
And it is at least arguable that —- the fact Iran doesn’t have nukes yet should give us all the more reason to push them harder before they get them.
Once Iran gets nukes, it will be harder to have a hardline policy with them. Not impossible or even inadvisable, just harder. That is one reason why Tehran wants that deterrent.
I also think the sponsoring of Hamas and Hezbolla should take a major place in forming Iranian policy. Until we are ready to largely abandon Israel as a key ally (which ain’t gonna happen anytime soon – whatever people are saying about Obama’s Middle East policy), the nature of Iranian-sponsored terrorism in the region is a key concern for the US.
But let’s just look at another difference between NK and Iran:
I haven’t considered this much — but it seems to me that nukes in Iran are a much higher cause of concern for the US than in NK. Both are bad but worse with Iran:
Why?
How many of us who pay attention to NK are worried that the North will decide to use nukes as an offensive weapon against Japan or South Korea? And/or, how many of us think North Korea with nukes now believes it can go back to a military option against SK — that it can return to the 1960s and early 70s with its military provocations at the DMZ and similar acts?
Judging by comments over the years — virtually none of us.
NK wants nukes as a deterrent, but it is still so weak economically and socially, it understands it has limits to what provocations it can get away with. It can’t afford to provoke too strong a response from the US and others.
Iran is not in that position. And its hatred of Israel makes a big difference. We have to consider the threats from Iran to Israel are more than idle rhetoric – however much rhetoric might be in play.
I don’t know as much about that region as East Asia, but who among us can picture Iran deciding once it gets nukes, it can easily step up military pressure on Israel and in the region?
I can’t picture a possible situation where NK sets things in motion that eventually lead to a nuclear exchange. It isn’t impossible just so improbable we can set it aside.
I can picture a situation in which Iran makes moves that eventually lead to a nuclear exchange between it and Israel (and maybe the US though much more unlikely).
I haven’t stated this well — but the point is: The fact Iran’s future nukes are significantly more likely than those of NK to have the chance of being used or leading Iran to use its conventional military against Israel and/or other neighbors – again makes it seem that a harder line against Tehran makes more sense before they get the nukes than a harder line against NK.
I guess I can frame this best by saying:
Iran wants nukes because it has long aspired to be the #1 power nation in the region — and it feels it needs to be able to use military provocations or outright attacks in order to exercise the strength of such a top power.
NK just wants to survive and thinks nukes can help it do so.
And considering this with everything else, it at least seems to me that a harder line against Tehran would be the way to go.
On Iran feeling bolder with nukes, I can add a couple of items I think are true:
1. The future of the US is going to be tied to that of Iraq far into the foreseeable future. Most likely, US troops are going to be stationed there indefinitely somewhat like they have been in South Korea. But — even if US troops are somehow pulled out of Iraq, which I give a low probability, the US will still be largely concerned with Iraq’s stability and growth.
Meaning, we won’t just sit back and watch that nation collapse or be overrun (like we were with South Vietnam).
2. Compared to the possibility of NK using military action, it is much easier to picture an Iran with nukes deciding it can resume its war with Iraq. Especially if no or few US troops are on the ground but perhaps even with US troops there.
At minimum, it is LIKELY that an Iran with a proven nuclear deterrent will be as aggressive in trying to destabilize Iraq and cause a revolution like Iran had in 1979 — as it has been in the past in trying to destabilize Israel — or — even more aggressive than North Korea was in trying to do the same in South Korea in the past.
Iran with nukes will mean the US will have to watch as the level of violence in Iraq returns to something like what we saw before The Surge had success. At minimum, we’ll witness more frequent Palestine-type “intifadas”.
I’d like to aver the striking and probably most important similarity between Iran and the DPRK that few want to grapple with: they are both religious regimes that reject all manner of serious ideological dissent.
Both regimes have painted themselves into a corner with their ideological dogmatism; Iran with the doctrine of the Mahdi and NK with Juche. Neither can compromise with committing ideological suicide. That means one thing on a political level but a completely different thing on the religious level which runs significantly deeper.
Iran is a thornier problem because their Shiite Twelver theology is much more mature and has adherents around the world. NK’s is a homemade syncretist combination of Confucian ancestor worship, Stalinism, and pragmatic adaptation to current events. Every attempt at engagement is a dead end. The ideologies themselves must be attacked with superior polemics and appeal to the masses. That is an information war, not a nuclear one. And as of right now, both regimes have the squishy, relativist morally decadent West vastly outgunned. The West (especially Europe) has largely lost its belief in moral certitude and the afterlife, and therefore sees nothing worth dying for. Both the DPRK and Iran have made pacts with death, and would rather die fighting than compromise dogma.
Until Western democracies renew their own religious and cultural heritage, they will continue to timidly wring their hands over rogue regimes like these that have a commitment to their ideologies, even if the ideologies themselves are doomed to fail.
I agree that nukes in Iran are much more serious than nukes in North Korea. But some of the differences are important for policy. The Iranians have a lot more friends than the North Koreans. The North Koreans are busy isolating themselves, even from China, but Iran has influence in lots of places that matter for the US; in Iraq, in Syria, in Lebanon, on the Arabian street, even amongst Muslims outside the Middle East. The US policy of defending Israel to the hilt is much more unpopular than their defence of South Korea, even within the US. Iranian society is not as one-sided as North Korea’s. There’s more debate, more awareness of the outside world, more people crossing the borders. There’s even a possibility that moderates might win the upcoming election and show a bit of flexibility.
The Iraqis would probably need to invade Iran to restart the Iran-Iraq war. The Iranians have much more influence in Iraq now than they had under Saddam. They can use their soft power; they have close religious ties with the Shiite majority there, who in turn wield considerable influence thanks to the rules of democracy.
The North Koreans have also flagrantly violated international law. Even the Chinese agree on that. The Iranians are still in the NPT and really have a credibility problem with the IAEA more than anything really blatant like an attempted test or two. Under the NPT they ought to be allowed to enrich uranium for civilian use, provided they can demonstrate that there is no military intent (other countries do this). The IAEA just doesn’t believe them at the moment. Once they declare military intent then the ground changes a lot. Then you can go after them without worrying about what will replace the NPT.
Iran also sounds a lot like Iraq to a lot of people in democracies and they remember that Iraq was attacked because of their supposed WMD programme. There’s a political cost that you need to weigh up. And don’t forget, the Iranians have something that oils the cogs of the world economy.
Still, I think that if the US does nothing about Iran and things continue as they are, then Israel will be forced to act alone at some point. The question for US policy makers is which is worse, the US acts or Israel acts alone?
To me, soft power diplomacy by Iran means Hezbollah and Hamas and prolonged terrorist campaigns. They did/do it in Lebanon – so it isn’t just an Israel thing with them. It is also why governments like those in Egypt and Saudi Arabia don’t trust Tehran too much.
I pretty much take it for granted Iran is going to gain a nuclear deterent.
And I think when they get it, they will step up terrorism in Israel, Iraq, Lebanon, and wherever else they think it will enhance their regional power.
Do you think the Israelis will stand by and let them get a nuclear deterrent? I think the Israelis would need to conclude that a mission has nearly zero chance of success before they pulled the plug on it. It’s a bottom line for Israel, way more than it is for the US. They just can’t allow it. And Netanyahu, like Laura Ling, has a family pedigree to uphold.