Lankov in the NYT, on Changing North Korea
My friend Andrei begins by advocating “cultural exchanges” as a means to change North Korea, a topic we’ve often debated in the past. If only such exchanges had the potential he suggests they do. North Korea only permits them on an infinitesimal scale, with people whose loyalty is thoroughly vetted, and when it calculates that the regime-stabilizing financial benefits outweigh the risk that the participants will be corrupted. Look no further than the Kaesong experience, or that of the North Korean cheerleaders who ended up in the gulag.
In that sense, I’m surprised that Andrei doesn’t see how financial pressure supports the goal of opening North Korea by weakening the regime’s capacities to repress and isolate, forcing more of the regime’s minions to trade and smuggle to sustain their standard of living, and by shifting the regime’s profit-risk calculations to support more exchanges. Furthermore, with the Obama Administration now pressing the financial constriction of the regime through UNSCR 1874, wouldn’t supporting “exchanges” from which the regime profits financially undermine that policy? Frankly, if I were driving Treasury’s sanctions, I’d sic the dogs on the assets of Koryo Tours and the Korean Friendship Association, both of which funnel money to the regime and enable its profiteering from mass child abuse which contributes nothing to our understanding of North Korea, or to North Korea’s understanding of us.
Because of the regime’s success at controlling them, cultural exchanges are responsible for a tiny percentage of what North Koreans see about the outside world. On the other hand, Andrei makes a great deal of sense when he begins to speak of non-permissive engagement, the kind that appears to be responsible for the vast majority of subversive information that passes before the eyes of North Koreans today:
As during the Cold War, radio broadcasts remain a reliable method of disseminating information, and an increasing number of tunable radios are being smuggled into North Korea. Videos and DVDs smuggled from South Korea are watched widely. It makes sense, then, to support the production of documentaries that inform North Koreans about daily social and economic life in South Korea, contemporary history and political matters such as reunification. And instead of continuing its current harmful ban in the sale of Pentium-class personal computers, the United States should encourage their spread inside North Korea.
Broadly, the U.S. government can take part in cultivating a political opposition and alternative elite that could one day replace the current regime. Due to many factors, those few North Koreans who are politically aware hardly constitute a community of dissenting intellectuals. An increasing number of North Koreans have doubts about the system, but they remain isolated and terrified. Washington should focus, therefore, on aiding the dissident community in South Korea, where some 16,000 North Korean defectors live.
Combining engagement, information dissemination and support for ĂŠmigrĂŠss is the only way to promote change. This approach, however, might be a hard sell to most Americans. It is likely to bring about only incremental change — at least until the situation reaches a breaking point, which could be years away.
He is also right that it will take years for this strategy to work. Fortunately, the process of infiltrating North Korea with South Korean DVD’s and other media is fairly advanced. But DVD’s alone won’t present North Koreans with a well-formed idea of what a better government would look like, nor will any challenge to the regime be effective as long as North Korea is a political ice cube tray, with each mind, village, and town isolated from the others.
I don’t know if anyone has seen this but you might like to comment on it:
Did somebody say minced beef?
Bernice Han, Agence France-Presse
Published: Wednesday, October 14, 2009
See here.
Sorry to be off-tangent.
I think it’s the non-story of the year, and have commented accordingly.
I apologise for wasting your time.
It’s not completely O/T, but it says nothing whatsoever about North Korea changing. North Korea comes up with these displays on occasion to throw a bone to people who say that there are closet reformers waiting in the wings, if only we’d give the regime enough goodies to empower them.
Try ordering a hamburger in Chongjin or Hungnam. You won’t find one. This is for external consumption.
Anything we do to elevate the status of, prolong the existence of, or sustain the current North Korean regime is unforgivably evil.
Just as the millions of starvation victims in Central Africa are the direct result of the UN and Jimmy Carter forcing Zimbabwe to accept Robert Mugabe, the deaths caused by the Norks are the direct result of those who supply them with money, food, and oil…
Even the so-called “Six-Party Talks” caused pointless deaths.
Let them be ostracized and fail. The Russians and Chinese laugh at us for our continued appeasement of the only fat guy in Korea north of the DMZ…
If one is serious about isolating Pyongyang, one should at least view the Singaporean fast food venture with some concern. One reason one wants economic exchanges is for the North Koreans to learn how to run an globalized economy. But, in a country where the military is constitutionally preeminent, any knowledge would benefit the armed forces. I doubt the North Koreans can run and maintain a modern food system that these restaurants need. Even if the military can do it, I doubt the food is safe by any standard. The news also shows what corporations, which back these publications, want – more openness, not isolation. An isolated country isn’t good for news.
Lankov had it right, Stanton (once again, not surprisingly) had it wrong. Since when did “financial pressure” and sanctions ever work? Cuba, Iraq, Libya, Myanmar and countless other examples have all proven that sanctions don’t work. The poor North Korean people will end up getting the brunt of it while the DPRK government will continue to survive and thrive. Actually sanctions give the DPRK authorities the perfect excuse to tell the North Korean people that the hardship they are experiencing is caused completely by the nasty Americans and their pesky allies, the Dear Leader has no part in it.
Stanton, unless you favor sending an invasion army to Pyongyang (and getting screwed along the way), I’d say you’d better listen to your “dear friend” Lankov on this one.
Juche, Exactly what fact or event proves the point you’re attempting to make? I’ve always said sanctions would take time to work, but they are already showing some signs of working. The more we impose sanctions, the more conciliatory the North Koreans seem. Admittedly, that’s only going to work to a point if North Korea isn’t willing to disarm (it isn’t) but hopefully, we’ll intensify them enough to slow the regime’s WMD development and destabilize the regime. No doubt you suggest going back to financing North Korea’s WMD programs, which suits China’s interests just fine, but which had absolutely no success at disarming North Korea.
