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Is There Still a Case for Food Aid to North Korea?

I’ve generally been underwhelmed by the performance of the Human Rights Industry when it comes to North Korea, but Kay Seok of Human Rights Watch is a bright light in this dreary landscape. Writing in the Wall Street Journal, Seok finds the regime’s misappropriation of its resources on a Kimjongilia flower festival to be “outrageous” at a time when “North Koreans may face the worst food shortage since a famine claimed a million lives in the 1990s.” But if that is so — and most recent predictions of large-scale famine in North Korea, including mine, have been wrong — then how does Seok justify what follows: a call for the resumption of food aid that the donors don’t know will feed those who need it most?

Seok answers the obvious question by stating, a bit sheepishly, that “there is some precedent for meaningful, if not optimal, monitoring of food aid.” By setting the bar as low as this, Seok manages to make an arguably true statement, but the “meaningful” monitoring was short-lived, required very hard bargaining, and lasted no longer than the aid’s overall usefulness to the regime itself. Then, in late 2005, the regime slashed the program by two-thirds. Since then, of course, it has evicted American food aid workers and refused a large offer of U.S. government food aid.

More broadly, Seok cannot argue — even with the best of intentions — against a long history of North Korea resisting not only monitoring, but the aid itself. As Seok seems to acknowledge, food is cheaper that a lot of the other things North Korea prefers to buy with its money. North Korea has the means to feed its people; it’s the will that’s lacking:

The markets in North Korea have finally stabilized due to increased food rations which have gone up by 80% nationwide, according to a source on April 2. Except for those who work at farms, 80% of North Korean citizens receive rations, 600g for adults and 300g for students. Given farmers take up 20-30% of the population, 60% of the population is receiving rations.

This is unprecedented; such distributions have not been handed out since the Arduous March.

Our source stated that rations have been distributed since February 16 in almost all areas, including Pyongyang, Shin-ui-ju, Sariwon, Musan, and Chungjin. Additionally, the rations will be distributed at least until Kim Il-Sung’s Birthday on April 15, and the price of food will not rise for a month. The source stated that the food seems to have come from Storage #2 in order to support the public since the failed currency reform, which has caused famine in many parts of the country.

The price of food has dropped since the distribution of rations. On April 2, the rice price was 300g per kg. On April 1, rice was 280Won per kg in Pyongyang. Compared to the rice price on March 8 which was at 1,300 won, the rice price fell by 70%. Corn price has also stabilized at 120-150 Won per kg. [Open News]

No one knows if this will last, of course. Sadly, the regime’s will to feed the people is a function of its perception that the lack of food threatens the stability of the regime (Seok also draws this link). It probably isn’t coincidental that the outpouring of rations coincides with reports of rising discontent. In that case, might the regime be more inclined to feed its people if the people were more politically empowered to resist and destabilize the regime? And if North Korea lacks the will to feed its own people (the better to buy their allegiance), why would it let us feed them?

Regular readers of this site know that I’ve long been supportive, in principle, of giving food aid. Nothing that caused the misery of the North Korean people is their fault, after all, and monitored food aid is one of the few potentially effective means of “engagement” I can imagine. But the more time passes, the more convinced I become that food aid has little impact on North Korea’s food situation anyway, at least in comparison to markets.

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7 Responses

  1. I haven’t seen the data (if it even access), but the anecdotal evidence I’ve heard suggests that a longitudinal analysis of food aid, and most important, the access related to food aid, is one of progress rather than prohibition. Furthermore, no one is really sure how much is diverted, or where it goes to. I don’t have the book beside me, but I think I remember Haggard and Noland mentioning that the figure was around 25% – which means that 75% of it does go to the intended recipients. Furthermore, that 25% may not necessarily go to the regime itself, but may even fuel the very markets you (and I) applaud.

    Unfortunately, this 25% is translated into a political question, ie. “is it worth the cost of doing business to have 25% of this diverted?” Translated again, the bigger political football becomes, “is it worth the cost of business to save Pyongyang the opportunity costs of feeding its own people.” Some may argue yes; I cannot with good conscience do so.

  2. Inasmuch as conscience compels North Koreans to reject the idolatry of Jucheism, they are at least in some part responsible for their own privations. God gave man a mind and a conscience. Denying food aid to perpetuate Juche enslavement of millions of people is a moral good, even though it results in much suffering. Jucheism is an objectively moral evil and no empty stomach can justify the damnation of so many beloved souls.

  4. Oh, this is rich: apparently there are 1,000 ‘millionaires’ (USD equivalent) living in the capital city of the Worker’s Paradise:

    Well-to-do North Koreans have been hoarding South Korean goods since a disastrous currency reform, Open Radio for North Korea said Wednesday.

    “Wealthy people in Pyongyang prefer goods to cash as they have lost confidence in the North Korean currency since the reform,” it said. “Demand for South Korean goods, which are considered best quality, has more than doubled.”

    The broadcaster quoted a Korean-Chinese trader dealing with the North as saying, “Growing numbers of people want to smuggle South Korean products and sell them in the North despite a crackdown by North Korean customs.” It said the widespread perception among North Koreans is that South Korean goods are of much better quality than Japanese or Chinese products.

    Sinuiju Customs Office lets small quantities of South Korean goods that do not seem to be for sale pass through on condition that they do not carry “Made in Korea” labels, but is strict about seizing larger quantities.

    Favorite products include luxury goods like necklaces and earrings, electronic home appliances such as TV sets, DVD players, digital cameras, and notebook computers, toiletries, air fresheners, and clothing.

    Pyongyang is believed to be home to an estimated 1,000 dollar millionaires, the radio station said.

    Comrade! Can you spare a Samsung laptop?

  5. I think her anecdotal evidence combined with the clustering of starvation during the 1994 famine among certain provinces and certain class of people indicate that North Korea uses the lack of food as a policy tool. Starving people find it hard to cause rebellions. Decreasing food supply has the converse effect of centralizing power in North Korea when food is centrally distributed. Hence, the regime rejects food aid because it sees it as detrimental to its control (even when it is partially diverted).

    I think the discussion so far centers on the government having a unified view of food aid. I think some sectors of Pyongyang benefits from food aid at an individual level – officials who get a cut of the aid by selling it. These individuals can facilitate aid delivery often without too much oversight from the top leadership, often by directing it to areas that are less controlled by the KPA (some areas fall under direct jurisdiction of the KPA and others are much more controlled by the party).

  6. I believe Muntarbhorn reported last year that North Korea’s food imports increased, presumably through heavily-subsidized prices from China. What is unclear is where the NK regime got the money to pay for these imports – this is speculation but it is probably from its illicit activities.

    Additionally, North Korea hasn’t refused US aid – it’s more that the US has withheld pledged-food aid, demanding that a certain number of Korean-speaking WFP workers to ensure transparency and accountability. Literally thousands of tons of aid are being withheld for nominal, minimal improvements in transparency.

    [This is factually incorrect. – Joshua]

    As of November 2009, the US and NK have apparently been in negotiations about this, but seeing as that there hasn’t been any news about the delivery of the aid, I’m assuming it hasn’t been delivered yet.

    In any case, whatever happened to the ideal/policy that food aid should be irrespective of political circumstances? And what the hell is Special Envoy Bob King doing? Where the hell is Bob King anyway?