Everybody Panic
If North Korea does attack, how far would its armies really get? Not very, says Stuart Koehl, which is why it probably won’t, and from the looks of things, it isn’t building up its forces for such a move.
Koehl writes about North Korea’s much-feared artillery as the most important factor in saving as many South Korean civilian lives as possible, specifically, the silencing of North Korea’s “Y-sites.” Koehl explains that the advent of J-DAMs has greatly enhanced our capacity to do that quickly, though not quickly enough to prevent much needless loss of life.
Writing in the New York Times, however, B.J. Lee tells us that it’s time to stock your basement with ramyeon noodes, ChocoPies, and plenty of clean underwear.
Did anyone manage to keep a straight face after this line: (in the NYT article)
Also,
I guess “advanced weaponry” has a different meaning depending on your viewpoint.
Wouldn’t the smart thing to do be break all defense agreements with South Korea and remove all forces from the mainland, then launch an air attack? I would think it would at least make it harder for them to retaliate against South Korea. (And, of course, by “attack” I mean destroy as many North Korean military targets as possible, not just missile and nuclear targets. Considering the cost of breaking agreements, the North Korean military would have to be crippled.)
Of course, the one downside is that North Korea might decide to launch a land invasion while U.S. forces have been removed.
Joshua,
Thanks for the link to the Koehl article.
Also, is there a reason why you didn’t link Wittman’s original American Spectator article–which inspired the Koehl response?
Although Koehl presents a far better grasp of the strategic realities on the peninsula than Wittman, the long, detailed exchanges between Koehl and Wittman’s defenders in the comments section of the Wittman article are unusually stimulating. And while I ultimately agree more with Koehl’s viewpoint, he does seem to under-estimate the psychological panic a Northern attack on Seoul would cause. Indeed, his faith in the efficacy of the South Korean civil defense apparatus to contain the panic and greatly minimize casualties is suspect, to say the least.
P.S. Is the spam filter here acting up again? I’ve lost two comments from a while ago, and I don’t think my comments contained anything that would be picked up by spam filters…
Jack,
I referenced the discussion at the American Spectator site, because Koehl does elaborate his position in greater scope and detail than his Weekly Standard article. As I am sure you know–and I can testify from personal experience–writing for publication means that you labor under that giant albatross called word limit, and you will necessarily leave out some essential points.
In particular, Koehl explicitly addresses the chemical weapons issue. He claims, if I recall correctly, two basic points. First, Pyongyang would be extremely reluctant to use them, because they fear that a general chemical attack would give the U.S. an excuse to retaliate with nuclear weapons.
Second, he thinks the casualties from a chemical attack would be minimal. In fact, he thinks the North would suffer more from it, because their anti-chemical equipment is far less advanced than those possessed by the American and the South Korean military.
(Note: I am not necessarily agreeing with him, but merely emphasizing that he does at least address potential weaknesses in his article.)
But I generally agree with the main thrust of your argument that Koehl does indeed downplay how catastrophic a 6.25 repeat would be by downplaying things like morale, the degree of havoc that could be wrought by Pyongyang’s vast commando dorces, etc.
In the Lee op-ed, I too was taken aback by the “North is now far ahead of the South in its military capabilities” line as well. I have trouble even contriving a context in which I can place that statement as true.