Incidentally, I’ve always opposed direct military action, but you’d have to have actually read my views to know that.
You had one other comment that went into the moderation cue. It was stupid, so I deleted it. Reread the house rules, especially the part about my unwillingness to allow stupid comments to drive out intelligent comments. I don’t have to put up with a lot of ChiBot comment spam from someone who can’t even cite facts, make coherent arguments, or make his arguments civilly. Go do that on Sina or better yet, start your own blog. You’re in permanent moderation, meaning if you actually say something rational or cited by credible authority, I’ll approve your comment.
Actually sanctions give the DPRK authorities the perfect excuse to tell the North Korean people that the hardship they are experiencing is caused completely by the [imperialist] Americans and their [running dog] allies, the Dear Leader has no part in it.
With apologies for the corrections to Juche C.M.’s prose to render it more idiomatic to the North Korean milieu (although it would be better if I could recall the Korean phrase for “running dog” — “sadae-ist” perhaps?) — the above point would appear to be a central contradiction between the two of you which I would love to see worked out myself.
I suppose J.C.M.’s point is almost impossible to _prove_ — and defectors outside the system are unlikely to provide him with supporting evidence. But for the masses inside North Korea, I wonder if the story is different. Having just emerged from a couple days of reading U.S./ROK leaflets dropped on the North (along with megatons of bombs) during the Korean War, I suppose I can see how the “blame it on the imperialists” framework could still work to a degree for the Kim regime.
It’s an important question insofar as you are going to have a population of very disaffected individuals if/when North Korea cracks open, and axiomatic anti-US sentiment should, to the extent possible, be avoided. At the same time, maybe it doesn’t matter at all — Pyongyang is going to do whatever it wants to its population while redircting the blame elsewhere.
But having gone back to your original post, I can see you’ve put together a logic on the cultural exchange front that is worth mulling over. Perhaps this is the logic to which Obama administration is also committed?
In that sense, I’m surprised that Andrei doesn’t see how financial pressure supports the goal of opening North Korea by weakening the regime’s capacities to repress and isolate, forcing more of the regime’s minions to trade and smuggle to sustain their standard of living, and by shifting the regime’s profit-risk calculations to support more exchanges.
In conclusion, in spite of his impertinence I hope comrade Juchechosunmansei will be allowed to ply his gadfly perspectives here every so often. He brought some solid data to the table on the forest fire thing, and at the very least he got me back to your original argument on Lankov, which is valuable in my book. Maybe you think he just needs more citations?
Would that be one ply or two ply?
Stanton, let’s have some common sense here, shall we?
Show me just one, just one example where sanctions actually worked.
They certainly didn’t work in Cuba, Iraq (pre-US invasion), Libya and Myanmar.
“Showing some signs of working”? What signs Stanton?
To me the DPRK is as defiant as ever and there are no signs showing that they will denuclearize at all. The only positive sign, which is the Dear Leader telling the Chinese Premier Wen Jiaobao that the DPRK would consider coming back to the 6-party talks IF the outcome between the DPRK-US talk is positive enough, was secured by China bribing the Dear Leader to make it happen. Nevertheless it IS a step forward.
I don’t see what the Americans can achieve by simply playing tough. The Americans have been playing tough for decades. Clinton didn’t get the DPRK to sign the Agreed Framework in 1994 by only playing tough.
That’s why I was saying Obama doesn’t really have a North Korea policy. If he does, it is apparently not working.
Tell me again Stanton, exactly how do you “slow the regime’s WMD development and destabilize the regime”? By imposing sanctions again?
FYI the DPRK has been under sanctions for more than a decade and it has not budged.
I certainly understand why you want to destablize the DPRK government, however don’t expect the Chinese and even the South Koreans to come on board.
It is easy for you Americans to do stuff to destablize country A and country B in regions far away, the neighbors will have to suffer the direct consequences of a country getting destablized. Neither China nor South Korea wants the DPRK to destablize and collapse all of sudden.
And for the Nth time Stanton, explain to me (and with some facts and sources) why it is in China’s interest to have a nuclear DPRK.
Explain to me why China has been eager to re-start the 6-party talks. Explain to me why China is trying to persuade the US and the DPRK to come together and have an one-on-one. Why is China doing all of these if China simply wants to go ahead and allow the DPRK to stay nuclear?
It is funny that you accused me of not “citing facts, making coherent arguments, or making arguments civilly”. What facts have you cited to show that there are signs of the sanctions working? What facts have you cited to show that China not only tolerates but actually wants a nuclear DPRK?
And if what I wrote yesterday was too much for you, too bad Stanton. I was merely trying to make the point that (1) the US should sit down with the DPRK to have an one-on-one and (2) don’t be so hypocritical to accuse China of violating a UN resolution while overlooking the fact that US has done it too, many times.
I didn’t know that your blog doesn’t allow different opinions.
In a way you are like the Chinese President who just wants a harmonious place.
I agree with J.C.M. that the US should sit down with the DPRK to have a one-on-one — the exact nature of this one-on-one is key, however, to destabilzing the present regime. Let’s be smart instead of gullible – focus on the vilest aspect of the present regime: the concentration camps – know that this is their achille’s heel – use the technology that we have to finally expose them – this is what they fear most. Appeal to the conscience of the international community to do something more than what has been done with respect to providing safe havens and an ultimate high tech “underground raliroad” for the hapless victims that have been crying for our help in securing their freedom for too long.
I still can’t believe we’re not doing this – if the technology is classified, just use it to do something soon!